This makes the implementation less likely to provide useful timing
information to potential attackers from comparisons of information
received from a remote device and private material known only by the
authorized devices.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This makes the implementation less likely to provide useful timing
information to potential attackers from comparisons of information
received from a remote device and private material known only by the
authorized devices.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This makes the implementation less likely to provide useful timing
information to potential attackers from comparisons of information
received from a remote device and private material known only by the
authorized devices.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This makes the implementation less likely to provide useful timing
information to potential attackers from comparisons of information
received from a remote device and private material known only by the
authorized devices.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This makes the implementation less likely to provide useful timing
information to potential attackers from comparisons of information
received from a remote device and private material known only by the
authorized devices.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This makes the implementation less likely to provide useful timing
information to potential attackers from comparisons of information
received from a remote device and private material known only by the
authorized devices.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This makes the implementation less likely to provide useful timing
information to potential attackers from comparisons of information
received from a remote device and private material known only by the
authorized devices.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Instead of using implicit limit based on 16-bit unsigned integer having
a maximum value of 65535, limit the maximum length of a fragmented
EAP-pwd message explicitly to 15000 bytes. None of the supported groups
use longer messages, so it is fine to reject any longer message without
even trying to reassemble it. This will hopefully also help in reducing
false warnings from static analyzers (CID 68124).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This makes it easier for static analyzers to figure out which code paths
are possible within eap_sim_msg_finish() for EAP-SIM. This will
hopefully avoid some false warnings (CID 68110, CID 68113, CID 68114).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Use size_t instead of int for storing and comparing the TLV length
against the remaining buffer length to make this easier for static
analyzers to understand.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Since there is a limit on the EAP exchange due to maximum number of
roundtrips, there is no point in allowing excessively large buffers to
be allocated based on what the peer device claims the total message to
be. Instead, reject the message if it would not be possible to receive
it in full anyway.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
If the peer provides a username with large part of it being non-ASCII
characters, the previously used buffers may not have been long enough to
include the full string in debug logs and database search due to forced
truncation of the string by printf_encode(). Avoid this by increasing
the buffer sizes to fit in the maximum result.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Previously, hostapd had to be started with at least one of the
configuration files enabling TNC for TNC to be usable. Change this to
allow TNC to be enabled when the first interface with TNC enabled gets
added during runtime.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This is for enabling easier testing of TNCS/TNCC functionality as part
of the test scripts without having to use the fixed /etc/tnc_config
location that could be used by the main system and would require changes
within /etc.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
RFC 5106 is not exactly clear on the requirements for the "no data"
packet that is used to acknowledge a fragmented message. Allow it to be
processed without the integrity checksum data field since it is possible
to interpret the RFC as this not being included. This fixes reassembly
of fragmented frames after keys have been derived.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
If invalid group was negotiated, compute_password_element() left some of
the data->grp pointer uninitialized and this could result in
segmentation fault when deinitializing the EAP method. Fix this by
explicitly clearing all the pointer with eap_zalloc(). In addition,
speed up EAP failure reporting in this type of error case by indicating
that the EAP method execution cannot continue anymore on the peer side
instead of waiting for a timeout.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
If fragmentation is used, the temporary inbuf/outbuf could have been
leaked in error cases (e.g., reaching maximum number of roundtrips).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
"user" MACACL "password" style lines in the eap_user file can now be
used to configured user entries for RADIUS-based MAC ACL.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The internal TLS server implementation and RADIUS server implementation
in hostapd can be configured to allow EAP clients to be tested to
perform TLS validation steps correctly. This functionality is not
included in the default build; CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS=y in
hostapd/.config can be used to enable this.
When enabled, the RADIUS server will configure special TLS test modes
based on the received User-Name attribute value in this format:
<user>@test-tls-<id>.<rest-of-realm>. For example,
anonymous@test-tls-1.example.com. When this special format is used, TLS
test modes are enabled. For other cases, the RADIUS server works
normally.
The following TLS test cases are enabled in this commit:
1 - break verify_data in the server Finished message
2 - break signed_params hash in ServerKeyExchange
3 - break Signature in ServerKeyExchange
Correctly behaving TLS client must abort connection if any of these
failures is detected and as such, shall not transmit continue the
session.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This allows the internal TLS implementation to write log entries to the
same authlog with rest of the RADIUS server and EAP server
functionality.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This extends the design already available for Access-Request packets to
the RADIUS server and Access-Accept messages. Each user entry can be
configured to add arbitrary RADIUS attributes.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
The new hostapd.conf parameter subscr_remediation_url can be used to
define the URL of the Subscription Remediation Server that will be added
in a WFA VSA to Access-Accept message if the SQLite user database
indicates that the user need subscription remediation.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
If the connection from hostapd authentication server to hlr_auc_gw fails
due to hlr_auc_gw not running yet, the local socket file was left
behind. Delete the socket file on connect() failure path.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
PEAPv2 implementation was not fully completed and there does not seem to
be any deployments of PEAPv2 nor any clear sign of such showing up in
the future either. As such, there is not much point in maintaining this
implementation in hostapd/wpa_supplicant.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This should probably have used monotonic time for entry timestamps, but
as those aren't used at all right now, so just remove them entirely.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Allow another EAP method to be tried if one of the enabled methods
fails. If all the remaining methods fail, reject connection by adding a
new METHOD_REQUEST -> FAILURE transition. Previously, this case resulted
in the state machine trying to send a message when none was available
and then waiting for a following event until timeout.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
It was possible to configure hostapd in a way that could try to
initialize a TLS-based EAP method even when TLS library context was not
initialized (e.g., due to not configuring server or CA certificate).
Such a case could potentially result in NULL pointer dereference in the
TLS library, so check for this condition and reject EAP method
initialization.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Commit 8a9f58f2cc ("EAP-AKA server: Store
permanent username in session data") broke AUTS processing by skipping
new authentication triplet fetch after having reported AUTS. Fix this by
started new full authentication sequence immediately after reporting
AUTS so that the updated parameters are available for the Challenge
message.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The new server_id parameter in hostapd.conf can now be used to specify
which identity is delivered to the EAP peer with EAP methods that
support authenticated server identity.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
There are quite a few places in the current implementation where a nul
terminated string is generated from binary data. Add a helper function
to simplify the code a bit.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Commit 68a41bbb44 broke fallback from
reauth id to fullauth id by not allowing a second AKA/Identity round to
be used after having received unrecognized reauth_id in the first round.
Fix this by allowing fullauth id to be requested in such a case.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
If identity round limit is reached, EAP-SIM/AKA session is terminated.
This needs to free the allocated message.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
While the existing code already addresses TLS Message Length validation
for both EAP-TLS peer and server side, this adds explicit checks and
rejection of invalid messages in the functions handling reassembly. This
does not change externally observable behavior in case of EAP server.
For EAP peer, this starts rejecting invalid messages instead of
addressing them by reallocating the buffer (i.e., ignoring TLS Message
Length in practice).
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
EAP-TLS/PEAP/TTLS/FAST server implementation did not validate TLS
Message Length value properly and could end up trying to store more
information into the message buffer than the allocated size if the first
fragment is longer than the indicated size. This could result in hostapd
process terminating in wpabuf length validation. Fix this by rejecting
messages that have invalid TLS Message Length value.
This would affect cases that use the internal EAP authentication server
in hostapd either directly with IEEE 802.1X or when using hostapd as a
RADIUS authentication server and when receiving an incorrectly
constructed EAP-TLS message. Cases where hostapd uses an external
authentication are not affected.
Thanks to Timo Warns for finding and reporting this issue.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
intended-for: hostap-1
The EAP-SIM/AKA code is already validating the prefix and the following
lookup would not find matches if the prefix is incorrect, so there is no
need for the extra checks here.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
If EAP-Response/Identity includes a known pseudonym or re-auth username,
skip the AKA/Identity exchange since we already know the permanent
username of the peer.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
RFC 4186, chapter 6.3.3 mandates that EAP-Failure is used only after
Client-Error and Notification messages. Convert the direct jumps to the
FAILURE state with a notification round before sending out EAP-Failure.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
If the peer rejects re-authentication with AT_COUNTER_TOO_SMALL, fall
back to full authentication to allow the authentication session to be
completed.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
These fields are used only as the search key, so the value is already
known and does not need to be copied from the database.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Store permanent username (i.e., including prefix character) instead of
IMSI in the SQLite DB. Convert the string to a string since the EAP-AKA
prefix can start with zero. This cleans up the field names since the
value was already with the prefix included instead of just IMSI. In
addition, this explicitly removes some theoretical cases where the
different identity types could have been mixed.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Since the EAP-SIM/AKA identities are ASCII strings, there is no need to
use more complex way for storing and passing them. In addition, be more
strict about enforcing username (i.e., no realm part) to be used in the
EAP-SIM DB API. Similarly, require specific username type instead of any
of the types to be used as the key in the pseudonym and reauth
operations. This allows simpler lookup operations to be used.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Since we always request an identity in the request, the response
has to include AT_IDENTITY. This allows the AKA/Identity response
processing to be simplified a bit.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
There is no need to use eap_sim_db_identity_known() here since a new
AKA/Identity message is built only if the identity in the previous
response was not recognized. The first round is always used to request
AT_ANY_ID_REQ to meet the RFC 4187 recommendation on EAP method specific
identity request.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Since we always request an identity in the request, the response
has to include AT_IDENTITY. This allows the SIM/Start response
processing to be simplified a bit.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
There is no need to use eap_sim_db_identity_known() here since a new
SIM/Start message is built only if the identity in the previous response
was not recognized. The first round will always request AT_ANY_ID_REQ to
meet the RFC 4186 recommendation on EAP method specific identity request
being used.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The reauth_id prefix can be used to determine which AKA version is used,
so there is no need to store the aka_prime information in a separate
field.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
If hostapd is built and configured to use SQLite database, store
EAP-SIM/AKA reauth data into the database to allow this to persist
over hostapd restarts.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This allows hostapd to use an SQLite database for storing EAP-SIM/AKA
pseudonyms over process restarts. CONFIG_SQLITE=y build option adds
support for this and the SQLite database file is specified in eap_sib_db
configuration parameter.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This EAP type uses a vendor specific expanded EAP header to encapsulate
EAP-TLS with a configuration where the EAP server does not authenticate
the EAP peer. In other words, this method includes only server
authentication. The peer is configured with only the ca_cert parameter
(similarly to other TLS-based EAP methods). This method can be used for
cases where the network provides free access to anyone, but use of RSN
with a securely derived unique PMK for each station is desired.
The expanded EAP header uses the hostapd/wpa_supplicant vendor
code 39068 and vendor type 1 to identify the UNAUTH-TLS method.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The previous implementation was able to re-open the connection to an
external program (e.g., hlr_auc_gw) when needed, but required the
connection to be available during startup. Extend this to allow the
initial failure, so that hlr_auc_gw can be started after hostapd.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
All the TNC base64 operations are within tncs.c, so there is no point in
including base64.h into eap_server_tnc.c.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
If the os_malloc() call for the User-Name value fails in EAP-TTLS
server, the inner MSCHAPv2 processing could have tried to dereference a
NULL pointer. Avoid this by handling this cleanly as an internal error
and reject the authentication attempt.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
intended-for: hostap-1
These validation steps are already done in the EAP parsing code and in
the EAP methods, but the additional check is defensive programming and
can make the validation of received EAP messages more easier to
understand.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
If the peer uses an unknown reauth id, it would still be possible to use
pseudonym instead of permanent id. Allow this by changing the
AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ to AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ in case unknown reauth id is
used in EAP-Response/Identity.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
There was a technical change between the last IETF draft version
(draft-arkko-eap-aka-kdf-10) and RFC 5448 in the leading characters
used in the username (i.e., use unique characters for EAP-AKA' instead
of reusing the EAP-AKA ones). This commit updates EAP-AKA' server and
peer implementations to use the leading characters based on the final
RFC.
Note: This will make EAP-AKA' not interoperate between the earlier
draft version and the new version.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
intended-for: hostap-1
Incorrect identity string could end up being used with EAP-AKA' when
the EAP client is using pseudonym. This code was supposed to use
sm->identity just like the EAP-AKA case.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
intended-for: hostap-1
AT_NEXT_PSEUDONYM is supposed to be included only in the Challenge
messages, not in the Re-authentication messages. This attribute was
incorrectly included in the Re-authentication messages and could have
been used to update the pseudonym state on the server without the peer
updating its state.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
intended-for: hostap-1
Remove the GPL notification text from EAP-pwd implementation per
approval from Dan Harkins who contributed these files.
(email from Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org> dated
Wed, 4 Jan 2012 16:25:48 -0800)
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Fix start of reauthentication after failed authentication with
passthrough (external AAA server) to use internal EAP Identity method.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This reverts commit 204dd3f420.
start_reauth was not supposed to be used in this way and setting it
to TRUE in INITIALIZE breaks internal EAP server.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Make sure sign extension does not end up getting used here by
explicitly type casting the variables to correct size.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Previously, sm->start_reauth was set to TRUE in SUCCESS2 state to force
reauthentication to start with EAP identity request. This works fine for
the case of EAP success through the AAA passthrough authentication, but
is not enough to handle passthrough authentication failure. sm->identity
is set in that case and getDecision would return PASSTHROUGH instead of
CONTINUE (to Identity method).
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
While the copy is not used as a null terminated string, this can prevent
some static analyzers from complaining about non-issue.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Prepare for multiple TLS PRF functions by renaming the SHA1+MD5 based
TLS PRF function to more specific name and add tls_prf() within the
internal TLS implementation as a wrapper for this for now.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This structure was not really used for anything apart from figuring out
length of the EAP-pwd header (and even that in a way that would not work
with fragmentation). Since the bitfields in the structure could have
been problematic depending on target endianness, remove this unnecessary
structure.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Another niceness of OpenSSL is that if the high-order bit of a 521-bit
big num is not set then BN_bn2bin() will just return 65 bytes instead of
66 bytes with the 1st (big endian, after all) being all zero. When this
happens the wrong number of octets are mixed into function H(). So
there's a whole bunch of "offset" computations and BN_bn2bin() dumps the
big number into a buffer + offset. That should be obvious in the patch
too.
