mirror of
https://github.com/vanhoefm/fragattacks.git
synced 2024-11-28 18:28:23 -05:00
566ea1b7ce
wpa_drv_set_key() was called with a NULL address for IGTK and MGTK before this patch. The nl80211 driver will then not add the NL80211_KEY_DEFAULT_TYPE_MULTICAST flag for the key, which wrongly marks this key also as a default unicast key in the Linux kernel. With SAE this is no real problem in practice, as a pairwise key will be negotiated in mesh mode, before the first data frame gets send. When using IEEE 802.1X in a mesh network in the future, this gets a problem, as Linux now will encrypt EAPOL frames with the default key, which is also marked for unicast usage without this patch. Signed-off-by: Markus Theil <markus.theil@tu-ilmenau.de>
797 lines
21 KiB
C
797 lines
21 KiB
C
/*
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* WPA Supplicant - Mesh RSN routines
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* Copyright (c) 2013-2014, cozybit, Inc. All rights reserved.
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*
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* This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license.
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* See README for more details.
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*/
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#include "utils/includes.h"
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#include "utils/common.h"
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#include "utils/eloop.h"
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#include "crypto/sha256.h"
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#include "crypto/random.h"
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#include "crypto/aes.h"
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#include "crypto/aes_siv.h"
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#include "rsn_supp/wpa.h"
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#include "ap/hostapd.h"
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#include "ap/wpa_auth.h"
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#include "ap/sta_info.h"
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#include "ap/ieee802_11.h"
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#include "wpa_supplicant_i.h"
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#include "driver_i.h"
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#include "wpas_glue.h"
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#include "mesh_mpm.h"
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#include "mesh_rsn.h"
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#define MESH_AUTH_TIMEOUT 10
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#define MESH_AUTH_RETRY 3
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void mesh_auth_timer(void *eloop_ctx, void *user_data)
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{
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struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s = eloop_ctx;
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struct sta_info *sta = user_data;
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struct hostapd_data *hapd;
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if (sta->sae->state != SAE_ACCEPTED) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "AUTH: Re-authenticate with " MACSTR
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" (attempt %d) ",
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MAC2STR(sta->addr), sta->sae_auth_retry);
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wpa_msg(wpa_s, MSG_INFO, MESH_SAE_AUTH_FAILURE "addr=" MACSTR,
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MAC2STR(sta->addr));
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if (sta->sae_auth_retry < MESH_AUTH_RETRY) {
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mesh_rsn_auth_sae_sta(wpa_s, sta);
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} else {
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hapd = wpa_s->ifmsh->bss[0];
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if (sta->sae_auth_retry > MESH_AUTH_RETRY) {
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ap_free_sta(hapd, sta);
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return;
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}
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/* block the STA if exceeded the number of attempts */
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wpa_mesh_set_plink_state(wpa_s, sta, PLINK_BLOCKED);
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sta->sae->state = SAE_NOTHING;
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wpa_msg(wpa_s, MSG_INFO, MESH_SAE_AUTH_BLOCKED "addr="
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MACSTR " duration=%d",
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MAC2STR(sta->addr),
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hapd->conf->ap_max_inactivity);
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}
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sta->sae_auth_retry++;
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}
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}
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static void auth_logger(void *ctx, const u8 *addr, logger_level level,
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const char *txt)
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{
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if (addr)
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "AUTH: " MACSTR " - %s",
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MAC2STR(addr), txt);
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else
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "AUTH: %s", txt);
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}
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static const u8 *auth_get_psk(void *ctx, const u8 *addr,
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const u8 *p2p_dev_addr, const u8 *prev_psk,
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size_t *psk_len, int *vlan_id)
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{
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struct mesh_rsn *mesh_rsn = ctx;
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struct hostapd_data *hapd = mesh_rsn->wpa_s->ifmsh->bss[0];
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struct sta_info *sta = ap_get_sta(hapd, addr);
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if (psk_len)
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*psk_len = PMK_LEN;
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if (vlan_id)
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*vlan_id = 0;
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "AUTH: %s (addr=" MACSTR " prev_psk=%p)",
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__func__, MAC2STR(addr), prev_psk);
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if (sta && sta->auth_alg == WLAN_AUTH_SAE) {
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if (!sta->sae || prev_psk)
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return NULL;
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return sta->sae->pmk;
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}
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return NULL;
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}
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static int auth_set_key(void *ctx, int vlan_id, enum wpa_alg alg,
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const u8 *addr, int idx, u8 *key, size_t key_len,
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enum key_flag key_flag)
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{
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struct mesh_rsn *mesh_rsn = ctx;
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u8 seq[6];
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os_memset(seq, 0, sizeof(seq));
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if (addr) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "AUTH: %s(alg=%d addr=" MACSTR
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" key_idx=%d)",
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__func__, alg, MAC2STR(addr), idx);
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} else {
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "AUTH: %s(alg=%d key_idx=%d)",
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__func__, alg, idx);
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}
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wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "AUTH: set_key - key", key, key_len);
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return wpa_drv_set_key(mesh_rsn->wpa_s, alg, addr, idx,
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1, seq, 6, key, key_len, key_flag);
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}
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static int auth_start_ampe(void *ctx, const u8 *addr)
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{
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struct mesh_rsn *mesh_rsn = ctx;
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struct hostapd_data *hapd;
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struct sta_info *sta;
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if (mesh_rsn->wpa_s->current_ssid->mode != WPAS_MODE_MESH)
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return -1;
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hapd = mesh_rsn->wpa_s->ifmsh->bss[0];
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sta = ap_get_sta(hapd, addr);
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if (sta)
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eloop_cancel_timeout(mesh_auth_timer, mesh_rsn->wpa_s, sta);
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mesh_mpm_auth_peer(mesh_rsn->wpa_s, addr);
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return 0;
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}
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static int __mesh_rsn_auth_init(struct mesh_rsn *rsn, const u8 *addr,
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enum mfp_options ieee80211w, int ocv)
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{
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struct wpa_auth_config conf;
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static const struct wpa_auth_callbacks cb = {
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.logger = auth_logger,
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.get_psk = auth_get_psk,
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.set_key = auth_set_key,
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.start_ampe = auth_start_ampe,
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};
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u8 seq[6] = {};
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "AUTH: Initializing group state machine");
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os_memset(&conf, 0, sizeof(conf));
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conf.wpa = WPA_PROTO_RSN;
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conf.wpa_key_mgmt = WPA_KEY_MGMT_SAE;
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conf.wpa_pairwise = rsn->pairwise_cipher;
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conf.rsn_pairwise = rsn->pairwise_cipher;
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conf.wpa_group = rsn->group_cipher;
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conf.eapol_version = 0;
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conf.wpa_group_rekey = -1;
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conf.wpa_group_update_count = 4;
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conf.wpa_pairwise_update_count = 4;
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conf.ieee80211w = ieee80211w;
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if (ieee80211w != NO_MGMT_FRAME_PROTECTION)
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conf.group_mgmt_cipher = rsn->mgmt_group_cipher;
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#ifdef CONFIG_OCV
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conf.ocv = ocv;
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#endif /* CONFIG_OCV */
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rsn->auth = wpa_init(addr, &conf, &cb, rsn);
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if (rsn->auth == NULL) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "AUTH: wpa_init() failed");
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return -1;
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}
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/* TODO: support rekeying */
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rsn->mgtk_len = wpa_cipher_key_len(conf.wpa_group);
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if (random_get_bytes(rsn->mgtk, rsn->mgtk_len) < 0)
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return -1;
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rsn->mgtk_key_id = 1;
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if (ieee80211w != NO_MGMT_FRAME_PROTECTION) {
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rsn->igtk_len = wpa_cipher_key_len(conf.group_mgmt_cipher);
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if (random_get_bytes(rsn->igtk, rsn->igtk_len) < 0)
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return -1;
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rsn->igtk_key_id = 4;
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/* group mgmt */
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wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "mesh: Own TX IGTK",
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rsn->igtk, rsn->igtk_len);
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wpa_drv_set_key(rsn->wpa_s,
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wpa_cipher_to_alg(rsn->mgmt_group_cipher),
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broadcast_ether_addr,
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rsn->igtk_key_id, 1,
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seq, sizeof(seq), rsn->igtk, rsn->igtk_len,
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KEY_FLAG_GROUP_TX_DEFAULT);
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}
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/* group privacy / data frames */
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wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "mesh: Own TX MGTK",
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rsn->mgtk, rsn->mgtk_len);
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wpa_drv_set_key(rsn->wpa_s, wpa_cipher_to_alg(rsn->group_cipher),
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broadcast_ether_addr,
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rsn->mgtk_key_id, 1, seq, sizeof(seq),
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rsn->mgtk, rsn->mgtk_len, KEY_FLAG_GROUP_TX_DEFAULT);
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return 0;
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}
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static void mesh_rsn_deinit(struct mesh_rsn *rsn)
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{
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os_memset(rsn->mgtk, 0, sizeof(rsn->mgtk));
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rsn->mgtk_len = 0;
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os_memset(rsn->igtk, 0, sizeof(rsn->igtk));
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rsn->igtk_len = 0;
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if (rsn->auth)
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wpa_deinit(rsn->auth);
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}
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struct mesh_rsn *mesh_rsn_auth_init(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
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struct mesh_conf *conf)
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{
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struct mesh_rsn *mesh_rsn;
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struct hostapd_data *bss = wpa_s->ifmsh->bss[0];
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const u8 *ie;
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size_t ie_len;
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#ifdef CONFIG_PMKSA_CACHE_EXTERNAL
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struct external_pmksa_cache *entry;
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#endif /* CONFIG_PMKSA_CACHE_EXTERNAL */
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mesh_rsn = os_zalloc(sizeof(*mesh_rsn));
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if (mesh_rsn == NULL)
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return NULL;
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mesh_rsn->wpa_s = wpa_s;
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mesh_rsn->pairwise_cipher = conf->pairwise_cipher;
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mesh_rsn->group_cipher = conf->group_cipher;
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mesh_rsn->mgmt_group_cipher = conf->mgmt_group_cipher;
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if (__mesh_rsn_auth_init(mesh_rsn, wpa_s->own_addr,
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conf->ieee80211w, conf->ocv) < 0) {
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mesh_rsn_deinit(mesh_rsn);
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os_free(mesh_rsn);
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return NULL;
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}
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bss->wpa_auth = mesh_rsn->auth;
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#ifdef CONFIG_PMKSA_CACHE_EXTERNAL
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while ((entry = dl_list_last(&wpa_s->mesh_external_pmksa_cache,
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struct external_pmksa_cache,
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list)) != NULL) {
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int ret;
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ret = wpa_auth_pmksa_add_entry(bss->wpa_auth,
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entry->pmksa_cache);
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dl_list_del(&entry->list);
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os_free(entry);
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if (ret < 0)
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return NULL;
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}
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#endif /* CONFIG_PMKSA_CACHE_EXTERNAL */
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ie = wpa_auth_get_wpa_ie(mesh_rsn->auth, &ie_len);
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conf->rsn_ie = (u8 *) ie;
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conf->rsn_ie_len = ie_len;
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wpa_supplicant_rsn_supp_set_config(wpa_s, wpa_s->current_ssid);
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return mesh_rsn;
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}
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static int index_within_array(const int *array, int idx)
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{
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int i;
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for (i = 0; i < idx; i++) {
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if (array[i] == -1)
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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static int mesh_rsn_sae_group(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
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struct sae_data *sae)
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{
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int *groups = wpa_s->ifmsh->bss[0]->conf->sae_groups;
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/* Configuration may have changed, so validate current index */
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if (!index_within_array(groups, wpa_s->mesh_rsn->sae_group_index))
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return -1;
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for (;;) {
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int group = groups[wpa_s->mesh_rsn->sae_group_index];
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if (group <= 0)
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break;
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if (sae_set_group(sae, group) == 0) {
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wpa_dbg(wpa_s, MSG_DEBUG, "SME: Selected SAE group %d",
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sae->group);
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return 0;
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}
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wpa_s->mesh_rsn->sae_group_index++;
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}
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return -1;
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}
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static int mesh_rsn_build_sae_commit(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
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struct wpa_ssid *ssid,
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struct sta_info *sta)
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{
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const char *password;
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password = ssid->sae_password;
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if (!password)
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password = ssid->passphrase;
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if (!password) {
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wpa_msg(wpa_s, MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: No password available");
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return -1;
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}
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if (mesh_rsn_sae_group(wpa_s, sta->sae) < 0) {
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wpa_msg(wpa_s, MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Failed to select group");
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return -1;
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}
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if (sta->sae->tmp && !sta->sae->tmp->pw_id && ssid->sae_password_id) {
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sta->sae->tmp->pw_id = os_strdup(ssid->sae_password_id);
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if (!sta->sae->tmp->pw_id)
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return -1;
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}
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return sae_prepare_commit(wpa_s->own_addr, sta->addr,
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(u8 *) password, os_strlen(password),
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ssid->sae_password_id,
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sta->sae);
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}
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/* initiate new SAE authentication with sta */
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int mesh_rsn_auth_sae_sta(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
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struct sta_info *sta)
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{
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struct hostapd_data *hapd = wpa_s->ifmsh->bss[0];
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struct wpa_ssid *ssid = wpa_s->current_ssid;
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struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *pmksa;
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unsigned int rnd;
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int ret;
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if (!ssid) {
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wpa_msg(wpa_s, MSG_DEBUG,
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"AUTH: No current_ssid known to initiate new SAE");
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return -1;
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}
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if (!sta->sae) {
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sta->sae = os_zalloc(sizeof(*sta->sae));
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if (sta->sae == NULL)
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return -1;
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}
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pmksa = wpa_auth_pmksa_get(hapd->wpa_auth, sta->addr, NULL);
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if (pmksa) {
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if (!sta->wpa_sm)
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sta->wpa_sm = wpa_auth_sta_init(hapd->wpa_auth,
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sta->addr, NULL);
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if (!sta->wpa_sm) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
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"mesh: Failed to initialize RSN state machine");
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return -1;
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}
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
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"AUTH: Mesh PMKSA cache entry found for " MACSTR
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" - try to use PMKSA caching instead of new SAE authentication",
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MAC2STR(sta->addr));
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wpa_auth_pmksa_set_to_sm(pmksa, sta->wpa_sm, hapd->wpa_auth,
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sta->sae->pmkid, sta->sae->pmk);
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sae_accept_sta(hapd, sta);
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sta->mesh_sae_pmksa_caching = 1;
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return 0;
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}
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sta->mesh_sae_pmksa_caching = 0;
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if (mesh_rsn_build_sae_commit(wpa_s, ssid, sta))
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return -1;
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wpa_msg(wpa_s, MSG_DEBUG,
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"AUTH: started authentication with SAE peer: " MACSTR,
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MAC2STR(sta->addr));
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ret = auth_sae_init_committed(hapd, sta);
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if (ret)
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return ret;
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eloop_cancel_timeout(mesh_auth_timer, wpa_s, sta);
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rnd = rand() % MESH_AUTH_TIMEOUT;
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eloop_register_timeout(MESH_AUTH_TIMEOUT + rnd, 0, mesh_auth_timer,
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wpa_s, sta);
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return 0;
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}
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void mesh_rsn_get_pmkid(struct mesh_rsn *rsn, struct sta_info *sta, u8 *pmkid)
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{
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os_memcpy(pmkid, sta->sae->pmkid, SAE_PMKID_LEN);
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}
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static void
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mesh_rsn_derive_aek(struct mesh_rsn *rsn, struct sta_info *sta)
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{
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u8 *myaddr = rsn->wpa_s->own_addr;
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u8 *peer = sta->addr;
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u8 *addr1, *addr2;
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u8 context[RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + 2 * ETH_ALEN], *ptr = context;
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/*
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* AEK = KDF-Hash-256(PMK, "AEK Derivation", Selected AKM Suite ||
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* min(localMAC, peerMAC) || max(localMAC, peerMAC))
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*/
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/* Selected AKM Suite: SAE */
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RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(ptr, RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_SAE);
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ptr += RSN_SELECTOR_LEN;
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if (os_memcmp(myaddr, peer, ETH_ALEN) < 0) {
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addr1 = myaddr;
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addr2 = peer;
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} else {
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addr1 = peer;
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addr2 = myaddr;
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}
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os_memcpy(ptr, addr1, ETH_ALEN);
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ptr += ETH_ALEN;
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os_memcpy(ptr, addr2, ETH_ALEN);
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sha256_prf(sta->sae->pmk, sizeof(sta->sae->pmk), "AEK Derivation",
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context, sizeof(context), sta->aek, sizeof(sta->aek));
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}
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/* derive mesh temporal key from pmk */
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int mesh_rsn_derive_mtk(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, struct sta_info *sta)
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{
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u8 *ptr;
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u8 *min, *max;
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u8 *myaddr = wpa_s->own_addr;
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u8 *peer = sta->addr;
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u8 context[2 * WPA_NONCE_LEN + 2 * 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + 2 * ETH_ALEN];
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* MTK = KDF-Hash-Length(PMK, "Temporal Key Derivation", min(localNonce,
|
|
* peerNonce) || max(localNonce, peerNonce) || min(localLinkID,
|
|
* peerLinkID) || max(localLinkID, peerLinkID) || Selected AKM Suite ||
|
|
* min(localMAC, peerMAC) || max(localMAC, peerMAC))
|
|
*/
|
|
ptr = context;
|
|
if (os_memcmp(sta->my_nonce, sta->peer_nonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) < 0) {
|
|
min = sta->my_nonce;
|
|
max = sta->peer_nonce;
|
|
} else {
|
|
min = sta->peer_nonce;
|
|
max = sta->my_nonce;
|
|
}
|
|
os_memcpy(ptr, min, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
|
|
ptr += WPA_NONCE_LEN;
|
|
os_memcpy(ptr, max, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
|
|
ptr += WPA_NONCE_LEN;
|
|
|
|
if (sta->my_lid < sta->peer_lid) {
|
|
WPA_PUT_LE16(ptr, sta->my_lid);
|
|
ptr += 2;
|
|
WPA_PUT_LE16(ptr, sta->peer_lid);
|
|
ptr += 2;
|
|
} else {
|
|
WPA_PUT_LE16(ptr, sta->peer_lid);
|
|
ptr += 2;
|
|
WPA_PUT_LE16(ptr, sta->my_lid);
|
|
ptr += 2;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Selected AKM Suite: SAE */
|
|
RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(ptr, RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_SAE);
|
|
ptr += RSN_SELECTOR_LEN;
|
|
|
|
if (os_memcmp(myaddr, peer, ETH_ALEN) < 0) {
|
|
min = myaddr;
|
|
max = peer;
|
|
} else {
|
|
min = peer;
|
|
max = myaddr;
|
|
}
|
|
os_memcpy(ptr, min, ETH_ALEN);
|
|
ptr += ETH_ALEN;
|
|
os_memcpy(ptr, max, ETH_ALEN);
|
|
|
|
sta->mtk_len = wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_s->mesh_rsn->pairwise_cipher);
|
|
sha256_prf(sta->sae->pmk, SAE_PMK_LEN,
|
|
"Temporal Key Derivation", context, sizeof(context),
|
|
sta->mtk, sta->mtk_len);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
void mesh_rsn_init_ampe_sta(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, struct sta_info *sta)
|
|
{
|
|
if (random_get_bytes(sta->my_nonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) < 0) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "mesh: Failed to derive random nonce");
|
|
/* TODO: How to handle this more cleanly? */
|
|
}
|
|
os_memset(sta->peer_nonce, 0, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
|
|
mesh_rsn_derive_aek(wpa_s->mesh_rsn, sta);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* insert AMPE and encrypted MIC at @ie.
|
|
* @mesh_rsn: mesh RSN context
|
|
* @sta: STA we're sending to
|
|
* @cat: pointer to category code in frame header.
|
|
* @buf: wpabuf to add encrypted AMPE and MIC to.
|
|
* */
|
|
int mesh_rsn_protect_frame(struct mesh_rsn *rsn, struct sta_info *sta,
|
|
const u8 *cat, struct wpabuf *buf)
|
|
{
|
|
struct ieee80211_ampe_ie *ampe;
|
|
u8 const *ie = wpabuf_head_u8(buf) + wpabuf_len(buf);
|
|
u8 *ampe_ie, *pos, *mic_payload;
|
|
const u8 *aad[] = { rsn->wpa_s->own_addr, sta->addr, cat };
|
|
const size_t aad_len[] = { ETH_ALEN, ETH_ALEN, ie - cat };
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
size_t len;
|
|
|
|
len = sizeof(*ampe);
|
|
if (cat[1] == PLINK_OPEN)
|
|
len += rsn->mgtk_len + WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN + 4;
|
|
if (cat[1] == PLINK_OPEN && rsn->igtk_len)
|
|
len += 2 + 6 + rsn->igtk_len;
|
|
|
|
if (2 + AES_BLOCK_SIZE + 2 + len > wpabuf_tailroom(buf)) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "protect frame: buffer too small");
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ampe_ie = os_zalloc(2 + len);
|
|
if (!ampe_ie) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "protect frame: out of memory");
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* IE: AMPE */
|
|
ampe_ie[0] = WLAN_EID_AMPE;
|
|
ampe_ie[1] = len;
|
|
ampe = (struct ieee80211_ampe_ie *) (ampe_ie + 2);
|
|
|
|
RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(ampe->selected_pairwise_suite,
|
|
RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP);
|
|
os_memcpy(ampe->local_nonce, sta->my_nonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
|
|
os_memcpy(ampe->peer_nonce, sta->peer_nonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
|
|
|
|
pos = (u8 *) (ampe + 1);
|
|
if (cat[1] != PLINK_OPEN)
|
|
goto skip_keys;
|
|
|
|
/* TODO: Key Replay Counter[8] optionally for
|
|
* Mesh Group Key Inform/Acknowledge frames */
|
|
|
|
/* TODO: static mgtk for now since we don't support rekeying! */
|
|
/*
|
|
* GTKdata[variable]:
|
|
* MGTK[variable] || Key RSC[8] || GTKExpirationTime[4]
|
|
*/
|
|
os_memcpy(pos, rsn->mgtk, rsn->mgtk_len);
|
|
pos += rsn->mgtk_len;
|
|
wpa_drv_get_seqnum(rsn->wpa_s, NULL, rsn->mgtk_key_id, pos);
|
|
pos += WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN;
|
|
/* Use fixed GTKExpirationTime for now */
|
|
WPA_PUT_LE32(pos, 0xffffffff);
|
|
pos += 4;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* IGTKdata[variable]:
|
|
* Key ID[2], IPN[6], IGTK[variable]
|
|
*/
|
|
if (rsn->igtk_len) {
|
|
WPA_PUT_LE16(pos, rsn->igtk_key_id);
|
|
pos += 2;
|
|
wpa_drv_get_seqnum(rsn->wpa_s, NULL, rsn->igtk_key_id, pos);
|
|
pos += 6;
|
|
os_memcpy(pos, rsn->igtk, rsn->igtk_len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
skip_keys:
|
|
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "mesh: Plaintext AMPE element",
|
|
ampe_ie, 2 + len);
|
|
|
|
/* IE: MIC */
|
|
wpabuf_put_u8(buf, WLAN_EID_MIC);
|
|
wpabuf_put_u8(buf, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
|
|
/* MIC field is output ciphertext */
|
|
|
|
/* encrypt after MIC */
|
|
mic_payload = wpabuf_put(buf, 2 + len + AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
if (aes_siv_encrypt(sta->aek, sizeof(sta->aek), ampe_ie, 2 + len, 3,
|
|
aad, aad_len, mic_payload)) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "protect frame: failed to encrypt");
|
|
ret = -ENOMEM;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
os_free(ampe_ie);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
int mesh_rsn_process_ampe(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, struct sta_info *sta,
|
|
struct ieee802_11_elems *elems, const u8 *cat,
|
|
const u8 *chosen_pmk,
|
|
const u8 *start, size_t elems_len)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
struct ieee80211_ampe_ie *ampe;
|
|
u8 null_nonce[WPA_NONCE_LEN] = {};
|
|
u8 ampe_eid;
|
|
u8 ampe_ie_len;
|
|
u8 *ampe_buf, *crypt = NULL, *pos, *end;
|
|
size_t crypt_len;
|
|
const u8 *aad[] = { sta->addr, wpa_s->own_addr, cat };
|
|
const size_t aad_len[] = { ETH_ALEN, ETH_ALEN,
|
|
elems->mic ? (elems->mic - 2) - cat : 0 };
|
|
size_t key_len;
|
|
|
|
if (!sta->sae) {
|
|
struct hostapd_data *hapd = wpa_s->ifmsh->bss[0];
|
|
|
|
if (!wpa_auth_pmksa_get(hapd->wpa_auth, sta->addr, NULL)) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
|
|
"Mesh RSN: SAE is not prepared yet");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
mesh_rsn_auth_sae_sta(wpa_s, sta);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (chosen_pmk &&
|
|
(!sta->sae ||
|
|
os_memcmp(chosen_pmk, sta->sae->pmkid, PMKID_LEN) != 0)) {
|
|
wpa_msg(wpa_s, MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"Mesh RSN: Invalid PMKID (Chosen PMK did not match calculated PMKID)");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!elems->mic || elems->mic_len < AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
|
|
wpa_msg(wpa_s, MSG_DEBUG, "Mesh RSN: missing mic ie");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ampe_buf = (u8 *) elems->mic + elems->mic_len;
|
|
if ((int) elems_len < ampe_buf - start)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
crypt_len = elems_len - (elems->mic - start);
|
|
if (crypt_len < 2 + AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
|
|
wpa_msg(wpa_s, MSG_DEBUG, "Mesh RSN: missing ampe ie");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* crypt is modified by siv_decrypt */
|
|
crypt = os_zalloc(crypt_len);
|
|
if (!crypt) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Mesh RSN: out of memory");
|
|
ret = -ENOMEM;
|
|
goto free;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
os_memcpy(crypt, elems->mic, crypt_len);
|
|
|
|
if (aes_siv_decrypt(sta->aek, sizeof(sta->aek), crypt, crypt_len, 3,
|
|
aad, aad_len, ampe_buf)) {
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Mesh RSN: frame verification failed!");
|
|
ret = -2;
|
|
goto free;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
crypt_len -= AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
|
|
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "mesh: Decrypted AMPE element",
|
|
ampe_buf, crypt_len);
|
|
|
|
ampe_eid = *ampe_buf++;
|
|
ampe_ie_len = *ampe_buf++;
|
|
|
|
if (ampe_eid != WLAN_EID_AMPE ||
|
|
(size_t) 2 + ampe_ie_len > crypt_len ||
|
|
ampe_ie_len < sizeof(struct ieee80211_ampe_ie)) {
|
|
wpa_msg(wpa_s, MSG_DEBUG, "Mesh RSN: invalid ampe ie");
|
|
ret = -1;
|
|
goto free;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ampe = (struct ieee80211_ampe_ie *) ampe_buf;
|
|
pos = (u8 *) (ampe + 1);
|
|
end = ampe_buf + ampe_ie_len;
|
|
if (os_memcmp(ampe->peer_nonce, null_nonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0 &&
|
|
os_memcmp(ampe->peer_nonce, sta->my_nonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0) {
|
|
wpa_msg(wpa_s, MSG_DEBUG, "Mesh RSN: invalid peer nonce");
|
|
ret = -1;
|
|
goto free;
|
|
}
|
|
os_memcpy(sta->peer_nonce, ampe->local_nonce,
|
|
sizeof(ampe->local_nonce));
|
|
|
|
/* TODO: Key Replay Counter[8] in Mesh Group Key Inform/Acknowledge
|
|
* frames */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* GTKdata shall not be included in Mesh Peering Confirm. While the
|
|
* standard does not state the same about IGTKdata, that same constraint
|
|
* needs to apply for it. It makes no sense to include the keys in Mesh
|
|
* Peering Close frames either, so while the standard does not seem to
|
|
* have a shall statement for these, they are described without
|
|
* mentioning GTKdata.
|
|
*
|
|
* An earlier implementation used to add GTKdata to both Mesh Peering
|
|
* Open and Mesh Peering Confirm frames, so ignore the possibly present
|
|
* GTKdata frame without rejecting the frame as a backwards
|
|
* compatibility mechanism.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (cat[1] != PLINK_OPEN) {
|
|
if (end > pos) {
|
|
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"mesh: Ignore unexpected GTKdata(etc.) fields in the end of AMPE element in Mesh Peering Confirm/Close",
|
|
pos, end - pos);
|
|
}
|
|
goto free;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* GTKdata[variable]:
|
|
* MGTK[variable] || Key RSC[8] || GTKExpirationTime[4]
|
|
*/
|
|
sta->mgtk_key_id = 1; /* FIX: Where to get Key ID? */
|
|
key_len = wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_s->mesh_rsn->group_cipher);
|
|
if ((int) key_len + WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN + 4 > end - pos) {
|
|
wpa_dbg(wpa_s, MSG_DEBUG, "mesh: Truncated AMPE element");
|
|
ret = -1;
|
|
goto free;
|
|
}
|
|
sta->mgtk_len = key_len;
|
|
os_memcpy(sta->mgtk, pos, sta->mgtk_len);
|
|
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "mesh: GTKdata - MGTK",
|
|
sta->mgtk, sta->mgtk_len);
|
|
pos += sta->mgtk_len;
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "mesh: GTKdata - MGTK - Key RSC",
|
|
pos, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN);
|
|
os_memcpy(sta->mgtk_rsc, pos, sizeof(sta->mgtk_rsc));
|
|
pos += WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN;
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
"mesh: GTKdata - MGTK - GTKExpirationTime: %u seconds",
|
|
WPA_GET_LE32(pos));
|
|
pos += 4;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* IGTKdata[variable]:
|
|
* Key ID[2], IPN[6], IGTK[variable]
|
|
*/
|
|
key_len = wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_s->mesh_rsn->mgmt_group_cipher);
|
|
if (end - pos >= (int) (2 + 6 + key_len)) {
|
|
sta->igtk_key_id = WPA_GET_LE16(pos);
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "mesh: IGTKdata - Key ID %u",
|
|
sta->igtk_key_id);
|
|
pos += 2;
|
|
os_memcpy(sta->igtk_rsc, pos, sizeof(sta->igtk_rsc));
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "mesh: IGTKdata - IPN",
|
|
sta->igtk_rsc, sizeof(sta->igtk_rsc));
|
|
pos += 6;
|
|
os_memcpy(sta->igtk, pos, key_len);
|
|
sta->igtk_len = key_len;
|
|
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "mesh: IGTKdata - IGTK",
|
|
sta->igtk, sta->igtk_len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
free:
|
|
os_free(crypt);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|