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https://github.com/pineappleEA/pineapple-src.git
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1061 lines
29 KiB
C
Executable File
1061 lines
29 KiB
C
Executable File
/* $OpenBSD: d1_pkt.c,v 1.123 2022/03/26 15:05:53 jsing Exp $ */
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/*
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* DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
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* (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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*
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
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* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
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* distribution.
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*
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
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* software must display the following acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
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* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
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* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
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* openssl-core@openssl.org.
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*
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* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
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* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
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* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
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*
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* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
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* acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
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* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
|
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
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* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
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* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
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* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
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* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
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* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
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* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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* ====================================================================
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*
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* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
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* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
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* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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*/
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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This package is an SSL implementation written
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* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
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* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
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*
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* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
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* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
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* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
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* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
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* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
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* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
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* the code are not to be removed.
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* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
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* as the author of the parts of the library used.
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* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
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* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
|
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
|
|
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
|
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
|
|
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
|
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
|
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* must display the following acknowledgement:
|
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* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
|
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* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
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* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
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* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
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* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
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* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
|
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
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* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
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* copied and put under another distribution licence
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* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
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*/
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#include <endian.h>
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#include <errno.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <openssl/buffer.h>
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include "bytestring.h"
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#include "dtls_locl.h"
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#include "pqueue.h"
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#include "ssl_locl.h"
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/* mod 128 saturating subtract of two 64-bit values in big-endian order */
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static int
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satsub64be(const unsigned char *v1, const unsigned char *v2)
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{
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int ret, sat, brw, i;
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if (sizeof(long) == 8)
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do {
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long l;
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if (BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN)
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break;
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/* not reached on little-endians */
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/* following test is redundant, because input is
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* always aligned, but I take no chances... */
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if (((size_t)v1 | (size_t)v2) & 0x7)
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break;
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l = *((long *)v1);
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l -= *((long *)v2);
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if (l > 128)
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return 128;
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else if (l<-128)
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return -128;
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else
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return (int)l;
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} while (0);
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ret = (int)v1[7] - (int)v2[7];
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sat = 0;
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brw = ret >> 8; /* brw is either 0 or -1 */
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if (ret & 0x80) {
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for (i = 6; i >= 0; i--) {
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brw += (int)v1[i]-(int)v2[i];
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sat |= ~brw;
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brw >>= 8;
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}
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} else {
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for (i = 6; i >= 0; i--) {
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brw += (int)v1[i]-(int)v2[i];
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sat |= brw;
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brw >>= 8;
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}
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}
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brw <<= 8; /* brw is either 0 or -256 */
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if (sat & 0xff)
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return brw | 0x80;
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else
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return brw + (ret & 0xFF);
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}
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static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap,
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const unsigned char *seq);
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static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap,
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const unsigned char *seq);
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static DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD_INTERNAL *rr,
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unsigned int *is_next_epoch);
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static int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *q,
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unsigned char *priority);
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static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s);
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/* copy buffered record into SSL structure */
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static int
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dtls1_copy_record(SSL *s, DTLS1_RECORD_DATA_INTERNAL *rdata)
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{
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ssl3_release_buffer(&s->s3->rbuf);
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s->internal->packet = rdata->packet;
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s->internal->packet_length = rdata->packet_length;
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memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER_INTERNAL));
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memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD_INTERNAL));
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return (1);
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}
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static int
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dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, unsigned char *priority)
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{
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DTLS1_RECORD_DATA_INTERNAL *rdata;
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pitem *item;
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/* Limit the size of the queue to prevent DOS attacks */
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if (pqueue_size(queue->q) >= 100)
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return 0;
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rdata = malloc(sizeof(DTLS1_RECORD_DATA_INTERNAL));
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item = pitem_new(priority, rdata);
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if (rdata == NULL || item == NULL)
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goto init_err;
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rdata->packet = s->internal->packet;
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rdata->packet_length = s->internal->packet_length;
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memcpy(&(rdata->rbuf), &(s->s3->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER_INTERNAL));
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memcpy(&(rdata->rrec), &(s->s3->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD_INTERNAL));
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item->data = rdata;
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s->internal->packet = NULL;
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s->internal->packet_length = 0;
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memset(&(s->s3->rbuf), 0, sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER_INTERNAL));
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memset(&(s->s3->rrec), 0, sizeof(SSL3_RECORD_INTERNAL));
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if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
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goto err;
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/* insert should not fail, since duplicates are dropped */
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if (pqueue_insert(queue->q, item) == NULL)
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goto err;
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return (1);
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err:
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ssl3_release_buffer(&rdata->rbuf);
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init_err:
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SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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free(rdata);
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pitem_free(item);
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return (-1);
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}
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static int
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dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue)
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{
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pitem *item;
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item = pqueue_pop(queue->q);
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if (item) {
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dtls1_copy_record(s, item->data);
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free(item->data);
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pitem_free(item);
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return (1);
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}
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return (0);
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}
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static int
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dtls1_process_buffered_record(SSL *s)
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{
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/* Check if epoch is current. */
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if (s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch !=
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tls12_record_layer_read_epoch(s->internal->rl))
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return (0);
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/* Update epoch once all unprocessed records have been processed. */
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if (pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q) == NULL) {
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s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch =
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tls12_record_layer_read_epoch(s->internal->rl) + 1;
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return (0);
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}
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/* Process one of the records. */
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if (!dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record(s, &s->d1->unprocessed_rcds))
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return (-1);
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if (!dtls1_process_record(s))
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return (-1);
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return (1);
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}
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static int
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dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
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{
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SSL3_RECORD_INTERNAL *rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
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uint8_t alert_desc;
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uint8_t *out;
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size_t out_len;
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tls12_record_layer_set_version(s->internal->rl, s->version);
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if (!tls12_record_layer_open_record(s->internal->rl, s->internal->packet,
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s->internal->packet_length, &out, &out_len)) {
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tls12_record_layer_alert(s->internal->rl, &alert_desc);
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if (alert_desc == 0)
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goto err;
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/*
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* DTLS should silently discard invalid records, including those
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* with a bad MAC, as per RFC 6347 section 4.1.2.1.
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*/
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if (alert_desc == SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC) {
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out_len = 0;
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goto done;
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}
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if (alert_desc == SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW)
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SSLerror(s, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
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goto fatal_err;
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}
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done:
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rr->data = out;
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rr->length = out_len;
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rr->off = 0;
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s->internal->packet_length = 0;
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return (1);
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fatal_err:
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ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert_desc);
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err:
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return (0);
|
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}
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|
|
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/* Call this to get a new input record.
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* It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
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* or non-blocking IO.
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* When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
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* ssl->s3->internal->rrec.type - is the type of record
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* ssl->s3->internal->rrec.data, - data
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* ssl->s3->internal->rrec.length, - number of bytes
|
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*/
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/* used only by dtls1_read_bytes */
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int
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dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
|
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{
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SSL3_RECORD_INTERNAL *rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
|
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unsigned char *p = NULL;
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|
DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap;
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unsigned int is_next_epoch;
|
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int ret, n;
|
|
|
|
/* See if there are pending records that can now be processed. */
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if ((ret = dtls1_process_buffered_record(s)) != 0)
|
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return (ret);
|
|
|
|
/* get something from the wire */
|
|
if (0) {
|
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again:
|
|
/* dump this record on all retries */
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rr->length = 0;
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s->internal->packet_length = 0;
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}
|
|
|
|
/* check if we have the header */
|
|
if ((s->internal->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
|
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(s->internal->packet_length < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
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CBS header, seq_no;
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|
uint16_t epoch, len, ssl_version;
|
|
uint8_t type;
|
|
|
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n = ssl3_packet_read(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
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|
if (n <= 0)
|
|
return (n);
|
|
|
|
/* If this packet contained a partial record, dump it. */
|
|
if (n != DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
|
|
goto again;
|
|
|
|
s->internal->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
|
|
|
|
CBS_init(&header, s->internal->packet, s->internal->packet_length);
|
|
|
|
/* Pull apart the header into the DTLS1_RECORD */
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u8(&header, &type))
|
|
goto again;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u16(&header, &ssl_version))
|
|
goto again;
|
|
|
|
/* Sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch. */
|
|
if (!CBS_get_bytes(&header, &seq_no, SSL3_SEQUENCE_SIZE))
|
|
goto again;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u16(&seq_no, &epoch))
|
|
goto again;
|
|
if (!CBS_write_bytes(&seq_no, &rr->seq_num[2],
|
|
sizeof(rr->seq_num) - 2, NULL))
|
|
goto again;
|
|
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u16(&header, &len))
|
|
goto again;
|
|
|
|
rr->type = type;
|
|
rr->epoch = epoch;
|
|
rr->length = len;
|
|
|
|
/* unexpected version, silently discard */
|
|
if (!s->internal->first_packet && ssl_version != s->version)
|
|
goto again;
|
|
|
|
/* wrong version, silently discard record */
|
|
if ((ssl_version & 0xff00) != (s->version & 0xff00))
|
|
goto again;
|
|
|
|
/* record too long, silently discard it */
|
|
if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH)
|
|
goto again;
|
|
|
|
/* now s->internal->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
|
|
p = (unsigned char *)CBS_data(&header);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* s->internal->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
|
|
|
|
n = ssl3_packet_extend(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length);
|
|
if (n <= 0)
|
|
return (n);
|
|
|
|
/* If this packet contained a partial record, dump it. */
|
|
if (n != DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length)
|
|
goto again;
|
|
|
|
s->internal->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
|
|
|
|
/* match epochs. NULL means the packet is dropped on the floor */
|
|
bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch);
|
|
if (bitmap == NULL)
|
|
goto again;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record.
|
|
* Don't check if we're listening and this message is
|
|
* a ClientHello. They can look as if they're replayed,
|
|
* since they arrive from different connections and
|
|
* would be dropped unnecessarily.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!(s->d1->listen && rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
|
|
p != NULL && *p == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
|
|
!dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap, rr->seq_num))
|
|
goto again;
|
|
|
|
/* just read a 0 length packet */
|
|
if (rr->length == 0)
|
|
goto again;
|
|
|
|
/* If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT),
|
|
* and a handshake is currently in progress, buffer it since it
|
|
* cannot be processed at this time. However, do not buffer
|
|
* anything while listening.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (is_next_epoch) {
|
|
if ((SSL_in_init(s) || s->internal->in_handshake) && !s->d1->listen) {
|
|
if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds),
|
|
rr->seq_num) < 0)
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
/* Mark receipt of record. */
|
|
dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap, rr->seq_num);
|
|
}
|
|
goto again;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!dtls1_process_record(s))
|
|
goto again;
|
|
|
|
/* Mark receipt of record. */
|
|
dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap, rr->seq_num);
|
|
|
|
return (1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
dtls1_read_handshake_unexpected(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
SSL3_RECORD_INTERNAL *rr = &s->s3->rrec;
|
|
struct hm_header_st hs_msg_hdr;
|
|
CBS cbs;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
if (s->internal->in_handshake) {
|
|
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (rr->off != 0) {
|
|
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Parse handshake message header. */
|
|
CBS_init(&cbs, rr->data, rr->length);
|
|
if (!dtls1_get_message_header(&cbs, &hs_msg_hdr))
|
|
return -1; /* XXX - probably should drop/continue. */
|
|
|
|
/* This may just be a stale retransmit. */
|
|
if (rr->epoch != tls12_record_layer_read_epoch(s->internal->rl)) {
|
|
rr->length = 0;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (hs_msg_hdr.type == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Incoming HelloRequest messages should only be received by a
|
|
* client. A server may send these at any time - a client should
|
|
* ignore the message if received in the middle of a handshake.
|
|
* See RFC 5246 sections 7.4 and 7.4.1.1.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->server) {
|
|
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
|
|
SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* XXX - should also check frag offset/length. */
|
|
if (hs_msg_hdr.msg_len != 0) {
|
|
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl_msg_callback(s, 0, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, rr->data,
|
|
DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
|
|
|
|
rr->length = 0;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* It should be impossible to hit this, but keep the safety
|
|
* harness for now...
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->session == NULL || s->session->cipher == NULL)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Ignore this message if we're currently handshaking,
|
|
* renegotiation is already pending or renegotiation is disabled
|
|
* via flags.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!SSL_is_init_finished(s) || s->s3->renegotiate ||
|
|
(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) != 0)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
|
|
|
|
/* XXX - why is this set here but not in ssl3? */
|
|
s->internal->new_session = 1;
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl3_renegotiate(s))
|
|
return 1;
|
|
if (!ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
} else if (hs_msg_hdr.type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Incoming ClientHello messages should only be received by a
|
|
* server. A client may send these in response to server
|
|
* initiated renegotiation (HelloRequest) or in order to
|
|
* initiate renegotiation by the client. See RFC 5246 section
|
|
* 7.4.1.2.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!s->server) {
|
|
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
|
|
SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* A client should not be sending a ClientHello unless we're not
|
|
* currently handshaking.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!SSL_is_init_finished(s)) {
|
|
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
|
|
SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((s->internal->options & SSL_OP_NO_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATION) != 0) {
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
|
|
SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->session == NULL || s->session->cipher == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Client requested renegotiation but it is not permitted. */
|
|
if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding ||
|
|
(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) != 0) {
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING,
|
|
SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->s3->hs.state = SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
|
|
s->internal->renegotiate = 1;
|
|
s->internal->new_session = 1;
|
|
|
|
} else if (hs_msg_hdr.type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED && s->server) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we are server, we may have a repeated FINISHED of the
|
|
* client here, then retransmit our CCS and FINISHED.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(s) < 0)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
/* XXX - should this be calling ssl_msg_callback()? */
|
|
|
|
dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s);
|
|
|
|
rr->length = 0;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((ret = s->internal->handshake_func(s)) < 0)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
if (ret == 0) {
|
|
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!(s->internal->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
|
|
if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) {
|
|
ssl_force_want_read(s);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try again
|
|
* to obtain the (application) data we were asked for.
|
|
*/
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
|
|
* 'type' is one of the following:
|
|
*
|
|
* - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
|
|
* - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
|
|
* - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
|
|
*
|
|
* If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
|
|
* (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
|
|
*
|
|
* This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
|
|
* Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
|
|
* a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
|
|
* Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
|
|
* them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
|
|
* may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
|
|
* Change cipher spec protocol
|
|
* just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
|
|
* Alert protocol
|
|
* 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
|
|
* Handshake protocol
|
|
* 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
|
|
* to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
|
|
* here, anything else is handled by higher layers
|
|
* Application data protocol
|
|
* none of our business
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
|
|
{
|
|
SSL3_RECORD_INTERNAL *rr;
|
|
int rrcount = 0;
|
|
unsigned int n;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) {
|
|
if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (len < 0) {
|
|
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (type != 0 && type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
|
|
type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
|
|
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
if (peek && type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
|
|
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->internal->in_handshake) {
|
|
if ((ret = s->internal->handshake_func(s)) < 0)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
if (ret == 0) {
|
|
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
start:
|
|
/*
|
|
* Do not process more than three consecutive records, otherwise the
|
|
* peer can cause us to loop indefinitely. Instead, return with an
|
|
* SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ so the caller can choose when to handle further
|
|
* processing. In the future, the total number of non-handshake and
|
|
* non-application data records per connection should probably also be
|
|
* limited...
|
|
*/
|
|
if (rrcount++ >= 3) {
|
|
ssl_force_want_read(s);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->internal->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
|
|
|
|
rr = &s->s3->rrec;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We are not handshaking and have no data yet, so process data buffered
|
|
* during the last handshake in advance, if any.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->s3->hs.state == SSL_ST_OK && rr->length == 0)
|
|
dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record(s, &s->d1->buffered_app_data);
|
|
|
|
if (dtls1_handle_timeout(s) > 0)
|
|
goto start;
|
|
|
|
if (rr->length == 0 || s->internal->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY) {
|
|
if ((ret = dtls1_get_record(s)) <= 0) {
|
|
/* Anything other than a timeout is an error. */
|
|
if ((ret = dtls1_read_failed(s, ret)) <= 0)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
goto start;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->d1->listen && rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
|
|
rr->length = 0;
|
|
goto start;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* We now have a packet which can be read and processed. */
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec && rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* We now have application data between CCS and Finished.
|
|
* Most likely the packets were reordered on their way, so
|
|
* buffer the application data for later processing rather
|
|
* than dropping the connection.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &s->d1->buffered_app_data,
|
|
rr->seq_num) < 0) {
|
|
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
}
|
|
rr->length = 0;
|
|
goto start;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
|
|
* 'peek' mode).
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->internal->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
|
|
s->internal->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
|
|
rr->length = 0;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
|
|
if (type == rr->type) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Make sure that we are not getting application data when we
|
|
* are doing a handshake for the first time.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (SSL_in_init(s) && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
|
|
!tls12_record_layer_read_protected(s->internal->rl)) {
|
|
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
|
|
SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (len <= 0)
|
|
return len;
|
|
|
|
if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
|
|
n = rr->length;
|
|
else
|
|
n = (unsigned int)len;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(buf, &rr->data[rr->off], n);
|
|
if (!peek) {
|
|
memset(&rr->data[rr->off], 0, n);
|
|
rr->length -= n;
|
|
rr->off += n;
|
|
if (rr->length == 0) {
|
|
s->internal->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
|
|
rr->off = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return n;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
|
|
* message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello).
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
|
|
if ((ret = ssl3_read_alert(s)) <= 0)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
goto start;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->internal->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) {
|
|
s->internal->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
|
|
rr->length = 0;
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
|
|
* application data. If the library was running inside
|
|
* ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes
|
|
* sense to read application data at this point (session
|
|
* renegotiation not yet started), we will indulge it.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->s3->in_read_app_data != 0 &&
|
|
s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0 &&
|
|
(((s->s3->hs.state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
|
|
(s->s3->hs.state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
|
|
(s->s3->hs.state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)) || (
|
|
(s->s3->hs.state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
|
|
(s->s3->hs.state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
|
|
(s->s3->hs.state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)))) {
|
|
s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
|
|
return -1;
|
|
} else {
|
|
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
|
|
SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
|
|
if ((ret = ssl3_read_change_cipher_spec(s)) <= 0)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
goto start;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
|
|
if ((ret = dtls1_read_handshake_unexpected(s)) <= 0)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
goto start;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Unknown record type. */
|
|
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
dtls1_write_app_data_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->internal->in_handshake)
|
|
{
|
|
i = s->internal->handshake_func(s);
|
|
if (i < 0)
|
|
return (i);
|
|
if (i == 0) {
|
|
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (len > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) {
|
|
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
i = dtls1_write_bytes(s, type, buf_, len);
|
|
return i;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
|
|
* It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_assert(len <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
|
|
s->internal->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
|
|
i = do_dtls1_write(s, type, buf, len);
|
|
return i;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len)
|
|
{
|
|
SSL3_BUFFER_INTERNAL *wb = &(s->s3->wbuf);
|
|
size_t out_len;
|
|
CBB cbb;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb));
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* First check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER_INTERNAL still being written
|
|
* out. This will happen with non blocking IO.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (wb->left != 0) {
|
|
OPENSSL_assert(0); /* XDTLS: want to see if we ever get here */
|
|
return (ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If we have an alert to send, let's send it */
|
|
if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
|
|
if ((ret = ssl3_dispatch_alert(s)) <= 0)
|
|
return (ret);
|
|
/* If it went, fall through and send more stuff. */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (len == 0)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
wb->offset = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (!CBB_init_fixed(&cbb, wb->buf, wb->len))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
tls12_record_layer_set_version(s->internal->rl, s->version);
|
|
|
|
if (!tls12_record_layer_seal_record(s->internal->rl, type, buf, len, &cbb))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
if (!CBB_finish(&cbb, NULL, &out_len))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
wb->left = out_len;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect
|
|
* bad write retries later.
|
|
*/
|
|
s->s3->wpend_tot = len;
|
|
s->s3->wpend_buf = buf;
|
|
s->s3->wpend_type = type;
|
|
s->s3->wpend_ret = len;
|
|
|
|
/* We now just need to write the buffer. */
|
|
return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len);
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap,
|
|
const unsigned char *seq)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned int shift;
|
|
int cmp;
|
|
|
|
cmp = satsub64be(seq, bitmap->max_seq_num);
|
|
if (cmp > 0)
|
|
return 1; /* this record in new */
|
|
shift = -cmp;
|
|
if (shift >= sizeof(bitmap->map)*8)
|
|
return 0; /* stale, outside the window */
|
|
else if (bitmap->map & (1UL << shift))
|
|
return 0; /* record previously received */
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap,
|
|
const unsigned char *seq)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned int shift;
|
|
int cmp;
|
|
|
|
cmp = satsub64be(seq, bitmap->max_seq_num);
|
|
if (cmp > 0) {
|
|
shift = cmp;
|
|
if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map)*8)
|
|
bitmap->map <<= shift, bitmap->map |= 1UL;
|
|
else
|
|
bitmap->map = 1UL;
|
|
memcpy(bitmap->max_seq_num, seq, 8);
|
|
} else {
|
|
shift = -cmp;
|
|
if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map) * 8)
|
|
bitmap->map |= 1UL << shift;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static DTLS1_BITMAP *
|
|
dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD_INTERNAL *rr, unsigned int *is_next_epoch)
|
|
{
|
|
uint16_t read_epoch, read_epoch_next;
|
|
|
|
*is_next_epoch = 0;
|
|
|
|
read_epoch = tls12_record_layer_read_epoch(s->internal->rl);
|
|
read_epoch_next = read_epoch + 1;
|
|
|
|
/* In current epoch, accept HM, CCS, DATA, & ALERT */
|
|
if (rr->epoch == read_epoch)
|
|
return &s->d1->bitmap;
|
|
|
|
/* Only HM and ALERT messages can be from the next epoch */
|
|
if (rr->epoch == read_epoch_next &&
|
|
(rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
|
|
*is_next_epoch = 1;
|
|
return &s->d1->next_bitmap;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
dtls1_reset_read_seq_numbers(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
memcpy(&(s->d1->bitmap), &(s->d1->next_bitmap), sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP));
|
|
memset(&(s->d1->next_bitmap), 0, sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP));
|
|
}
|