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d7c3347f59
This makes it somewhat easier for the station to be able to receive and process the encrypted WNM-Notification frames that the AP previously sentt immediately after receiving EAPOL-Key msg 4/4. While the station is supposed to have the TK configured for receive before sending out EAPOL-Key msg 4/4, not many actual implementations do that. As such, there is a race condition in being able to configure the key at the station and the AP sending out the first encrypted frame after EAPOL-Key 4/4. The extra 100 ms time here makes it more likely for the station to have managed to configure the key in time. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> |
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| .. | ||
| ap | ||
| common | ||
| crypto | ||
| drivers | ||
| eap_common | ||
| eap_peer | ||
| eap_server | ||
| eapol_auth | ||
| eapol_supp | ||
| fst | ||
| l2_packet | ||
| p2p | ||
| pae | ||
| radius | ||
| rsn_supp | ||
| tls | ||
| utils | ||
| wps | ||
| lib.rules | ||
| Makefile | ||