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869 lines
21 KiB
C
869 lines
21 KiB
C
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/* $OpenBSD: rsa_pmeth.c,v 1.32 2019/10/31 14:05:30 jsing Exp $ */
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/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
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* project 2006.
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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*
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
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* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
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* distribution.
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*
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
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* software must display the following acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
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*
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* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
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* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
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* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
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* licensing@OpenSSL.org.
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*
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* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
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* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
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* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
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*
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* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
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* acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
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* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
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* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
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* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
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* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
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* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
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* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
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* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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* ====================================================================
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*
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* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
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* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
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* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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*/
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#include <limits.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
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#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
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#include <openssl/bn.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include <openssl/rsa.h>
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#include <openssl/x509.h>
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#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
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#include "evp_locl.h"
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#include "rsa_locl.h"
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/* RSA pkey context structure */
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typedef struct {
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/* Key gen parameters */
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int nbits;
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BIGNUM *pub_exp;
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/* Keygen callback info */
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int gentmp[2];
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/* RSA padding mode */
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int pad_mode;
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/* message digest */
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const EVP_MD *md;
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/* message digest for MGF1 */
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const EVP_MD *mgf1md;
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/* PSS salt length */
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int saltlen;
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/* Minimum salt length or -1 if no PSS parameter restriction */
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int min_saltlen;
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/* Temp buffer */
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unsigned char *tbuf;
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/* OAEP label */
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unsigned char *oaep_label;
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size_t oaep_labellen;
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} RSA_PKEY_CTX;
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/* True if PSS parameters are restricted */
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#define rsa_pss_restricted(rctx) (rctx->min_saltlen != -1)
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static int
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pkey_rsa_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
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{
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RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx;
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if ((rctx = calloc(1, sizeof(RSA_PKEY_CTX))) == NULL)
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return 0;
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rctx->nbits = 2048;
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if (ctx->pmeth->pkey_id == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS)
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rctx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING;
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else
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rctx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
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/* Maximum for sign, auto for verify */
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rctx->saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
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rctx->min_saltlen = -1;
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ctx->data = rctx;
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ctx->keygen_info = rctx->gentmp;
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ctx->keygen_info_count = 2;
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return 1;
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}
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static int
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pkey_rsa_copy(EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst, EVP_PKEY_CTX *src)
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{
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RSA_PKEY_CTX *dctx, *sctx;
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if (!pkey_rsa_init(dst))
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return 0;
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sctx = src->data;
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dctx = dst->data;
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dctx->nbits = sctx->nbits;
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if (sctx->pub_exp != NULL) {
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BN_free(dctx->pub_exp);
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if ((dctx->pub_exp = BN_dup(sctx->pub_exp)) == NULL)
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return 0;
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}
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dctx->pad_mode = sctx->pad_mode;
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dctx->md = sctx->md;
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dctx->mgf1md = sctx->mgf1md;
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if (sctx->oaep_label != NULL) {
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free(dctx->oaep_label);
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if ((dctx->oaep_label = calloc(1, sctx->oaep_labellen)) == NULL)
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return 0;
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memcpy(dctx->oaep_label, sctx->oaep_label, sctx->oaep_labellen);
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dctx->oaep_labellen = sctx->oaep_labellen;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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static int
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setup_tbuf(RSA_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX *pk)
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{
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if (ctx->tbuf != NULL)
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return 1;
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if ((ctx->tbuf = calloc(1, EVP_PKEY_size(pk->pkey))) == NULL) {
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RSAerror(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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static void
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pkey_rsa_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
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{
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RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
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if (rctx) {
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BN_free(rctx->pub_exp);
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free(rctx->tbuf);
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free(rctx->oaep_label);
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free(rctx);
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}
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}
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static int
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pkey_rsa_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
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const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
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{
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int ret;
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RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
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RSA *rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa;
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if (rctx->md) {
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if (tbslen != (size_t)EVP_MD_size(rctx->md)) {
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RSAerror(RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
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return -1;
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}
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if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
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if ((size_t)EVP_PKEY_size(ctx->pkey) < tbslen + 1) {
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RSAerror(RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
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return -1;
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}
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if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx)) {
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RSAerror(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return -1;
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}
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memcpy(rctx->tbuf, tbs, tbslen);
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rctx->tbuf[tbslen] =
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RSA_X931_hash_id(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md));
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ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen + 1, rctx->tbuf, sig,
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rsa, RSA_X931_PADDING);
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} else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) {
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unsigned int sltmp;
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ret = RSA_sign(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md), tbs, tbslen, sig,
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&sltmp, rsa);
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if (ret <= 0)
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return ret;
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ret = sltmp;
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} else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
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if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
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return -1;
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if (!RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa, rctx->tbuf,
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tbs, rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md, rctx->saltlen))
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return -1;
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ret = RSA_private_encrypt(RSA_size(rsa), rctx->tbuf,
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sig, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
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} else {
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return -1;
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}
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} else {
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ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen, tbs, sig, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa,
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rctx->pad_mode);
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}
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if (ret < 0)
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return ret;
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*siglen = ret;
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return 1;
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}
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static int
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pkey_rsa_verifyrecover(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *rout, size_t *routlen,
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const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen)
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{
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int ret;
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RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
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if (rctx->md) {
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if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
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if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
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return -1;
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ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rctx->tbuf,
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ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa, RSA_X931_PADDING);
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if (ret < 1)
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return 0;
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ret--;
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if (rctx->tbuf[ret] !=
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RSA_X931_hash_id(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md))) {
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RSAerror(RSA_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH);
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return 0;
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}
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if (ret != EVP_MD_size(rctx->md)) {
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RSAerror(RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
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return 0;
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}
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if (rout)
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memcpy(rout, rctx->tbuf, ret);
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} else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) {
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size_t sltmp;
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ret = int_rsa_verify(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md), NULL, 0,
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rout, &sltmp, sig, siglen, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa);
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if (ret <= 0)
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return 0;
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ret = sltmp;
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} else {
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return -1;
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}
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} else {
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ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rout, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa,
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rctx->pad_mode);
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}
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if (ret < 0)
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return ret;
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*routlen = ret;
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return 1;
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}
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static int
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pkey_rsa_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen,
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const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
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{
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RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
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RSA *rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa;
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size_t rslen;
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if (rctx->md) {
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if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
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return RSA_verify(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md), tbs, tbslen,
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sig, siglen, rsa);
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if (tbslen != (size_t)EVP_MD_size(rctx->md)) {
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RSAerror(RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
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return -1;
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}
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if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
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if (pkey_rsa_verifyrecover(ctx, NULL, &rslen, sig,
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siglen) <= 0)
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return 0;
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} else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
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int ret;
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if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
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return -1;
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ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rctx->tbuf,
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rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
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if (ret <= 0)
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return 0;
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ret = RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa, tbs, rctx->md,
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rctx->mgf1md, rctx->tbuf, rctx->saltlen);
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if (ret <= 0)
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return 0;
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return 1;
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} else {
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return -1;
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}
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} else {
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if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
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return -1;
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rslen = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rctx->tbuf, rsa,
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rctx->pad_mode);
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if (rslen == 0)
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return 0;
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}
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if (rslen != tbslen || timingsafe_bcmp(tbs, rctx->tbuf, rslen))
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return 0;
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return 1;
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}
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static int
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pkey_rsa_encrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
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const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)
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{
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RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
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int ret;
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if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
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int klen = RSA_size(ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa);
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if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
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return -1;
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if (!RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(rctx->tbuf, klen,
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in, inlen, rctx->oaep_label, rctx->oaep_labellen,
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rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md))
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return -1;
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ret = RSA_public_encrypt(klen, rctx->tbuf, out,
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ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
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} else {
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ret = RSA_public_encrypt(inlen, in, out, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa,
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rctx->pad_mode);
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}
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if (ret < 0)
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return ret;
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*outlen = ret;
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return 1;
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}
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static int
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pkey_rsa_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
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const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)
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{
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int ret;
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RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
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|
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if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
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if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
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return -1;
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ret = RSA_private_decrypt(inlen, in, rctx->tbuf,
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ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
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if (ret <= 0)
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return ret;
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ret = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(out, ret, rctx->tbuf,
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ret, ret, rctx->oaep_label, rctx->oaep_labellen, rctx->md,
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rctx->mgf1md);
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} else {
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ret = RSA_private_decrypt(inlen, in, out, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa,
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rctx->pad_mode);
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}
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if (ret < 0)
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return ret;
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*outlen = ret;
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return 1;
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}
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||
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||
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static int
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check_padding_md(const EVP_MD *md, int padding)
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||
|
{
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|
if (md == NULL)
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|
return 1;
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||
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||
|
if (padding == RSA_NO_PADDING) {
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||
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RSAerror(RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
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||
|
return 0;
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||
|
}
|
||
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||
|
if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
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||
|
if (RSA_X931_hash_id(EVP_MD_type(md)) == -1) {
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||
|
RSAerror(RSA_R_INVALID_X931_DIGEST);
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
} else {
|
||
|
/* List of all supported RSA digests. */
|
||
|
switch(EVP_MD_type(md)) {
|
||
|
case NID_sha1:
|
||
|
case NID_sha224:
|
||
|
case NID_sha256:
|
||
|
case NID_sha384:
|
||
|
case NID_sha512:
|
||
|
case NID_md5:
|
||
|
case NID_md5_sha1:
|
||
|
case NID_md4:
|
||
|
case NID_ripemd160:
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
default:
|
||
|
RSAerror(RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST);
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
static int
|
||
|
pkey_rsa_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
|
||
|
|
||
|
switch (type) {
|
||
|
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PADDING:
|
||
|
if (p1 >= RSA_PKCS1_PADDING && p1 <= RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
|
||
|
if (!check_padding_md(rctx->md, p1))
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
if (p1 == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
|
||
|
if (!(ctx->operation &
|
||
|
(EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN | EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY)))
|
||
|
goto bad_pad;
|
||
|
if (!rctx->md)
|
||
|
rctx->md = EVP_sha1();
|
||
|
} else if (ctx->pmeth->pkey_id == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
|
||
|
goto bad_pad;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (p1 == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
|
||
|
if (!(ctx->operation & EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT))
|
||
|
goto bad_pad;
|
||
|
if (!rctx->md)
|
||
|
rctx->md = EVP_sha1();
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
rctx->pad_mode = p1;
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
bad_pad:
|
||
|
RSAerror(RSA_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE);
|
||
|
return -2;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PADDING:
|
||
|
*(int *)p2 = rctx->pad_mode;
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN:
|
||
|
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN:
|
||
|
if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
|
||
|
RSAerror(RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
|
||
|
return -2;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (type == EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN) {
|
||
|
*(int *)p2 = rctx->saltlen;
|
||
|
} else {
|
||
|
if (p1 < RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX)
|
||
|
return -2;
|
||
|
if (rsa_pss_restricted(rctx)) {
|
||
|
if (p1 == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO &&
|
||
|
ctx->operation == EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY) {
|
||
|
RSAerror(RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
|
||
|
return -2;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if ((p1 == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST &&
|
||
|
rctx->min_saltlen > EVP_MD_size(rctx->md)) ||
|
||
|
(p1 >= 0 && p1 < rctx->min_saltlen)) {
|
||
|
RSAerror(RSA_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL);
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
rctx->saltlen = p1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_BITS:
|
||
|
if (p1 < RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS) {
|
||
|
RSAerror(RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
|
||
|
return -2;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
rctx->nbits = p1;
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PUBEXP:
|
||
|
if (p2 == NULL || !BN_is_odd((BIGNUM *)p2) ||
|
||
|
BN_is_one((BIGNUM *)p2)) {
|
||
|
RSAerror(RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
|
||
|
return -2;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
BN_free(rctx->pub_exp);
|
||
|
rctx->pub_exp = p2;
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_MD:
|
||
|
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_MD:
|
||
|
if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
|
||
|
RSAerror(RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
|
||
|
return -2;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (type == EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_MD)
|
||
|
*(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->md;
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
rctx->md = p2;
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD:
|
||
|
if (!check_padding_md(p2, rctx->pad_mode))
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
if (rsa_pss_restricted(rctx)) {
|
||
|
if (EVP_MD_type(rctx->md) == EVP_MD_type(p2))
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
RSAerror(RSA_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
rctx->md = p2;
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_MD:
|
||
|
*(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->md;
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD:
|
||
|
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD:
|
||
|
if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING &&
|
||
|
rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
|
||
|
RSAerror(RSA_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD);
|
||
|
return -2;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (type == EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD) {
|
||
|
if (rctx->mgf1md)
|
||
|
*(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->mgf1md;
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
*(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->md;
|
||
|
} else {
|
||
|
if (rsa_pss_restricted(rctx)) {
|
||
|
if (EVP_MD_type(rctx->mgf1md) == EVP_MD_type(p2))
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
RSAerror(RSA_R_MGF1_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
rctx->mgf1md = p2;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_LABEL:
|
||
|
if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
|
||
|
RSAerror(RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
|
||
|
return -2;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
free(rctx->oaep_label);
|
||
|
if (p2 != NULL && p1 > 0) {
|
||
|
rctx->oaep_label = p2;
|
||
|
rctx->oaep_labellen = p1;
|
||
|
} else {
|
||
|
rctx->oaep_label = NULL;
|
||
|
rctx->oaep_labellen = 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_LABEL:
|
||
|
if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
|
||
|
RSAerror(RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
|
||
|
return -2;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
*(unsigned char **)p2 = rctx->oaep_label;
|
||
|
return rctx->oaep_labellen;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DIGESTINIT:
|
||
|
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN:
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
|
||
|
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_SIGN:
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_ENCRYPT:
|
||
|
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_DECRYPT:
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
|
||
|
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_DECRYPT:
|
||
|
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_ENCRYPT:
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
if (ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS)
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* fall through */
|
||
|
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY:
|
||
|
RSAerror(RSA_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
|
||
|
return -2;
|
||
|
|
||
|
default:
|
||
|
return -2;
|
||
|
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
static int
|
||
|
pkey_rsa_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *type, const char *value)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
if (!value) {
|
||
|
RSAerror(RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING);
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (!strcmp(type, "rsa_padding_mode")) {
|
||
|
int pm;
|
||
|
if (!strcmp(value, "pkcs1"))
|
||
|
pm = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
|
||
|
else if (!strcmp(value, "none"))
|
||
|
pm = RSA_NO_PADDING;
|
||
|
else if (!strcmp(value, "oeap"))
|
||
|
pm = RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING;
|
||
|
else if (!strcmp(value, "oaep"))
|
||
|
pm = RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING;
|
||
|
else if (!strcmp(value, "x931"))
|
||
|
pm = RSA_X931_PADDING;
|
||
|
else if (!strcmp(value, "pss"))
|
||
|
pm = RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING;
|
||
|
else {
|
||
|
RSAerror(RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
|
||
|
return -2;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, pm);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (strcmp(type, "rsa_pss_saltlen") == 0) {
|
||
|
int saltlen;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (!strcmp(value, "digest"))
|
||
|
saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST;
|
||
|
else if (!strcmp(value, "max"))
|
||
|
saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX;
|
||
|
else if (!strcmp(value, "auto"))
|
||
|
saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
saltlen = atoi(value);
|
||
|
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(ctx, saltlen);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (strcmp(type, "rsa_keygen_bits") == 0) {
|
||
|
int nbits = atoi(value);
|
||
|
|
||
|
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_bits(ctx, nbits);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (strcmp(type, "rsa_keygen_pubexp") == 0) {
|
||
|
BIGNUM *pubexp = NULL;
|
||
|
int ret;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (!BN_asc2bn(&pubexp, value))
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
ret = EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_pubexp(ctx, pubexp);
|
||
|
if (ret <= 0)
|
||
|
BN_free(pubexp);
|
||
|
return ret;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (strcmp(type, "rsa_mgf1_md") == 0)
|
||
|
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_md(ctx,
|
||
|
EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
|
||
|
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD, value);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (ctx->pmeth->pkey_id == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
|
||
|
if (strcmp(type, "rsa_pss_keygen_mgf1_md") == 0)
|
||
|
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_md(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN,
|
||
|
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD, value);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (strcmp(type, "rsa_pss_keygen_md") == 0)
|
||
|
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_md(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN,
|
||
|
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD, value);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (strcmp(type, "rsa_pss_keygen_saltlen") == 0) {
|
||
|
int saltlen = atoi(value);
|
||
|
|
||
|
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_keygen_saltlen(ctx, saltlen);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (strcmp(type, "rsa_oaep_md") == 0)
|
||
|
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_md(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
|
||
|
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_MD, value);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (strcmp(type, "rsa_oaep_label") == 0) {
|
||
|
unsigned char *lab;
|
||
|
long lablen;
|
||
|
int ret;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if ((lab = string_to_hex(value, &lablen)) == NULL)
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
ret = EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_rsa_oaep_label(ctx, lab, lablen);
|
||
|
if (ret <= 0)
|
||
|
free(lab);
|
||
|
|
||
|
return ret;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
return -2;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Set PSS parameters when generating a key, if necessary. */
|
||
|
static int
|
||
|
rsa_set_pss_param(RSA *rsa, EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS)
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* If all parameters are default values then do not set PSS. */
|
||
|
if (rctx->md == NULL && rctx->mgf1md == NULL &&
|
||
|
rctx->saltlen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO)
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
rsa->pss = rsa_pss_params_create(rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md,
|
||
|
rctx->saltlen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO ? 0 : rctx->saltlen);
|
||
|
if (rsa->pss == NULL)
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
static int
|
||
|
pkey_rsa_keygen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
RSA *rsa = NULL;
|
||
|
RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
|
||
|
BN_GENCB *pcb, cb;
|
||
|
int ret;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (rctx->pub_exp == NULL) {
|
||
|
if ((rctx->pub_exp = BN_new()) == NULL)
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
if (!BN_set_word(rctx->pub_exp, RSA_F4))
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL)
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
if (ctx->pkey_gencb != NULL) {
|
||
|
pcb = &cb;
|
||
|
evp_pkey_set_cb_translate(pcb, ctx);
|
||
|
} else {
|
||
|
pcb = NULL;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
ret = RSA_generate_key_ex(rsa, rctx->nbits, rctx->pub_exp, pcb);
|
||
|
if (ret > 0 && !rsa_set_pss_param(rsa, ctx)) {
|
||
|
RSA_free(rsa);
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (ret > 0)
|
||
|
EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, ctx->pmeth->pkey_id, rsa);
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
RSA_free(rsa);
|
||
|
return ret;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
const EVP_PKEY_METHOD rsa_pkey_meth = {
|
||
|
.pkey_id = EVP_PKEY_RSA,
|
||
|
.flags = EVP_PKEY_FLAG_AUTOARGLEN,
|
||
|
|
||
|
.init = pkey_rsa_init,
|
||
|
.copy = pkey_rsa_copy,
|
||
|
.cleanup = pkey_rsa_cleanup,
|
||
|
|
||
|
.keygen = pkey_rsa_keygen,
|
||
|
|
||
|
.sign = pkey_rsa_sign,
|
||
|
|
||
|
.verify = pkey_rsa_verify,
|
||
|
|
||
|
.verify_recover = pkey_rsa_verifyrecover,
|
||
|
|
||
|
.encrypt = pkey_rsa_encrypt,
|
||
|
|
||
|
.decrypt = pkey_rsa_decrypt,
|
||
|
|
||
|
.ctrl = pkey_rsa_ctrl,
|
||
|
.ctrl_str = pkey_rsa_ctrl_str
|
||
|
};
|
||
|
|
||
|
/*
|
||
|
* Called for PSS sign or verify initialisation: checks PSS parameter
|
||
|
* sanity and sets any restrictions on key usage.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
|
||
|
static int
|
||
|
pkey_pss_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
RSA *rsa;
|
||
|
RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
|
||
|
const EVP_MD *md;
|
||
|
const EVP_MD *mgf1md;
|
||
|
int min_saltlen, max_saltlen;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Should never happen */
|
||
|
if (ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS)
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* If no restrictions just return */
|
||
|
if (rsa->pss == NULL)
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Get and check parameters */
|
||
|
if (!rsa_pss_get_param(rsa->pss, &md, &mgf1md, &min_saltlen))
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* See if minimum salt length exceeds maximum possible */
|
||
|
max_saltlen = RSA_size(rsa) - EVP_MD_size(md);
|
||
|
if ((RSA_bits(rsa) & 0x7) == 1)
|
||
|
max_saltlen--;
|
||
|
if (min_saltlen > max_saltlen) {
|
||
|
RSAerror(RSA_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH);
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
rctx->min_saltlen = min_saltlen;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/*
|
||
|
* Set PSS restrictions as defaults: we can then block any attempt to
|
||
|
* use invalid values in pkey_rsa_ctrl
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
|
||
|
rctx->md = md;
|
||
|
rctx->mgf1md = mgf1md;
|
||
|
rctx->saltlen = min_saltlen;
|
||
|
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
const EVP_PKEY_METHOD rsa_pss_pkey_meth = {
|
||
|
.pkey_id = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS,
|
||
|
.flags = EVP_PKEY_FLAG_AUTOARGLEN,
|
||
|
|
||
|
.init = pkey_rsa_init,
|
||
|
.copy = pkey_rsa_copy,
|
||
|
.cleanup = pkey_rsa_cleanup,
|
||
|
|
||
|
.keygen = pkey_rsa_keygen,
|
||
|
|
||
|
.sign_init = pkey_pss_init,
|
||
|
.sign = pkey_rsa_sign,
|
||
|
|
||
|
.verify_init = pkey_pss_init,
|
||
|
.verify = pkey_rsa_verify,
|
||
|
|
||
|
.ctrl = pkey_rsa_ctrl,
|
||
|
.ctrl_str = pkey_rsa_ctrl_str
|
||
|
};
|
||
|
|