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pineapple-src/externals/libressl/ssl/ssl_srvr.c
pineappleEA caa0c2911b early-access version 2698
2022-04-24 22:29:35 +02:00

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/* $OpenBSD: ssl_srvr.c,v 1.141 2022/02/05 14:54:10 jsing Exp $ */
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
*
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
* openssl-core@openssl.org.
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ====================================================================
*
* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
*
* Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
* SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
*
* The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
* license provided above.
*
* ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
* Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
*
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
*
* The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
* Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
* license.
*
* The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
* Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
* support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
*
* No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
* the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
* expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
*
* No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
* infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
* party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
* to make use of the Contribution.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
* ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
* SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
* OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
* OTHERWISE.
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/curve25519.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/hmac.h>
#include <openssl/md5.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
#include <openssl/gost.h>
#endif
#include "bytestring.h"
#include "dtls_locl.h"
#include "ssl_locl.h"
#include "ssl_sigalgs.h"
#include "ssl_tlsext.h"
int
ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
{
unsigned long alg_k;
int new_state, state, skip = 0;
int listen = 0;
int ret = -1;
ERR_clear_error();
errno = 0;
if (SSL_is_dtls(s))
listen = s->d1->listen;
/* init things to blank */
s->internal->in_handshake++;
if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))
SSL_clear(s);
if (SSL_is_dtls(s))
s->d1->listen = listen;
for (;;) {
state = s->s3->hs.state;
switch (s->s3->hs.state) {
case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
s->internal->renegotiate = 1;
/* s->s3->hs.state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
s->server = 1;
ssl_info_callback(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
if (!ssl_legacy_stack_version(s, s->version)) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
if (!ssl_supported_tls_version_range(s,
&s->s3->hs.our_min_tls_version,
&s->s3->hs.our_max_tls_version)) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE);
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
if (!ssl3_setup_init_buffer(s)) {
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
s->internal->init_num = 0;
if (s->s3->hs.state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) {
/*
* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO
* so that the output is sent in a way that
* TCP likes :-)
*/
if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) {
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
if (!tls1_transcript_init(s)) {
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
s->ctx->internal->stats.sess_accept++;
} else if (!SSL_is_dtls(s) && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
/*
* Server attempting to renegotiate with
* client that doesn't support secure
* renegotiation.
*/
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
ret = -1;
goto end;
} else {
/*
* s->s3->hs.state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
* we will just send a HelloRequest.
*/
s->ctx->internal->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
s->internal->shutdown = 0;
if (SSL_is_dtls(s)) {
dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
dtls1_start_timer(s);
}
ret = ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
if (SSL_is_dtls(s))
s->s3->hs.tls12.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
else
s->s3->hs.tls12.next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
s->internal->init_num = 0;
if (SSL_is_dtls(s)) {
if (!tls1_transcript_init(s)) {
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
s->s3->hs.state = SSL_ST_OK;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
s->internal->shutdown = 0;
if (SSL_is_dtls(s)) {
ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
dtls1_stop_timer(s);
if (ret == 1 &&
(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE))
s->s3->hs.state = DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A;
else
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
s->internal->init_num = 0;
/*
* Reflect ClientHello sequence to remain
* stateless while listening.
*/
if (listen) {
tls12_record_layer_reflect_seq_num(
s->internal->rl);
}
/* If we're just listening, stop here */
if (listen && s->s3->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) {
ret = 2;
s->d1->listen = 0;
/*
* Set expected sequence numbers to
* continue the handshake.
*/
s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 2;
s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 1;
s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 1;
goto end;
}
} else {
if (s->internal->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP) {
ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
}
s->internal->renegotiate = 2;
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
s->internal->init_num = 0;
}
break;
case DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A:
case DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B:
ret = ssl3_send_dtls_hello_verify_request(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
s->s3->hs.tls12.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
/* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC. */
tls1_transcript_reset(s);
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
if (SSL_is_dtls(s)) {
s->internal->renegotiate = 2;
dtls1_start_timer(s);
}
ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
if (s->internal->hit) {
if (s->internal->tlsext_ticket_expected)
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
else
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
} else {
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
}
s->internal->init_num = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
/* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH. */
if (!(s->s3->hs.cipher->algorithm_auth &
SSL_aNULL)) {
if (SSL_is_dtls(s))
dtls1_start_timer(s);
ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
if (s->internal->tlsext_status_expected)
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
else
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
} else {
skip = 1;
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
}
s->internal->init_num = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
alg_k = s->s3->hs.cipher->algorithm_mkey;
/*
* Only send if using a DH key exchange.
*
* For ECC ciphersuites, we send a ServerKeyExchange
* message only if the cipher suite is ECDHE. In other
* cases, the server certificate contains the server's
* public key for key exchange.
*/
if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE|SSL_kECDHE)) {
if (SSL_is_dtls(s))
dtls1_start_timer(s);
ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
} else
skip = 1;
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
s->internal->init_num = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
/*
* Determine whether or not we need to request a
* certificate.
*
* Do not request a certificate if:
*
* - We did not ask for it (SSL_VERIFY_PEER is unset).
*
* - SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set and we are
* renegotiating.
*
* - We are using an anonymous ciphersuites
* (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
* and in RFC 2246) ... except when the application
* insists on verification (against the specs, but
* s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3).
*/
if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
((s->session->peer_cert != NULL) &&
(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
((s->s3->hs.cipher->algorithm_auth &
SSL_aNULL) && !(s->verify_mode &
SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))) {
/* No cert request. */
skip = 1;
s->s3->hs.tls12.cert_request = 0;
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
if (!SSL_is_dtls(s))
tls1_transcript_free(s);
} else {
s->s3->hs.tls12.cert_request = 1;
if (SSL_is_dtls(s))
dtls1_start_timer(s);
ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
s->internal->init_num = 0;
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
if (SSL_is_dtls(s))
dtls1_start_timer(s);
ret = ssl3_send_server_done(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
s->s3->hs.tls12.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
s->internal->init_num = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
/*
* This code originally checked to see if
* any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
* and then flushed. This caused problems
* as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
* fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
* as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
* still exist. So instead we just flush
* unconditionally.
*/
s->internal->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
if (SSL_is_dtls(s)) {
/* If the write error was fatal, stop trying. */
if (!BIO_should_retry(s->wbio)) {
s->internal->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
s->s3->hs.state = s->s3->hs.tls12.next_state;
}
}
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
s->internal->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
s->s3->hs.state = s->s3->hs.tls12.next_state;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
if (s->s3->hs.tls12.cert_request) {
ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
}
s->internal->init_num = 0;
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
if (SSL_is_dtls(s)) {
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
s->internal->init_num = 0;
}
alg_k = s->s3->hs.cipher->algorithm_mkey;
if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
/*
* A GOST client may use the key from its
* certificate for key exchange, in which case
* the CertificateVerify message is not sent.
*/
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
s->internal->init_num = 0;
} else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)) {
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
s->internal->init_num = 0;
if (!s->session->peer_cert)
break;
/*
* Freeze the transcript for use during client
* certificate verification.
*/
tls1_transcript_freeze(s);
} else {
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
s->internal->init_num = 0;
tls1_transcript_free(s);
/*
* We need to get hashes here so if there is
* a client cert, it can be verified.
*/
if (!tls1_transcript_hash_value(s,
s->s3->hs.tls12.cert_verify,
sizeof(s->s3->hs.tls12.cert_verify),
NULL)) {
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
if (SSL_is_dtls(s))
s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1;
else
s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
/* we should decide if we expected this one */
ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
s->internal->init_num = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
if (SSL_is_dtls(s))
s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1;
else
s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
if (SSL_is_dtls(s))
dtls1_stop_timer(s);
if (s->internal->hit)
s->s3->hs.state = SSL_ST_OK;
else if (s->internal->tlsext_ticket_expected)
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
else
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
s->internal->init_num = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
ret = ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
s->internal->init_num = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
ret = ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
s->internal->init_num = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A, SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
s->internal->init_num = 0;
s->session->cipher = s->s3->hs.cipher;
if (!tls1_setup_key_block(s)) {
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
if (!tls1_change_write_cipher_state(s)) {
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
ret = ssl3_send_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,
SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
if (s->internal->hit) {
s->s3->hs.tls12.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
tls1_transcript_free(s);
} else
s->s3->hs.tls12.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
s->internal->init_num = 0;
break;
case SSL_ST_OK:
/* clean a few things up */
tls1_cleanup_key_block(s);
if (s->s3->handshake_transcript != NULL) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
if (!SSL_is_dtls(s))
ssl3_release_init_buffer(s);
/* remove buffering on output */
ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
s->internal->init_num = 0;
/* Skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest. */
if (s->internal->renegotiate == 2) {
s->internal->renegotiate = 0;
s->internal->new_session = 0;
ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
s->ctx->internal->stats.sess_accept_good++;
/* s->server=1; */
s->internal->handshake_func = ssl3_accept;
ssl_info_callback(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
}
ret = 1;
if (SSL_is_dtls(s)) {
/* Done handshaking, next message is client hello. */
s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0;
/* Next message is server hello. */
s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0;
s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
}
goto end;
/* break; */
default:
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
ret = -1;
goto end;
/* break; */
}
if (!s->s3->hs.tls12.reuse_message && !skip) {
if (s->internal->debug) {
if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
goto end;
}
if (s->s3->hs.state != state) {
new_state = s->s3->hs.state;
s->s3->hs.state = state;
ssl_info_callback(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
s->s3->hs.state = new_state;
}
}
skip = 0;
}
end:
/* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
s->internal->in_handshake--;
ssl_info_callback(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret);
return (ret);
}
int
ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
{
CBB cbb, hello;
memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb));
if (s->s3->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) {
if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &hello,
SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST))
goto err;
if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb))
goto err;
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
}
/* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
err:
CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
return (-1);
}
int
ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
{
CBS cbs, client_random, session_id, cookie, cipher_suites;
CBS compression_methods;
uint16_t client_version;
uint8_t comp_method;
int comp_null;
int i, j, al, ret, cookie_valid = 0;
unsigned long id;
SSL_CIPHER *c;
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
unsigned long alg_k;
const SSL_METHOD *method;
uint16_t shared_version;
/*
* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
* If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
* This down switching should be handled by a different method.
* If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
* TLSv1.
*/
if (s->s3->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
s->internal->first_packet = 1;
if ((ret = ssl3_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) <= 0)
return ret;
s->internal->first_packet = 0;
ret = -1;
if (s->internal->init_num < 0)
goto err;
CBS_init(&cbs, s->internal->init_msg, s->internal->init_num);
/* Parse client hello up until the extensions (if any). */
if (!CBS_get_u16(&cbs, &client_version))
goto decode_err;
if (!CBS_get_bytes(&cbs, &client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE))
goto decode_err;
if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&cbs, &session_id))
goto decode_err;
if (CBS_len(&session_id) > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
goto fatal_err;
}
if (SSL_is_dtls(s)) {
if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&cbs, &cookie))
goto decode_err;
}
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &cipher_suites))
goto decode_err;
if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&cbs, &compression_methods))
goto decode_err;
/*
* Use version from inside client hello, not from record header.
* (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
*/
if (!ssl_max_shared_version(s, client_version, &shared_version)) {
if ((client_version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
!tls12_record_layer_write_protected(s->internal->rl)) {
/*
* Similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote
* version number.
*/
s->version = client_version;
}
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
goto fatal_err;
}
s->s3->hs.peer_legacy_version = client_version;
s->version = shared_version;
s->s3->hs.negotiated_tls_version = ssl_tls_version(shared_version);
if (s->s3->hs.negotiated_tls_version == 0) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if ((method = ssl_get_method(shared_version)) == NULL) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
s->method = method;
/*
* If we require cookies (DTLS) and this ClientHello does not contain
* one, just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
* So check cookie length...
*/
if (SSL_is_dtls(s)) {
if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
if (CBS_len(&cookie) == 0)
return (1);
}
}
if (!CBS_write_bytes(&client_random, s->s3->client_random,
sizeof(s->s3->client_random), NULL))
goto err;
s->internal->hit = 0;
/*
* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
* renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
* ignore resumption requests with flag
* SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag
* rather than a change to default behavior so that applications
* relying on this for security won't even compile against older
* library versions).
*
* 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated()
* to request renegotiation but not a new session (s->internal->new_session
* remains unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
* SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
* ignored.
*/
if ((s->internal->new_session && (s->internal->options &
SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
goto err;
} else {
CBS ext_block;
CBS_dup(&cbs, &ext_block);
i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, &session_id, &ext_block, &al);
if (i == 1) { /* previous session */
s->internal->hit = 1;
} else if (i == -1)
goto fatal_err;
else {
/* i == 0 */
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
goto err;
}
}
if (SSL_is_dtls(s)) {
/*
* The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the HelloVerify
* message has not been sent - make sure that it does not cause
* an overflow.
*/
if (CBS_len(&cookie) > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
goto fatal_err;
}
/* Verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
CBS_len(&cookie) > 0) {
size_t cookie_len;
/* XXX - rcvd_cookie seems to only be used here... */
if (!CBS_write_bytes(&cookie, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie), &cookie_len))
goto err;
if (s->ctx->internal->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
if (s->ctx->internal->app_verify_cookie_cb(s,
s->d1->rcvd_cookie, cookie_len) == 0) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
goto fatal_err;
}
/* else cookie verification succeeded */
/* XXX - can d1->cookie_len > sizeof(rcvd_cookie) ? */
} else if (timingsafe_memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
/* default verification */
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
goto fatal_err;
}
cookie_valid = 1;
}
}
/* XXX - This logic seems wrong... */
if (CBS_len(&cipher_suites) == 0 && CBS_len(&session_id) != 0) {
/* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
goto fatal_err;
}
if (CBS_len(&cipher_suites) > 0) {
if ((ciphers = ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,
&cipher_suites)) == NULL)
goto err;
}
/* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
/* XXX - CBS_len(&cipher_suites) will always be zero here... */
if (s->internal->hit && CBS_len(&cipher_suites) > 0) {
j = 0;
id = s->session->cipher->id;
for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
if (c->id == id) {
j = 1;
break;
}
}
if (j == 0) {
/*
* We need to have the cipher in the cipher
* list if we are asked to reuse it
*/
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
goto fatal_err;
}
}
comp_null = 0;
while (CBS_len(&compression_methods) > 0) {
if (!CBS_get_u8(&compression_methods, &comp_method))
goto decode_err;
if (comp_method == 0)
comp_null = 1;
}
if (comp_null == 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
goto fatal_err;
}
if (!tlsext_server_parse(s, SSL_TLSEXT_MSG_CH, &cbs, &al)) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
goto fatal_err;
}
if (CBS_len(&cbs) != 0)
goto decode_err;
if (!s->s3->renegotiate_seen && s->internal->renegotiate) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
goto fatal_err;
}
if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
goto err;
}
/*
* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
* handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
* server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
* SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation.
*/
arc4random_buf(s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
if (s->s3->hs.our_max_tls_version >= TLS1_2_VERSION &&
s->s3->hs.negotiated_tls_version < s->s3->hs.our_max_tls_version) {
/*
* RFC 8446 section 4.1.3. If we are downgrading from TLS 1.3
* we must set the last 8 bytes of the server random to magical
* values to indicate we meant to downgrade. For TLS 1.2 it is
* recommended that we do the same.
*/
size_t index = SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - sizeof(tls13_downgrade_12);
uint8_t *magic = &s->s3->server_random[index];
if (s->s3->hs.negotiated_tls_version == TLS1_2_VERSION) {
/* Indicate we chose to downgrade to 1.2. */
memcpy(magic, tls13_downgrade_12,
sizeof(tls13_downgrade_12));
} else {
/* Indicate we chose to downgrade to 1.1 or lower */
memcpy(magic, tls13_downgrade_11,
sizeof(tls13_downgrade_11));
}
}
if (!s->internal->hit && s->internal->tls_session_secret_cb) {
SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
if (s->internal->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
&s->session->master_key_length, ciphers, &pref_cipher,
s->internal->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
s->internal->hit = 1;
s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
ciphers = NULL;
/* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
pref_cipher = pref_cipher ? pref_cipher :
ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers,
SSL_get_ciphers(s));
if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
goto fatal_err;
}
s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
}
}
/*
* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
* pick a cipher
*/
if (!s->internal->hit) {
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
if (ciphers == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
goto fatal_err;
}
ciphers = NULL;
c = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers,
SSL_get_ciphers(s));
if (c == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
goto fatal_err;
}
s->s3->hs.cipher = c;
} else {
s->s3->hs.cipher = s->session->cipher;
}
if (!tls1_transcript_hash_init(s))
goto err;
alg_k = s->s3->hs.cipher->algorithm_mkey;
if (!(SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)) ||
!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER))
tls1_transcript_free(s);
/*
* We now have the following setup.
* client_random
* cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
* ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
* compression - basically ignored right now
* ssl version is set - sslv3
* s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
* s->internal->hit - session reuse flag
* s->hs.cipher - the new cipher to use.
*/
/* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
goto err;
}
ret = cookie_valid ? 2 : 1;
if (0) {
decode_err:
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
fatal_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
}
err:
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
return (ret);
}
int
ssl3_send_dtls_hello_verify_request(SSL *s)
{
CBB cbb, verify, cookie;
memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb));
if (s->s3->hs.state == DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A) {
if (s->ctx->internal->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
s->ctx->internal->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
&(s->d1->cookie_len)) == 0) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
/*
* Per RFC 6347 section 4.2.1, the HelloVerifyRequest should
* always contain DTLSv1.0 regardless of the version that is
* going to be negotiated.
*/
if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &verify,
DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST))
goto err;
if (!CBB_add_u16(&verify, DTLS1_VERSION))
goto err;
if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&verify, &cookie))
goto err;
if (!CBB_add_bytes(&cookie, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len))
goto err;
if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb))
goto err;
s->s3->hs.state = DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B;
}
/* s->s3->hs.state = DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B */
return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
err:
CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
return (-1);
}
int
ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
{
CBB cbb, server_hello, session_id;
size_t sl;
memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb));
if (s->s3->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) {
if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &server_hello,
SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO))
goto err;
if (!CBB_add_u16(&server_hello, s->version))
goto err;
if (!CBB_add_bytes(&server_hello, s->s3->server_random,
sizeof(s->s3->server_random)))
goto err;
/*
* There are several cases for the session ID to send
* back in the server hello:
*
* - For session reuse from the session cache,
* we send back the old session ID.
* - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
* is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
* (which doesn't actually identify the session).
* - If it is a new session, we send back the new
* session ID.
* - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
* we send back a 0-length session ID.
*
* s->internal->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
* so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
* to send back.
*/
if (!(s->ctx->internal->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
&& !s->internal->hit)
s->session->session_id_length = 0;
sl = s->session->session_id_length;
if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&server_hello, &session_id))
goto err;
if (!CBB_add_bytes(&session_id, s->session->session_id, sl))
goto err;
/* Cipher suite. */
if (!CBB_add_u16(&server_hello,
ssl3_cipher_get_value(s->s3->hs.cipher)))
goto err;
/* Compression method (null). */
if (!CBB_add_u8(&server_hello, 0))
goto err;
/* TLS extensions */
if (!tlsext_server_build(s, SSL_TLSEXT_MSG_SH, &server_hello)) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb))
goto err;
}
/* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
err:
CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
return (-1);
}
int
ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
{
CBB cbb, done;
memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb));
if (s->s3->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) {
if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &done,
SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE))
goto err;
if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb))
goto err;
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
}
/* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
err:
CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
return (-1);
}
static int
ssl3_send_server_kex_dhe(SSL *s, CBB *cbb)
{
int nid = NID_dhKeyAgreement;
tls_key_share_free(s->s3->hs.key_share);
if ((s->s3->hs.key_share = tls_key_share_new_nid(nid)) == NULL)
goto err;
if (s->cert->dhe_params_auto != 0) {
size_t key_bits;
if ((key_bits = ssl_dhe_params_auto_key_bits(s)) == 0) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
tls_key_share_set_key_bits(s->s3->hs.key_share,
key_bits);
} else {
DH *dh_params = s->cert->dhe_params;
if (dh_params == NULL && s->cert->dhe_params_cb != NULL)
dh_params = s->cert->dhe_params_cb(s, 0,
SSL_C_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->hs.cipher));
if (dh_params == NULL) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!tls_key_share_set_dh_params(s->s3->hs.key_share, dh_params))
goto err;
}
if (!tls_key_share_generate(s->s3->hs.key_share))
goto err;
if (!tls_key_share_params(s->s3->hs.key_share, cbb))
goto err;
if (!tls_key_share_public(s->s3->hs.key_share, cbb))
goto err;
return 1;
err:
return 0;
}
static int
ssl3_send_server_kex_ecdhe(SSL *s, CBB *cbb)
{
CBB public;
int nid;
if ((nid = tls1_get_shared_curve(s)) == NID_undef) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
tls_key_share_free(s->s3->hs.key_share);
if ((s->s3->hs.key_share = tls_key_share_new_nid(nid)) == NULL)
goto err;
if (!tls_key_share_generate(s->s3->hs.key_share))
goto err;
/*
* ECC key exchange - see RFC 8422, section 5.4.
*/
if (!CBB_add_u8(cbb, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE))
goto err;
if (!CBB_add_u16(cbb, tls_key_share_group(s->s3->hs.key_share)))
goto err;
if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(cbb, &public))
goto err;
if (!tls_key_share_public(s->s3->hs.key_share, &public))
goto err;
if (!CBB_flush(cbb))
goto err;
return 1;
err:
return 0;
}
int
ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
CBB cbb, cbb_params, cbb_signature, server_kex;
const struct ssl_sigalg *sigalg = NULL;
unsigned char *signature = NULL;
size_t signature_len = 0;
unsigned char *params = NULL;
size_t params_len;
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
unsigned long type;
EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
int al;
memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb));
memset(&cbb_params, 0, sizeof(cbb_params));
if ((md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
if (s->s3->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &server_kex,
SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE))
goto err;
if (!CBB_init(&cbb_params, 0))
goto err;
type = s->s3->hs.cipher->algorithm_mkey;
if (type & SSL_kDHE) {
if (!ssl3_send_server_kex_dhe(s, &cbb_params))
goto err;
} else if (type & SSL_kECDHE) {
if (!ssl3_send_server_kex_ecdhe(s, &cbb_params))
goto err;
} else {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
goto fatal_err;
}
if (!CBB_finish(&cbb_params, &params, &params_len))
goto err;
if (!CBB_add_bytes(&server_kex, params, params_len))
goto err;
/* Add signature unless anonymous. */
if (!(s->s3->hs.cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)) {
if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->hs.cipher,
&md, &sigalg)) == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
goto fatal_err;
}
s->s3->hs.our_sigalg = sigalg;
/* Send signature algorithm. */
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
if (!CBB_add_u16(&server_kex, sigalg->value)) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto fatal_err;
}
}
if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey)) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
if ((sigalg->flags & SIGALG_FLAG_RSA_PSS) &&
(!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx,
RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) ||
!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, -1))) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx, s->s3->client_random,
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx, s->s3->server_random,
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx, params, params_len)) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(md_ctx, NULL, &signature_len) ||
!signature_len) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
if ((signature = calloc(1, signature_len)) == NULL) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(md_ctx, signature, &signature_len)) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&server_kex,
&cbb_signature))
goto err;
if (!CBB_add_bytes(&cbb_signature, signature,
signature_len))
goto err;
}
if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb))
goto err;
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
}
EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
free(params);
free(signature);
return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
fatal_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
CBB_cleanup(&cbb_params);
CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
free(params);
free(signature);
return (-1);
}
int
ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
{
CBB cbb, cert_request, cert_types, sigalgs, cert_auth, dn;
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
X509_NAME *name;
int i;
/*
* Certificate Request - RFC 5246 section 7.4.4.
*/
memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb));
if (s->s3->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) {
if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &cert_request,
SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST))
goto err;
if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&cert_request, &cert_types))
goto err;
if (!ssl3_get_req_cert_types(s, &cert_types))
goto err;
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cert_request,
&sigalgs))
goto err;
if (!ssl_sigalgs_build(
s->s3->hs.negotiated_tls_version, &sigalgs))
goto err;
}
if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cert_request, &cert_auth))
goto err;
sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
unsigned char *name_data;
size_t name_len;
name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
name_len = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);
if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cert_auth, &dn))
goto err;
if (!CBB_add_space(&dn, &name_data, name_len))
goto err;
if (i2d_X509_NAME(name, &name_data) != name_len)
goto err;
}
if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb))
goto err;
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
}
/* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
err:
CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
return (-1);
}
static int
ssl3_get_client_kex_rsa(SSL *s, CBS *cbs)
{
unsigned char fakekey[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
unsigned char *pms = NULL;
unsigned char *p;
size_t pms_len = 0;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
RSA *rsa = NULL;
CBS enc_pms;
int decrypt_len;
int al = -1;
arc4random_buf(fakekey, sizeof(fakekey));
fakekey[0] = s->s3->hs.peer_legacy_version >> 8;
fakekey[1] = s->s3->hs.peer_legacy_version & 0xff;
pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].privatekey;
if (pkey == NULL || (rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey)) == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
goto fatal_err;
}
pms_len = RSA_size(rsa);
if (pms_len < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
goto err;
if ((pms = malloc(pms_len)) == NULL)
goto err;
p = pms;
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &enc_pms))
goto decode_err;
if (CBS_len(cbs) != 0 || CBS_len(&enc_pms) != RSA_size(rsa)) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
goto err;
}
decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt(CBS_len(&enc_pms), CBS_data(&enc_pms),
pms, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
ERR_clear_error();
if (decrypt_len != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
/* SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
}
if ((al == -1) && !((pms[0] == (s->s3->hs.peer_legacy_version >> 8)) &&
(pms[1] == (s->s3->hs.peer_legacy_version & 0xff)))) {
/*
* The premaster secret must contain the same version number
* as the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks
* (strangely, the protocol does not offer such protection for
* DH ciphersuites).
*
* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
* (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
* number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
* reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
* made up by the adversary is properly formatted except that
* the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks, we should
* treat this just like any other decryption error.
*/
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
/* SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
}
if (al != -1) {
/*
* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead
* as countermeasure against Bleichenbacher's attack
* on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
* section 7.4.7.1).
*/
p = fakekey;
}
if (!tls12_derive_master_secret(s, p, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH))
goto err;
freezero(pms, pms_len);
return 1;
decode_err:
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
fatal_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
freezero(pms, pms_len);
return 0;
}
static int
ssl3_get_client_kex_dhe(SSL *s, CBS *cbs)
{
uint8_t *key = NULL;
size_t key_len = 0;
int decode_error, invalid_key;
int ret = 0;
if (s->s3->hs.key_share == NULL) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!tls_key_share_peer_public(s->s3->hs.key_share, cbs,
&decode_error, &invalid_key)) {
if (decode_error) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
}
goto err;
}
if (invalid_key) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH);
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
goto err;
}
if (!tls_key_share_derive(s->s3->hs.key_share, &key, &key_len))
goto err;
if (!tls12_derive_master_secret(s, key, key_len))
goto err;
ret = 1;
err:
freezero(key, key_len);
return ret;
}
static int
ssl3_get_client_kex_ecdhe(SSL *s, CBS *cbs)
{
uint8_t *key = NULL;
size_t key_len = 0;
int decode_error;
CBS public;
int ret = 0;
if (s->s3->hs.key_share == NULL) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
goto err;
}
if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(cbs, &public)) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (!tls_key_share_peer_public(s->s3->hs.key_share, &public,
&decode_error, NULL)) {
if (decode_error) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
}
goto err;
}
if (!tls_key_share_derive(s->s3->hs.key_share, &key, &key_len))
goto err;
if (!tls12_derive_master_secret(s, key, key_len))
goto err;
ret = 1;
err:
freezero(key, key_len);
return ret;
}
static int
ssl3_get_client_kex_gost(SSL *s, CBS *cbs)
{
unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *client_pubkey;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
size_t outlen;
CBS gostblob;
/* Get our certificate private key*/
if ((s->s3->hs.cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST01) != 0)
pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
if ((pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL)) == NULL)
goto err;
if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0)
goto err;
/*
* If client certificate is present and is of the same type,
* maybe use it for key exchange.
* Don't mind errors from EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because
* it is completely valid to use a client certificate for
* authorization only.
*/
if ((client_pubkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer_cert)) != NULL) {
if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pubkey) <= 0)
ERR_clear_error();
}
/* Decrypt session key */
if (!CBS_get_asn1(cbs, &gostblob, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE))
goto decode_err;
if (CBS_len(cbs) != 0)
goto decode_err;
outlen = sizeof(premaster_secret);
if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen,
CBS_data(&gostblob), CBS_len(&gostblob)) <= 0) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
goto err;
}
if (!tls12_derive_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
sizeof(premaster_secret)))
goto err;
/* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY,
2, NULL) > 0)
s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
explicit_bzero(premaster_secret, sizeof(premaster_secret));
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
return 1;
decode_err:
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
err:
explicit_bzero(premaster_secret, sizeof(premaster_secret));
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
return 0;
}
int
ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
unsigned long alg_k;
int al, ret;
CBS cbs;
/* 2048 maxlen is a guess. How long a key does that permit? */
if ((ret = ssl3_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048)) <= 0)
return ret;
if (s->internal->init_num < 0)
goto err;
CBS_init(&cbs, s->internal->init_msg, s->internal->init_num);
alg_k = s->s3->hs.cipher->algorithm_mkey;
if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
if (!ssl3_get_client_kex_rsa(s, &cbs))
goto err;
} else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) {
if (!ssl3_get_client_kex_dhe(s, &cbs))
goto err;
} else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) {
if (!ssl3_get_client_kex_ecdhe(s, &cbs))
goto err;
} else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
if (!ssl3_get_client_kex_gost(s, &cbs))
goto err;
} else {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
goto fatal_err;
}
if (CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
goto fatal_err;
}
return (1);
fatal_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
return (-1);
}
int
ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
{
CBS cbs, signature;
const struct ssl_sigalg *sigalg = NULL;
uint16_t sigalg_value = SIGALG_NONE;
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
X509 *peer_cert = NULL;
EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL;
int al, verify;
const unsigned char *hdata;
size_t hdatalen;
int type = 0;
int ret;
if ((ret = ssl3_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, -1, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) <= 0)
return ret;
ret = 0;
if (s->internal->init_num < 0)
goto err;
if ((mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
CBS_init(&cbs, s->internal->init_msg, s->internal->init_num);
peer_cert = s->session->peer_cert;
pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert);
type = X509_certificate_type(peer_cert, pkey);
if (s->s3->hs.tls12.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
s->s3->hs.tls12.reuse_message = 1;
if (peer_cert != NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
goto fatal_err;
}
ret = 1;
goto end;
}
if (peer_cert == NULL) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
goto fatal_err;
}
if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
goto fatal_err;
}
if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
goto fatal_err;
}
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
if (!CBS_get_u16(&cbs, &sigalg_value))
goto decode_err;
}
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &signature))
goto err;
if (CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
goto fatal_err;
}
if (CBS_len(&signature) > EVP_PKEY_size(pkey)) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
goto fatal_err;
}
if ((sigalg = ssl_sigalg_for_peer(s, pkey,
sigalg_value)) == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
goto fatal_err;
}
s->s3->hs.peer_sigalg = sigalg;
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
if (!tls1_transcript_data(s, &hdata, &hdatalen)) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto fatal_err;
}
if (!EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, &pctx, sigalg->md(),
NULL, pkey)) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto fatal_err;
}
if ((sigalg->flags & SIGALG_FLAG_RSA_PSS) &&
(!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx,
RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) ||
!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, -1))) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto fatal_err;
}
if (sigalg->key_type == EVP_PKEY_GOSTR01 &&
EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY,
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GOST_SIG_FORMAT, GOST_SIG_FORMAT_RS_LE,
NULL) <= 0) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto fatal_err;
}
if (!EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto fatal_err;
}
if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx, CBS_data(&signature),
CBS_len(&signature)) <= 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto fatal_err;
}
} else if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
RSA *rsa;
if ((rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey)) == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto fatal_err;
}
verify = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->hs.tls12.cert_verify,
MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, CBS_data(&signature),
CBS_len(&signature), rsa);
if (verify < 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
goto fatal_err;
}
if (verify == 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
goto fatal_err;
}
} else if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
EC_KEY *eckey;
if ((eckey = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)) == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto fatal_err;
}
verify = ECDSA_verify(0,
&(s->s3->hs.tls12.cert_verify[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, CBS_data(&signature),
CBS_len(&signature), eckey);
if (verify <= 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
goto fatal_err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
} else if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
unsigned char sigbuf[128];
unsigned int siglen = sizeof(sigbuf);
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
const EVP_MD *md;
int nid;
if (!tls1_transcript_data(s, &hdata, &hdatalen)) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto fatal_err;
}
if (!EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid(pkey, &nid) ||
!(md = EVP_get_digestbynid(nid))) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto fatal_err;
}
if ((pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL)) == NULL) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto fatal_err;
}
if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL) ||
!EVP_DigestUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) ||
!EVP_DigestFinal(mctx, sigbuf, &siglen) ||
(EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx) <= 0) ||
(EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, md) <= 0) ||
(EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY,
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GOST_SIG_FORMAT,
GOST_SIG_FORMAT_RS_LE, NULL) <= 0)) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
goto fatal_err;
}
if (EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, CBS_data(&signature),
CBS_len(&signature), sigbuf, siglen) <= 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
goto fatal_err;
}
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
#endif
} else {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
goto fatal_err;
}
ret = 1;
if (0) {
decode_err:
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
fatal_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
}
end:
tls1_transcript_free(s);
err:
EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
return (ret);
}
int
ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
{
CBS cbs, client_certs;
X509 *x = NULL;
const unsigned char *q;
STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
int i, al, ret;
if ((ret = ssl3_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
-1, s->internal->max_cert_list)) <= 0)
return ret;
ret = -1;
if (s->s3->hs.tls12.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
goto fatal_err;
}
/*
* If tls asked for a client cert,
* the client must return a 0 list.
*/
if (s->s3->hs.tls12.cert_request) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST
);
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
goto fatal_err;
}
s->s3->hs.tls12.reuse_message = 1;
return (1);
}
if (s->s3->hs.tls12.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
goto fatal_err;
}
if (s->internal->init_num < 0)
goto decode_err;
CBS_init(&cbs, s->internal->init_msg, s->internal->init_num);
if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&cbs, &client_certs) ||
CBS_len(&cbs) != 0)
goto decode_err;
while (CBS_len(&client_certs) > 0) {
CBS cert;
if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&client_certs, &cert)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto fatal_err;
}
q = CBS_data(&cert);
x = d2i_X509(NULL, &q, CBS_len(&cert));
if (x == NULL) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (q != CBS_data(&cert) + CBS_len(&cert)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto fatal_err;
}
if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
x = NULL;
}
if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
/*
* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned.
* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate.
*/
if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
goto fatal_err;
}
/* No client certificate so free transcript. */
tls1_transcript_free(s);
} else {
i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
if (i <= 0) {
al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
goto fatal_err;
}
}
X509_free(s->session->peer_cert);
s->session->peer_cert = sk_X509_shift(sk);
/*
* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
* peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c
*/
sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->cert_chain, X509_free);
s->session->cert_chain = sk;
sk = NULL;
s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
ret = 1;
if (0) {
decode_err:
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
fatal_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
}
err:
X509_free(x);
sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
return (ret);
}
int
ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
{
CBB cbb, server_cert;
SSL_CERT_PKEY *cpk;
/*
* Server Certificate - RFC 5246, section 7.4.2.
*/
memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb));
if (s->s3->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) {
if ((cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s)) == NULL) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return (0);
}
if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &server_cert,
SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE))
goto err;
if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, &server_cert, cpk))
goto err;
if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb))
goto err;
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
}
/* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
err:
CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
return (0);
}
/* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
int
ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
{
CBB cbb, session_ticket, ticket;
SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
size_t enc_session_len, enc_session_max_len, hmac_len;
size_t session_len = 0;
unsigned char *enc_session = NULL, *session = NULL;
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
unsigned char key_name[16];
unsigned char *hmac;
unsigned int hlen;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
int len;
/*
* New Session Ticket - RFC 5077, section 3.3.
*/
memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb));
if ((ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
if ((hctx = HMAC_CTX_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
if (s->s3->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) {
if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &session_ticket,
SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET))
goto err;
if (!SSL_SESSION_ticket(s->session, &session, &session_len))
goto err;
if (session_len > 0xffff)
goto err;
/*
* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback is present
* it does all the work, otherwise use generated values from
* parent context.
*/
if (tctx->internal->tlsext_ticket_key_cb != NULL) {
if (tctx->internal->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s,
key_name, iv, ctx, hctx, 1) < 0)
goto err;
} else {
arc4random_buf(iv, 16);
EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
tctx->internal->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->internal->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
16, EVP_sha256(), NULL);
memcpy(key_name, tctx->internal->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
}
/* Encrypt the session state. */
enc_session_max_len = session_len + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH;
if ((enc_session = calloc(1, enc_session_max_len)) == NULL)
goto err;
enc_session_len = 0;
if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, enc_session, &len, session,
session_len))
goto err;
enc_session_len += len;
if (!EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, enc_session + enc_session_len,
&len))
goto err;
enc_session_len += len;
if (enc_session_len > enc_session_max_len)
goto err;
/* Generate the HMAC. */
if (!HMAC_Update(hctx, key_name, sizeof(key_name)))
goto err;
if (!HMAC_Update(hctx, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx)))
goto err;
if (!HMAC_Update(hctx, enc_session, enc_session_len))
goto err;
if ((hmac_len = HMAC_size(hctx)) <= 0)
goto err;
/*
* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
* We leave this unspecified for resumed session
* (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for new
* sessions will live as long as their sessions.
*/
if (!CBB_add_u32(&session_ticket,
s->internal->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout))
goto err;
if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&session_ticket, &ticket))
goto err;
if (!CBB_add_bytes(&ticket, key_name, sizeof(key_name)))
goto err;
if (!CBB_add_bytes(&ticket, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx)))
goto err;
if (!CBB_add_bytes(&ticket, enc_session, enc_session_len))
goto err;
if (!CBB_add_space(&ticket, &hmac, hmac_len))
goto err;
if (!HMAC_Final(hctx, hmac, &hlen))
goto err;
if (hlen != hmac_len)
goto err;
if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb))
goto err;
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
}
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
freezero(session, session_len);
free(enc_session);
/* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
err:
CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
freezero(session, session_len);
free(enc_session);
return (-1);
}
int
ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
{
CBB cbb, certstatus, ocspresp;
memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb));
if (s->s3->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) {
if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &certstatus,
SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS))
goto err;
if (!CBB_add_u8(&certstatus, s->tlsext_status_type))
goto err;
if (!CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(&certstatus, &ocspresp))
goto err;
if (!CBB_add_bytes(&ocspresp, s->internal->tlsext_ocsp_resp,
s->internal->tlsext_ocsp_resp_len))
goto err;
if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb))
goto err;
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
}
/* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
err:
CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
return (-1);
}
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