mirror of
https://github.com/vanhoefm/fragattacks.git
synced 2024-11-29 18:58:21 -05:00
1390 lines
37 KiB
C
1390 lines
37 KiB
C
/*
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* EAP peer method: EAP-AKA (RFC 4187) and EAP-AKA' (draft-arkko-eap-aka-kdf)
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* Copyright (c) 2004-2008, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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*
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* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
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* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
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* published by the Free Software Foundation.
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*
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* Alternatively, this software may be distributed under the terms of BSD
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* license.
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*
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* See README and COPYING for more details.
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*/
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#include "includes.h"
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#include "common.h"
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#include "pcsc_funcs.h"
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#include "crypto/crypto.h"
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#include "crypto/sha1.h"
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#include "crypto/sha256.h"
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#include "crypto/milenage.h"
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#include "eap_common/eap_sim_common.h"
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#include "eap_config.h"
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#include "eap_i.h"
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struct eap_aka_data {
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u8 ik[EAP_AKA_IK_LEN], ck[EAP_AKA_CK_LEN], res[EAP_AKA_RES_MAX_LEN];
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size_t res_len;
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u8 nonce_s[EAP_SIM_NONCE_S_LEN];
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u8 mk[EAP_SIM_MK_LEN];
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u8 k_aut[EAP_AKA_PRIME_K_AUT_LEN];
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u8 k_encr[EAP_SIM_K_ENCR_LEN];
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u8 k_re[EAP_AKA_PRIME_K_RE_LEN]; /* EAP-AKA' only */
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u8 msk[EAP_SIM_KEYING_DATA_LEN];
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u8 emsk[EAP_EMSK_LEN];
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u8 rand[EAP_AKA_RAND_LEN], autn[EAP_AKA_AUTN_LEN];
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u8 auts[EAP_AKA_AUTS_LEN];
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int num_id_req, num_notification;
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u8 *pseudonym;
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size_t pseudonym_len;
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u8 *reauth_id;
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size_t reauth_id_len;
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int reauth;
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unsigned int counter, counter_too_small;
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u8 *last_eap_identity;
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size_t last_eap_identity_len;
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enum {
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CONTINUE, RESULT_SUCCESS, RESULT_FAILURE, SUCCESS, FAILURE
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} state;
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struct wpabuf *id_msgs;
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int prev_id;
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int result_ind, use_result_ind;
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u8 eap_method;
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u8 *network_name;
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size_t network_name_len;
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u16 kdf;
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int kdf_negotiation;
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};
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#ifndef CONFIG_NO_STDOUT_DEBUG
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static const char * eap_aka_state_txt(int state)
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{
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switch (state) {
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case CONTINUE:
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return "CONTINUE";
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case RESULT_SUCCESS:
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return "RESULT_SUCCESS";
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case RESULT_FAILURE:
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return "RESULT_FAILURE";
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case SUCCESS:
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return "SUCCESS";
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case FAILURE:
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return "FAILURE";
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default:
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return "?";
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}
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}
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#endif /* CONFIG_NO_STDOUT_DEBUG */
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static void eap_aka_state(struct eap_aka_data *data, int state)
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{
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: %s -> %s",
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eap_aka_state_txt(data->state),
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eap_aka_state_txt(state));
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data->state = state;
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}
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static void * eap_aka_init(struct eap_sm *sm)
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{
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struct eap_aka_data *data;
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const char *phase1 = eap_get_config_phase1(sm);
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data = os_zalloc(sizeof(*data));
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if (data == NULL)
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return NULL;
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data->eap_method = EAP_TYPE_AKA;
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eap_aka_state(data, CONTINUE);
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data->prev_id = -1;
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data->result_ind = phase1 && os_strstr(phase1, "result_ind=1") != NULL;
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return data;
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}
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#ifdef EAP_AKA_PRIME
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static void * eap_aka_prime_init(struct eap_sm *sm)
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{
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struct eap_aka_data *data = eap_aka_init(sm);
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if (data == NULL)
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return NULL;
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data->eap_method = EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME;
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return data;
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}
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#endif /* EAP_AKA_PRIME */
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static void eap_aka_deinit(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv)
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{
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struct eap_aka_data *data = priv;
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if (data) {
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os_free(data->pseudonym);
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os_free(data->reauth_id);
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os_free(data->last_eap_identity);
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wpabuf_free(data->id_msgs);
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os_free(data->network_name);
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os_free(data);
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}
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}
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static int eap_aka_umts_auth(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_aka_data *data)
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{
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struct eap_peer_config *conf;
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: UMTS authentication algorithm");
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conf = eap_get_config(sm);
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if (conf == NULL)
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return -1;
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if (conf->pcsc) {
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return scard_umts_auth(sm->scard_ctx, data->rand,
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data->autn, data->res, &data->res_len,
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data->ik, data->ck, data->auts);
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}
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#ifdef CONFIG_USIM_SIMULATOR
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if (conf->password) {
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u8 opc[16], k[16], sqn[6];
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const char *pos;
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Use internal Milenage "
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"implementation for UMTS authentication");
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if (conf->password_len < 78) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: invalid Milenage "
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"password");
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return -1;
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}
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pos = (const char *) conf->password;
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if (hexstr2bin(pos, k, 16))
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return -1;
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pos += 32;
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if (*pos != ':')
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return -1;
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pos++;
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if (hexstr2bin(pos, opc, 16))
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return -1;
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pos += 32;
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if (*pos != ':')
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return -1;
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pos++;
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if (hexstr2bin(pos, sqn, 6))
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return -1;
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return milenage_check(opc, k, sqn, data->rand, data->autn,
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data->ik, data->ck,
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data->res, &data->res_len, data->auts);
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}
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#endif /* CONFIG_USIM_SIMULATOR */
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#ifdef CONFIG_USIM_HARDCODED
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Use hardcoded Kc and SRES values for "
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"testing");
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/* These hardcoded Kc and SRES values are used for testing.
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* Could consider making them configurable. */
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os_memset(data->res, '2', EAP_AKA_RES_MAX_LEN);
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data->res_len = EAP_AKA_RES_MAX_LEN;
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os_memset(data->ik, '3', EAP_AKA_IK_LEN);
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os_memset(data->ck, '4', EAP_AKA_CK_LEN);
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{
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u8 autn[EAP_AKA_AUTN_LEN];
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os_memset(autn, '1', EAP_AKA_AUTN_LEN);
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if (os_memcmp(autn, data->autn, EAP_AKA_AUTN_LEN) != 0) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: AUTN did not match "
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"with expected value");
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return -1;
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}
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}
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#if 0
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{
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static int test_resync = 1;
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if (test_resync) {
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/* Test Resynchronization */
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test_resync = 0;
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return -2;
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}
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}
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#endif
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return 0;
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#else /* CONFIG_USIM_HARDCODED */
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: No UMTS authentication algorith "
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"enabled");
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return -1;
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#endif /* CONFIG_USIM_HARDCODED */
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}
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#define CLEAR_PSEUDONYM 0x01
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#define CLEAR_REAUTH_ID 0x02
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#define CLEAR_EAP_ID 0x04
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static void eap_aka_clear_identities(struct eap_aka_data *data, int id)
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{
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: forgetting old%s%s%s",
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id & CLEAR_PSEUDONYM ? " pseudonym" : "",
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id & CLEAR_REAUTH_ID ? " reauth_id" : "",
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id & CLEAR_EAP_ID ? " eap_id" : "");
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if (id & CLEAR_PSEUDONYM) {
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os_free(data->pseudonym);
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data->pseudonym = NULL;
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data->pseudonym_len = 0;
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}
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if (id & CLEAR_REAUTH_ID) {
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os_free(data->reauth_id);
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data->reauth_id = NULL;
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data->reauth_id_len = 0;
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}
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if (id & CLEAR_EAP_ID) {
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os_free(data->last_eap_identity);
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data->last_eap_identity = NULL;
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data->last_eap_identity_len = 0;
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}
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}
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static int eap_aka_learn_ids(struct eap_aka_data *data,
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struct eap_sim_attrs *attr)
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{
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if (attr->next_pseudonym) {
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os_free(data->pseudonym);
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data->pseudonym = os_malloc(attr->next_pseudonym_len);
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if (data->pseudonym == NULL) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-AKA: (encr) No memory for "
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"next pseudonym");
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return -1;
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}
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os_memcpy(data->pseudonym, attr->next_pseudonym,
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attr->next_pseudonym_len);
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data->pseudonym_len = attr->next_pseudonym_len;
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wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_DEBUG,
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"EAP-AKA: (encr) AT_NEXT_PSEUDONYM",
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data->pseudonym,
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data->pseudonym_len);
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}
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if (attr->next_reauth_id) {
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os_free(data->reauth_id);
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data->reauth_id = os_malloc(attr->next_reauth_id_len);
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if (data->reauth_id == NULL) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-AKA: (encr) No memory for "
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"next reauth_id");
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return -1;
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}
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os_memcpy(data->reauth_id, attr->next_reauth_id,
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attr->next_reauth_id_len);
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data->reauth_id_len = attr->next_reauth_id_len;
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wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_DEBUG,
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"EAP-AKA: (encr) AT_NEXT_REAUTH_ID",
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data->reauth_id,
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data->reauth_id_len);
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}
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return 0;
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}
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static int eap_aka_add_id_msg(struct eap_aka_data *data,
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const struct wpabuf *msg)
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{
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if (msg == NULL)
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return -1;
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if (data->id_msgs == NULL) {
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data->id_msgs = wpabuf_dup(msg);
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return data->id_msgs == NULL ? -1 : 0;
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}
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if (wpabuf_resize(&data->id_msgs, wpabuf_len(msg)) < 0)
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return -1;
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wpabuf_put_buf(data->id_msgs, msg);
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return 0;
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}
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static void eap_aka_add_checkcode(struct eap_aka_data *data,
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struct eap_sim_msg *msg)
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{
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const u8 *addr;
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size_t len;
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u8 hash[SHA256_MAC_LEN];
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_CHECKCODE");
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if (data->id_msgs == NULL) {
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/*
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* No EAP-AKA/Identity packets were exchanged - send empty
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* checkcode.
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*/
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eap_sim_msg_add(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_CHECKCODE, 0, NULL, 0);
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return;
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}
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/* Checkcode is SHA1/SHA256 hash over all EAP-AKA/Identity packets. */
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addr = wpabuf_head(data->id_msgs);
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len = wpabuf_len(data->id_msgs);
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wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "EAP-AKA: AT_CHECKCODE data", addr, len);
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#ifdef EAP_AKA_PRIME
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if (data->eap_method == EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME)
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sha256_vector(1, &addr, &len, hash);
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else
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#endif /* EAP_AKA_PRIME */
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sha1_vector(1, &addr, &len, hash);
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eap_sim_msg_add(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_CHECKCODE, 0, hash,
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data->eap_method == EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME ?
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EAP_AKA_PRIME_CHECKCODE_LEN : EAP_AKA_CHECKCODE_LEN);
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}
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static int eap_aka_verify_checkcode(struct eap_aka_data *data,
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const u8 *checkcode, size_t checkcode_len)
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{
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const u8 *addr;
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size_t len;
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u8 hash[SHA256_MAC_LEN];
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size_t hash_len;
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if (checkcode == NULL)
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return -1;
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if (data->id_msgs == NULL) {
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if (checkcode_len != 0) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Checkcode from server "
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"indicates that AKA/Identity messages were "
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"used, but they were not");
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return -1;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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hash_len = data->eap_method == EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME ?
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EAP_AKA_PRIME_CHECKCODE_LEN : EAP_AKA_CHECKCODE_LEN;
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if (checkcode_len != hash_len) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Checkcode from server "
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"indicates that AKA/Identity message were not "
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"used, but they were");
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return -1;
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}
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/* Checkcode is SHA1/SHA256 hash over all EAP-AKA/Identity packets. */
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addr = wpabuf_head(data->id_msgs);
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len = wpabuf_len(data->id_msgs);
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#ifdef EAP_AKA_PRIME
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if (data->eap_method == EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME)
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sha256_vector(1, &addr, &len, hash);
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else
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#endif /* EAP_AKA_PRIME */
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sha1_vector(1, &addr, &len, hash);
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if (os_memcmp(hash, checkcode, hash_len) != 0) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Mismatch in AT_CHECKCODE");
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return -1;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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static struct wpabuf * eap_aka_client_error(struct eap_aka_data *data, u8 id,
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int err)
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{
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struct eap_sim_msg *msg;
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eap_aka_state(data, FAILURE);
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data->num_id_req = 0;
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data->num_notification = 0;
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msg = eap_sim_msg_init(EAP_CODE_RESPONSE, id, data->eap_method,
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EAP_AKA_SUBTYPE_CLIENT_ERROR);
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eap_sim_msg_add(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_CLIENT_ERROR_CODE, err, NULL, 0);
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return eap_sim_msg_finish(msg, NULL, NULL, 0);
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}
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static struct wpabuf * eap_aka_authentication_reject(struct eap_aka_data *data,
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u8 id)
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{
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struct eap_sim_msg *msg;
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eap_aka_state(data, FAILURE);
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data->num_id_req = 0;
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data->num_notification = 0;
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Generating EAP-AKA Authentication-Reject "
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"(id=%d)", id);
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msg = eap_sim_msg_init(EAP_CODE_RESPONSE, id, data->eap_method,
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EAP_AKA_SUBTYPE_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT);
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return eap_sim_msg_finish(msg, NULL, NULL, 0);
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}
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static struct wpabuf * eap_aka_synchronization_failure(
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struct eap_aka_data *data, u8 id)
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{
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struct eap_sim_msg *msg;
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data->num_id_req = 0;
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data->num_notification = 0;
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Generating EAP-AKA Synchronization-Failure "
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"(id=%d)", id);
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msg = eap_sim_msg_init(EAP_CODE_RESPONSE, id, data->eap_method,
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EAP_AKA_SUBTYPE_SYNCHRONIZATION_FAILURE);
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_AUTS");
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eap_sim_msg_add_full(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_AUTS, data->auts,
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EAP_AKA_AUTS_LEN);
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return eap_sim_msg_finish(msg, NULL, NULL, 0);
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}
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static struct wpabuf * eap_aka_response_identity(struct eap_sm *sm,
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struct eap_aka_data *data,
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u8 id,
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enum eap_sim_id_req id_req)
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{
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const u8 *identity = NULL;
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size_t identity_len = 0;
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struct eap_sim_msg *msg;
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data->reauth = 0;
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if (id_req == ANY_ID && data->reauth_id) {
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identity = data->reauth_id;
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identity_len = data->reauth_id_len;
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data->reauth = 1;
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} else if ((id_req == ANY_ID || id_req == FULLAUTH_ID) &&
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data->pseudonym) {
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identity = data->pseudonym;
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identity_len = data->pseudonym_len;
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eap_aka_clear_identities(data, CLEAR_REAUTH_ID);
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} else if (id_req != NO_ID_REQ) {
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identity = eap_get_config_identity(sm, &identity_len);
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if (identity) {
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eap_aka_clear_identities(data, CLEAR_PSEUDONYM |
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CLEAR_REAUTH_ID);
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}
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}
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if (id_req != NO_ID_REQ)
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eap_aka_clear_identities(data, CLEAR_EAP_ID);
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Generating EAP-AKA Identity (id=%d)", id);
|
|
msg = eap_sim_msg_init(EAP_CODE_RESPONSE, id, data->eap_method,
|
|
EAP_AKA_SUBTYPE_IDENTITY);
|
|
|
|
if (identity) {
|
|
wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_IDENTITY",
|
|
identity, identity_len);
|
|
eap_sim_msg_add(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_IDENTITY, identity_len,
|
|
identity, identity_len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return eap_sim_msg_finish(msg, NULL, NULL, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static struct wpabuf * eap_aka_response_challenge(struct eap_aka_data *data,
|
|
u8 id)
|
|
{
|
|
struct eap_sim_msg *msg;
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Generating EAP-AKA Challenge (id=%d)", id);
|
|
msg = eap_sim_msg_init(EAP_CODE_RESPONSE, id, data->eap_method,
|
|
EAP_AKA_SUBTYPE_CHALLENGE);
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_RES");
|
|
eap_sim_msg_add(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_RES, data->res_len * 8,
|
|
data->res, data->res_len);
|
|
eap_aka_add_checkcode(data, msg);
|
|
if (data->use_result_ind) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_RESULT_IND");
|
|
eap_sim_msg_add(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_RESULT_IND, 0, NULL, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_MAC");
|
|
eap_sim_msg_add_mac(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_MAC);
|
|
return eap_sim_msg_finish(msg, data->k_aut, (u8 *) "", 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static struct wpabuf * eap_aka_response_reauth(struct eap_aka_data *data,
|
|
u8 id, int counter_too_small,
|
|
const u8 *nonce_s)
|
|
{
|
|
struct eap_sim_msg *msg;
|
|
unsigned int counter;
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Generating EAP-AKA Reauthentication (id=%d)",
|
|
id);
|
|
msg = eap_sim_msg_init(EAP_CODE_RESPONSE, id, data->eap_method,
|
|
EAP_AKA_SUBTYPE_REAUTHENTICATION);
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_IV");
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_ENCR_DATA");
|
|
eap_sim_msg_add_encr_start(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_IV, EAP_SIM_AT_ENCR_DATA);
|
|
|
|
if (counter_too_small) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " *AT_COUNTER_TOO_SMALL");
|
|
eap_sim_msg_add(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_COUNTER_TOO_SMALL, 0, NULL, 0);
|
|
counter = data->counter_too_small;
|
|
} else
|
|
counter = data->counter;
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " *AT_COUNTER %d", counter);
|
|
eap_sim_msg_add(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_COUNTER, counter, NULL, 0);
|
|
|
|
if (eap_sim_msg_add_encr_end(msg, data->k_encr, EAP_SIM_AT_PADDING)) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Failed to encrypt "
|
|
"AT_ENCR_DATA");
|
|
eap_sim_msg_free(msg);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
eap_aka_add_checkcode(data, msg);
|
|
if (data->use_result_ind) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_RESULT_IND");
|
|
eap_sim_msg_add(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_RESULT_IND, 0, NULL, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_MAC");
|
|
eap_sim_msg_add_mac(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_MAC);
|
|
return eap_sim_msg_finish(msg, data->k_aut, nonce_s,
|
|
EAP_SIM_NONCE_S_LEN);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static struct wpabuf * eap_aka_response_notification(struct eap_aka_data *data,
|
|
u8 id, u16 notification)
|
|
{
|
|
struct eap_sim_msg *msg;
|
|
u8 *k_aut = (notification & 0x4000) == 0 ? data->k_aut : NULL;
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Generating EAP-AKA Notification (id=%d)", id);
|
|
msg = eap_sim_msg_init(EAP_CODE_RESPONSE, id, data->eap_method,
|
|
EAP_AKA_SUBTYPE_NOTIFICATION);
|
|
if (k_aut && data->reauth) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_IV");
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_ENCR_DATA");
|
|
eap_sim_msg_add_encr_start(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_IV,
|
|
EAP_SIM_AT_ENCR_DATA);
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " *AT_COUNTER %d", data->counter);
|
|
eap_sim_msg_add(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_COUNTER, data->counter,
|
|
NULL, 0);
|
|
if (eap_sim_msg_add_encr_end(msg, data->k_encr,
|
|
EAP_SIM_AT_PADDING)) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Failed to encrypt "
|
|
"AT_ENCR_DATA");
|
|
eap_sim_msg_free(msg);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (k_aut) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_MAC");
|
|
eap_sim_msg_add_mac(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_MAC);
|
|
}
|
|
return eap_sim_msg_finish(msg, k_aut, (u8 *) "", 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static struct wpabuf * eap_aka_process_identity(struct eap_sm *sm,
|
|
struct eap_aka_data *data,
|
|
u8 id,
|
|
const struct wpabuf *reqData,
|
|
struct eap_sim_attrs *attr)
|
|
{
|
|
int id_error;
|
|
struct wpabuf *buf;
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: subtype Identity");
|
|
|
|
id_error = 0;
|
|
switch (attr->id_req) {
|
|
case NO_ID_REQ:
|
|
break;
|
|
case ANY_ID:
|
|
if (data->num_id_req > 0)
|
|
id_error++;
|
|
data->num_id_req++;
|
|
break;
|
|
case FULLAUTH_ID:
|
|
if (data->num_id_req > 1)
|
|
id_error++;
|
|
data->num_id_req++;
|
|
break;
|
|
case PERMANENT_ID:
|
|
if (data->num_id_req > 2)
|
|
id_error++;
|
|
data->num_id_req++;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
if (id_error) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-AKA: Too many ID requests "
|
|
"used within one authentication");
|
|
return eap_aka_client_error(data, id,
|
|
EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
buf = eap_aka_response_identity(sm, data, id, attr->id_req);
|
|
|
|
if (data->prev_id != id) {
|
|
eap_aka_add_id_msg(data, reqData);
|
|
eap_aka_add_id_msg(data, buf);
|
|
data->prev_id = id;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return buf;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int eap_aka_verify_mac(struct eap_aka_data *data,
|
|
const struct wpabuf *req,
|
|
const u8 *mac, const u8 *extra,
|
|
size_t extra_len)
|
|
{
|
|
if (data->eap_method == EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME)
|
|
return eap_sim_verify_mac_sha256(data->k_aut, req, mac, extra,
|
|
extra_len);
|
|
return eap_sim_verify_mac(data->k_aut, req, mac, extra, extra_len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef EAP_AKA_PRIME
|
|
static struct wpabuf * eap_aka_prime_kdf_select(struct eap_aka_data *data,
|
|
u8 id, u16 kdf)
|
|
{
|
|
struct eap_sim_msg *msg;
|
|
|
|
data->kdf_negotiation = 1;
|
|
data->kdf = kdf;
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Generating EAP-AKA Challenge (id=%d) (KDF "
|
|
"select)", id);
|
|
msg = eap_sim_msg_init(EAP_CODE_RESPONSE, id, data->eap_method,
|
|
EAP_AKA_SUBTYPE_CHALLENGE);
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_KDF");
|
|
eap_sim_msg_add(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_KDF, kdf, NULL, 0);
|
|
return eap_sim_msg_finish(msg, NULL, NULL, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static struct wpabuf * eap_aka_prime_kdf_neg(struct eap_aka_data *data,
|
|
u8 id, struct eap_sim_attrs *attr)
|
|
{
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < attr->kdf_count; i++) {
|
|
if (attr->kdf[i] == EAP_AKA_PRIME_KDF)
|
|
return eap_aka_prime_kdf_select(data, id,
|
|
EAP_AKA_PRIME_KDF);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* No matching KDF found - fail authentication as if AUTN had been
|
|
* incorrect */
|
|
return eap_aka_authentication_reject(data, id);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int eap_aka_prime_kdf_valid(struct eap_aka_data *data,
|
|
struct eap_sim_attrs *attr)
|
|
{
|
|
size_t i, j;
|
|
|
|
if (attr->kdf_count == 0)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/* The only allowed (and required) duplication of a KDF is the addition
|
|
* of the selected KDF into the beginning of the list. */
|
|
|
|
if (data->kdf_negotiation) {
|
|
if (attr->kdf[0] != data->kdf) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA': The server did not "
|
|
"accept the selected KDF");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (i = 1; i < attr->kdf_count; i++) {
|
|
if (attr->kdf[i] == data->kdf)
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
if (i == attr->kdf_count &&
|
|
attr->kdf_count < EAP_AKA_PRIME_KDF_MAX) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA': The server did not "
|
|
"duplicate the selected KDF");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* TODO: should check that the list is identical to the one
|
|
* used in the previous Challenge message apart from the added
|
|
* entry in the beginning. */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (i = data->kdf ? 1 : 0; i < attr->kdf_count; i++) {
|
|
for (j = i + 1; j < attr->kdf_count; j++) {
|
|
if (attr->kdf[i] == attr->kdf[j]) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA': The server "
|
|
"included a duplicated KDF");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* EAP_AKA_PRIME */
|
|
|
|
|
|
static struct wpabuf * eap_aka_process_challenge(struct eap_sm *sm,
|
|
struct eap_aka_data *data,
|
|
u8 id,
|
|
const struct wpabuf *reqData,
|
|
struct eap_sim_attrs *attr)
|
|
{
|
|
const u8 *identity;
|
|
size_t identity_len;
|
|
int res;
|
|
struct eap_sim_attrs eattr;
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: subtype Challenge");
|
|
|
|
if (attr->checkcode &&
|
|
eap_aka_verify_checkcode(data, attr->checkcode,
|
|
attr->checkcode_len)) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Invalid AT_CHECKCODE in the "
|
|
"message");
|
|
return eap_aka_client_error(data, id,
|
|
EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef EAP_AKA_PRIME
|
|
if (data->eap_method == EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME) {
|
|
if (!attr->kdf_input || attr->kdf_input_len == 0) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA': Challenge message "
|
|
"did not include non-empty AT_KDF_INPUT");
|
|
/* Fail authentication as if AUTN had been incorrect */
|
|
return eap_aka_authentication_reject(data, id);
|
|
}
|
|
os_free(data->network_name);
|
|
data->network_name = os_malloc(attr->kdf_input_len);
|
|
if (data->network_name == NULL) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA': No memory for "
|
|
"storing Network Name");
|
|
return eap_aka_authentication_reject(data, id);
|
|
}
|
|
os_memcpy(data->network_name, attr->kdf_input,
|
|
attr->kdf_input_len);
|
|
data->network_name_len = attr->kdf_input_len;
|
|
wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA': Network Name "
|
|
"(AT_KDF_INPUT)",
|
|
data->network_name, data->network_name_len);
|
|
/* TODO: check Network Name per 3GPP.33.402 */
|
|
|
|
if (!eap_aka_prime_kdf_valid(data, attr))
|
|
return eap_aka_authentication_reject(data, id);
|
|
|
|
if (attr->kdf[0] != EAP_AKA_PRIME_KDF)
|
|
return eap_aka_prime_kdf_neg(data, id, attr);
|
|
|
|
data->kdf = EAP_AKA_PRIME_KDF;
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA': KDF %d selected", data->kdf);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (data->eap_method == EAP_TYPE_AKA && attr->bidding) {
|
|
u16 flags = WPA_GET_BE16(attr->bidding);
|
|
if ((flags & EAP_AKA_BIDDING_FLAG_D) &&
|
|
eap_allowed_method(sm, EAP_VENDOR_IETF,
|
|
EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME)) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Bidding down from "
|
|
"AKA' to AKA detected");
|
|
/* Fail authentication as if AUTN had been incorrect */
|
|
return eap_aka_authentication_reject(data, id);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* EAP_AKA_PRIME */
|
|
|
|
data->reauth = 0;
|
|
if (!attr->mac || !attr->rand || !attr->autn) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Challenge message "
|
|
"did not include%s%s%s",
|
|
!attr->mac ? " AT_MAC" : "",
|
|
!attr->rand ? " AT_RAND" : "",
|
|
!attr->autn ? " AT_AUTN" : "");
|
|
return eap_aka_client_error(data, id,
|
|
EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET);
|
|
}
|
|
os_memcpy(data->rand, attr->rand, EAP_AKA_RAND_LEN);
|
|
os_memcpy(data->autn, attr->autn, EAP_AKA_AUTN_LEN);
|
|
|
|
res = eap_aka_umts_auth(sm, data);
|
|
if (res == -1) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: UMTS authentication "
|
|
"failed (AUTN)");
|
|
return eap_aka_authentication_reject(data, id);
|
|
} else if (res == -2) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: UMTS authentication "
|
|
"failed (AUTN seq# -> AUTS)");
|
|
return eap_aka_synchronization_failure(data, id);
|
|
} else if (res) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: UMTS authentication failed");
|
|
return eap_aka_client_error(data, id,
|
|
EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET);
|
|
}
|
|
#ifdef EAP_AKA_PRIME
|
|
if (data->eap_method == EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME) {
|
|
/* Note: AUTN = (SQN ^ AK) || AMF || MAC which gives us the
|
|
* needed 6-octet SQN ^ AK for CK',IK' derivation */
|
|
u16 amf = WPA_GET_BE16(data->autn + 6);
|
|
if (!(amf & 0x8000)) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA': AMF separation bit "
|
|
"not set (AMF=0x%4x)", amf);
|
|
return eap_aka_authentication_reject(data, id);
|
|
}
|
|
eap_aka_prime_derive_ck_ik_prime(data->ck, data->ik,
|
|
data->autn,
|
|
data->network_name,
|
|
data->network_name_len);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* EAP_AKA_PRIME */
|
|
if (data->last_eap_identity) {
|
|
identity = data->last_eap_identity;
|
|
identity_len = data->last_eap_identity_len;
|
|
} else if (data->pseudonym) {
|
|
identity = data->pseudonym;
|
|
identity_len = data->pseudonym_len;
|
|
} else
|
|
identity = eap_get_config_identity(sm, &identity_len);
|
|
wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Selected identity for MK "
|
|
"derivation", identity, identity_len);
|
|
if (data->eap_method == EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME) {
|
|
eap_aka_prime_derive_keys(identity, identity_len, data->ik,
|
|
data->ck, data->k_encr, data->k_aut,
|
|
data->k_re, data->msk, data->emsk);
|
|
} else {
|
|
eap_aka_derive_mk(identity, identity_len, data->ik, data->ck,
|
|
data->mk);
|
|
eap_sim_derive_keys(data->mk, data->k_encr, data->k_aut,
|
|
data->msk, data->emsk);
|
|
}
|
|
if (eap_aka_verify_mac(data, reqData, attr->mac, (u8 *) "", 0)) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Challenge message "
|
|
"used invalid AT_MAC");
|
|
return eap_aka_client_error(data, id,
|
|
EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Old reauthentication and pseudonym identities must not be used
|
|
* anymore. In other words, if no new identities are received, full
|
|
* authentication will be used on next reauthentication. */
|
|
eap_aka_clear_identities(data, CLEAR_PSEUDONYM | CLEAR_REAUTH_ID |
|
|
CLEAR_EAP_ID);
|
|
|
|
if (attr->encr_data) {
|
|
u8 *decrypted;
|
|
decrypted = eap_sim_parse_encr(data->k_encr, attr->encr_data,
|
|
attr->encr_data_len, attr->iv,
|
|
&eattr, 0);
|
|
if (decrypted == NULL) {
|
|
return eap_aka_client_error(
|
|
data, id, EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET);
|
|
}
|
|
eap_aka_learn_ids(data, &eattr);
|
|
os_free(decrypted);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (data->result_ind && attr->result_ind)
|
|
data->use_result_ind = 1;
|
|
|
|
if (data->state != FAILURE && data->state != RESULT_FAILURE) {
|
|
eap_aka_state(data, data->use_result_ind ?
|
|
RESULT_SUCCESS : SUCCESS);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
data->num_id_req = 0;
|
|
data->num_notification = 0;
|
|
/* RFC 4187 specifies that counter is initialized to one after
|
|
* fullauth, but initializing it to zero makes it easier to implement
|
|
* reauth verification. */
|
|
data->counter = 0;
|
|
return eap_aka_response_challenge(data, id);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int eap_aka_process_notification_reauth(struct eap_aka_data *data,
|
|
struct eap_sim_attrs *attr)
|
|
{
|
|
struct eap_sim_attrs eattr;
|
|
u8 *decrypted;
|
|
|
|
if (attr->encr_data == NULL || attr->iv == NULL) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Notification message after "
|
|
"reauth did not include encrypted data");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
decrypted = eap_sim_parse_encr(data->k_encr, attr->encr_data,
|
|
attr->encr_data_len, attr->iv, &eattr,
|
|
0);
|
|
if (decrypted == NULL) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Failed to parse encrypted "
|
|
"data from notification message");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (eattr.counter < 0 || (size_t) eattr.counter != data->counter) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Counter in notification "
|
|
"message does not match with counter in reauth "
|
|
"message");
|
|
os_free(decrypted);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
os_free(decrypted);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int eap_aka_process_notification_auth(struct eap_aka_data *data,
|
|
const struct wpabuf *reqData,
|
|
struct eap_sim_attrs *attr)
|
|
{
|
|
if (attr->mac == NULL) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-AKA: no AT_MAC in after_auth "
|
|
"Notification message");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (eap_aka_verify_mac(data, reqData, attr->mac, (u8 *) "", 0)) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Notification message "
|
|
"used invalid AT_MAC");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (data->reauth &&
|
|
eap_aka_process_notification_reauth(data, attr)) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Invalid notification "
|
|
"message after reauth");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static struct wpabuf * eap_aka_process_notification(
|
|
struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_aka_data *data, u8 id,
|
|
const struct wpabuf *reqData, struct eap_sim_attrs *attr)
|
|
{
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: subtype Notification");
|
|
if (data->num_notification > 0) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-AKA: too many notification "
|
|
"rounds (only one allowed)");
|
|
return eap_aka_client_error(data, id,
|
|
EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET);
|
|
}
|
|
data->num_notification++;
|
|
if (attr->notification == -1) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-AKA: no AT_NOTIFICATION in "
|
|
"Notification message");
|
|
return eap_aka_client_error(data, id,
|
|
EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((attr->notification & 0x4000) == 0 &&
|
|
eap_aka_process_notification_auth(data, reqData, attr)) {
|
|
return eap_aka_client_error(data, id,
|
|
EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
eap_sim_report_notification(sm->msg_ctx, attr->notification, 1);
|
|
if (attr->notification >= 0 && attr->notification < 32768) {
|
|
eap_aka_state(data, FAILURE);
|
|
} else if (attr->notification == EAP_SIM_SUCCESS &&
|
|
data->state == RESULT_SUCCESS)
|
|
eap_aka_state(data, SUCCESS);
|
|
return eap_aka_response_notification(data, id, attr->notification);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static struct wpabuf * eap_aka_process_reauthentication(
|
|
struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_aka_data *data, u8 id,
|
|
const struct wpabuf *reqData, struct eap_sim_attrs *attr)
|
|
{
|
|
struct eap_sim_attrs eattr;
|
|
u8 *decrypted;
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: subtype Reauthentication");
|
|
|
|
if (attr->checkcode &&
|
|
eap_aka_verify_checkcode(data, attr->checkcode,
|
|
attr->checkcode_len)) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Invalid AT_CHECKCODE in the "
|
|
"message");
|
|
return eap_aka_client_error(data, id,
|
|
EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (data->reauth_id == NULL) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Server is trying "
|
|
"reauthentication, but no reauth_id available");
|
|
return eap_aka_client_error(data, id,
|
|
EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
data->reauth = 1;
|
|
if (eap_aka_verify_mac(data, reqData, attr->mac, (u8 *) "", 0)) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Reauthentication "
|
|
"did not have valid AT_MAC");
|
|
return eap_aka_client_error(data, id,
|
|
EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (attr->encr_data == NULL || attr->iv == NULL) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Reauthentication "
|
|
"message did not include encrypted data");
|
|
return eap_aka_client_error(data, id,
|
|
EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
decrypted = eap_sim_parse_encr(data->k_encr, attr->encr_data,
|
|
attr->encr_data_len, attr->iv, &eattr,
|
|
0);
|
|
if (decrypted == NULL) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Failed to parse encrypted "
|
|
"data from reauthentication message");
|
|
return eap_aka_client_error(data, id,
|
|
EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (eattr.nonce_s == NULL || eattr.counter < 0) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-AKA: (encr) No%s%s in reauth packet",
|
|
!eattr.nonce_s ? " AT_NONCE_S" : "",
|
|
eattr.counter < 0 ? " AT_COUNTER" : "");
|
|
os_free(decrypted);
|
|
return eap_aka_client_error(data, id,
|
|
EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (eattr.counter < 0 || (size_t) eattr.counter <= data->counter) {
|
|
struct wpabuf *res;
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-AKA: (encr) Invalid counter "
|
|
"(%d <= %d)", eattr.counter, data->counter);
|
|
data->counter_too_small = eattr.counter;
|
|
|
|
/* Reply using Re-auth w/ AT_COUNTER_TOO_SMALL. The current
|
|
* reauth_id must not be used to start a new reauthentication.
|
|
* However, since it was used in the last EAP-Response-Identity
|
|
* packet, it has to saved for the following fullauth to be
|
|
* used in MK derivation. */
|
|
os_free(data->last_eap_identity);
|
|
data->last_eap_identity = data->reauth_id;
|
|
data->last_eap_identity_len = data->reauth_id_len;
|
|
data->reauth_id = NULL;
|
|
data->reauth_id_len = 0;
|
|
|
|
res = eap_aka_response_reauth(data, id, 1, eattr.nonce_s);
|
|
os_free(decrypted);
|
|
|
|
return res;
|
|
}
|
|
data->counter = eattr.counter;
|
|
|
|
os_memcpy(data->nonce_s, eattr.nonce_s, EAP_SIM_NONCE_S_LEN);
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: (encr) AT_NONCE_S",
|
|
data->nonce_s, EAP_SIM_NONCE_S_LEN);
|
|
|
|
if (data->eap_method == EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME) {
|
|
eap_aka_prime_derive_keys_reauth(data->k_re, data->counter,
|
|
data->reauth_id,
|
|
data->reauth_id_len,
|
|
data->nonce_s,
|
|
data->msk, data->emsk);
|
|
} else {
|
|
eap_sim_derive_keys_reauth(data->counter, data->reauth_id,
|
|
data->reauth_id_len,
|
|
data->nonce_s, data->mk,
|
|
data->msk, data->emsk);
|
|
}
|
|
eap_aka_clear_identities(data, CLEAR_REAUTH_ID | CLEAR_EAP_ID);
|
|
eap_aka_learn_ids(data, &eattr);
|
|
|
|
if (data->result_ind && attr->result_ind)
|
|
data->use_result_ind = 1;
|
|
|
|
if (data->state != FAILURE && data->state != RESULT_FAILURE) {
|
|
eap_aka_state(data, data->use_result_ind ?
|
|
RESULT_SUCCESS : SUCCESS);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
data->num_id_req = 0;
|
|
data->num_notification = 0;
|
|
if (data->counter > EAP_AKA_MAX_FAST_REAUTHS) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Maximum number of "
|
|
"fast reauths performed - force fullauth");
|
|
eap_aka_clear_identities(data, CLEAR_REAUTH_ID | CLEAR_EAP_ID);
|
|
}
|
|
os_free(decrypted);
|
|
return eap_aka_response_reauth(data, id, 0, data->nonce_s);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static struct wpabuf * eap_aka_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
|
|
struct eap_method_ret *ret,
|
|
const struct wpabuf *reqData)
|
|
{
|
|
struct eap_aka_data *data = priv;
|
|
const struct eap_hdr *req;
|
|
u8 subtype, id;
|
|
struct wpabuf *res;
|
|
const u8 *pos;
|
|
struct eap_sim_attrs attr;
|
|
size_t len;
|
|
|
|
wpa_hexdump_buf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: EAP data", reqData);
|
|
if (eap_get_config_identity(sm, &len) == NULL) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-AKA: Identity not configured");
|
|
eap_sm_request_identity(sm);
|
|
ret->ignore = TRUE;
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pos = eap_hdr_validate(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, data->eap_method, reqData,
|
|
&len);
|
|
if (pos == NULL || len < 1) {
|
|
ret->ignore = TRUE;
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
req = wpabuf_head(reqData);
|
|
id = req->identifier;
|
|
len = be_to_host16(req->length);
|
|
|
|
ret->ignore = FALSE;
|
|
ret->methodState = METHOD_MAY_CONT;
|
|
ret->decision = DECISION_FAIL;
|
|
ret->allowNotifications = TRUE;
|
|
|
|
subtype = *pos++;
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Subtype=%d", subtype);
|
|
pos += 2; /* Reserved */
|
|
|
|
if (eap_sim_parse_attr(pos, wpabuf_head_u8(reqData) + len, &attr,
|
|
data->eap_method == EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME ? 2 : 1,
|
|
0)) {
|
|
res = eap_aka_client_error(data, id,
|
|
EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET);
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch (subtype) {
|
|
case EAP_AKA_SUBTYPE_IDENTITY:
|
|
res = eap_aka_process_identity(sm, data, id, reqData, &attr);
|
|
break;
|
|
case EAP_AKA_SUBTYPE_CHALLENGE:
|
|
res = eap_aka_process_challenge(sm, data, id, reqData, &attr);
|
|
break;
|
|
case EAP_AKA_SUBTYPE_NOTIFICATION:
|
|
res = eap_aka_process_notification(sm, data, id, reqData,
|
|
&attr);
|
|
break;
|
|
case EAP_AKA_SUBTYPE_REAUTHENTICATION:
|
|
res = eap_aka_process_reauthentication(sm, data, id, reqData,
|
|
&attr);
|
|
break;
|
|
case EAP_AKA_SUBTYPE_CLIENT_ERROR:
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: subtype Client-Error");
|
|
res = eap_aka_client_error(data, id,
|
|
EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET);
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Unknown subtype=%d", subtype);
|
|
res = eap_aka_client_error(data, id,
|
|
EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
if (data->state == FAILURE) {
|
|
ret->decision = DECISION_FAIL;
|
|
ret->methodState = METHOD_DONE;
|
|
} else if (data->state == SUCCESS) {
|
|
ret->decision = data->use_result_ind ?
|
|
DECISION_UNCOND_SUCC : DECISION_COND_SUCC;
|
|
/*
|
|
* It is possible for the server to reply with AKA
|
|
* Notification, so we must allow the method to continue and
|
|
* not only accept EAP-Success at this point.
|
|
*/
|
|
ret->methodState = data->use_result_ind ?
|
|
METHOD_DONE : METHOD_MAY_CONT;
|
|
} else if (data->state == RESULT_FAILURE)
|
|
ret->methodState = METHOD_CONT;
|
|
else if (data->state == RESULT_SUCCESS)
|
|
ret->methodState = METHOD_CONT;
|
|
|
|
if (ret->methodState == METHOD_DONE) {
|
|
ret->allowNotifications = FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return res;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static Boolean eap_aka_has_reauth_data(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv)
|
|
{
|
|
struct eap_aka_data *data = priv;
|
|
return data->pseudonym || data->reauth_id;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void eap_aka_deinit_for_reauth(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv)
|
|
{
|
|
struct eap_aka_data *data = priv;
|
|
eap_aka_clear_identities(data, CLEAR_EAP_ID);
|
|
data->prev_id = -1;
|
|
wpabuf_free(data->id_msgs);
|
|
data->id_msgs = NULL;
|
|
data->use_result_ind = 0;
|
|
data->kdf_negotiation = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void * eap_aka_init_for_reauth(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv)
|
|
{
|
|
struct eap_aka_data *data = priv;
|
|
data->num_id_req = 0;
|
|
data->num_notification = 0;
|
|
eap_aka_state(data, CONTINUE);
|
|
return priv;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static const u8 * eap_aka_get_identity(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
|
|
size_t *len)
|
|
{
|
|
struct eap_aka_data *data = priv;
|
|
|
|
if (data->reauth_id) {
|
|
*len = data->reauth_id_len;
|
|
return data->reauth_id;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (data->pseudonym) {
|
|
*len = data->pseudonym_len;
|
|
return data->pseudonym;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static Boolean eap_aka_isKeyAvailable(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv)
|
|
{
|
|
struct eap_aka_data *data = priv;
|
|
return data->state == SUCCESS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static u8 * eap_aka_getKey(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, size_t *len)
|
|
{
|
|
struct eap_aka_data *data = priv;
|
|
u8 *key;
|
|
|
|
if (data->state != SUCCESS)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
key = os_malloc(EAP_SIM_KEYING_DATA_LEN);
|
|
if (key == NULL)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
*len = EAP_SIM_KEYING_DATA_LEN;
|
|
os_memcpy(key, data->msk, EAP_SIM_KEYING_DATA_LEN);
|
|
|
|
return key;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static u8 * eap_aka_get_emsk(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, size_t *len)
|
|
{
|
|
struct eap_aka_data *data = priv;
|
|
u8 *key;
|
|
|
|
if (data->state != SUCCESS)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
key = os_malloc(EAP_EMSK_LEN);
|
|
if (key == NULL)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
*len = EAP_EMSK_LEN;
|
|
os_memcpy(key, data->emsk, EAP_EMSK_LEN);
|
|
|
|
return key;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
int eap_peer_aka_register(void)
|
|
{
|
|
struct eap_method *eap;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
eap = eap_peer_method_alloc(EAP_PEER_METHOD_INTERFACE_VERSION,
|
|
EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_AKA, "AKA");
|
|
if (eap == NULL)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
eap->init = eap_aka_init;
|
|
eap->deinit = eap_aka_deinit;
|
|
eap->process = eap_aka_process;
|
|
eap->isKeyAvailable = eap_aka_isKeyAvailable;
|
|
eap->getKey = eap_aka_getKey;
|
|
eap->has_reauth_data = eap_aka_has_reauth_data;
|
|
eap->deinit_for_reauth = eap_aka_deinit_for_reauth;
|
|
eap->init_for_reauth = eap_aka_init_for_reauth;
|
|
eap->get_identity = eap_aka_get_identity;
|
|
eap->get_emsk = eap_aka_get_emsk;
|
|
|
|
ret = eap_peer_method_register(eap);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
eap_peer_method_free(eap);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef EAP_AKA_PRIME
|
|
int eap_peer_aka_prime_register(void)
|
|
{
|
|
struct eap_method *eap;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
eap = eap_peer_method_alloc(EAP_PEER_METHOD_INTERFACE_VERSION,
|
|
EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME,
|
|
"AKA'");
|
|
if (eap == NULL)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
eap->init = eap_aka_prime_init;
|
|
eap->deinit = eap_aka_deinit;
|
|
eap->process = eap_aka_process;
|
|
eap->isKeyAvailable = eap_aka_isKeyAvailable;
|
|
eap->getKey = eap_aka_getKey;
|
|
eap->has_reauth_data = eap_aka_has_reauth_data;
|
|
eap->deinit_for_reauth = eap_aka_deinit_for_reauth;
|
|
eap->init_for_reauth = eap_aka_init_for_reauth;
|
|
eap->get_identity = eap_aka_get_identity;
|
|
eap->get_emsk = eap_aka_get_emsk;
|
|
|
|
ret = eap_peer_method_register(eap);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
eap_peer_method_free(eap);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* EAP_AKA_PRIME */
|