mirror of
https://github.com/vanhoefm/fragattacks.git
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87fcb5a735
The req_plen argument to eap_pax_process_std_1() and eap_pax_process_std_3() could be smaller than sizeof(struct eap_pax_hdr) since the main processing function was only verifying that there is enough room for the ICV and then removed ICV length from the remaining payload length. In theory, this could have resulted in the size_t left parameter being set to a negative value that would be interpreted as a huge positive integer. That could then result in a small buffer read overflow and process termination if MSGDUMP debug verbosity was in use. In practice, it does not seem to be feasible to construct a short message that would be able to pass the ICV validation (calculated using HMAC-SHA1-128) even for the case where an empty password is used. Anyway, the implementation should really check the length explicitly instead of depending on implicit check through ICV validation. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
548 lines
14 KiB
C
548 lines
14 KiB
C
/*
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* EAP peer method: EAP-PAX (RFC 4746)
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* Copyright (c) 2005-2008, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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*
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* This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license.
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* See README for more details.
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*/
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#include "includes.h"
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#include "common.h"
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#include "crypto/random.h"
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#include "eap_common/eap_pax_common.h"
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#include "eap_i.h"
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/*
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* Note: only PAX_STD subprotocol is currently supported
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*
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* TODO: Add support with PAX_SEC with the mandatory to implement ciphersuite
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* (HMAC_SHA1_128, IANA DH Group 14 (2048 bits), RSA-PKCS1-V1_5) and
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* recommended ciphersuite (HMAC_SHA256_128, IANA DH Group 15 (3072 bits),
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* RSAES-OAEP).
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*/
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struct eap_pax_data {
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enum { PAX_INIT, PAX_STD_2_SENT, PAX_DONE } state;
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u8 mac_id, dh_group_id, public_key_id;
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union {
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u8 e[2 * EAP_PAX_RAND_LEN];
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struct {
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u8 x[EAP_PAX_RAND_LEN]; /* server rand */
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u8 y[EAP_PAX_RAND_LEN]; /* client rand */
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} r;
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} rand;
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char *cid;
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size_t cid_len;
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u8 ak[EAP_PAX_AK_LEN];
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u8 mk[EAP_PAX_MK_LEN];
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u8 ck[EAP_PAX_CK_LEN];
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u8 ick[EAP_PAX_ICK_LEN];
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u8 mid[EAP_PAX_MID_LEN];
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};
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static void eap_pax_deinit(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv);
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static void * eap_pax_init(struct eap_sm *sm)
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{
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struct eap_pax_data *data;
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const u8 *identity, *password;
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size_t identity_len, password_len;
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identity = eap_get_config_identity(sm, &identity_len);
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password = eap_get_config_password(sm, &password_len);
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if (!identity || !password) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PAX: CID (nai) or key (password) "
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"not configured");
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return NULL;
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}
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if (password_len != EAP_PAX_AK_LEN) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PAX: Invalid PSK length");
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return NULL;
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}
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data = os_zalloc(sizeof(*data));
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if (data == NULL)
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return NULL;
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data->state = PAX_INIT;
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data->cid = os_malloc(identity_len);
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if (data->cid == NULL) {
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eap_pax_deinit(sm, data);
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return NULL;
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}
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os_memcpy(data->cid, identity, identity_len);
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data->cid_len = identity_len;
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os_memcpy(data->ak, password, EAP_PAX_AK_LEN);
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return data;
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}
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static void eap_pax_deinit(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv)
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{
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struct eap_pax_data *data = priv;
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os_free(data->cid);
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bin_clear_free(data, sizeof(*data));
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}
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static struct wpabuf * eap_pax_alloc_resp(const struct eap_pax_hdr *req,
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u8 id, u8 op_code, size_t plen)
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{
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struct wpabuf *resp;
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struct eap_pax_hdr *pax;
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resp = eap_msg_alloc(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_PAX,
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sizeof(*pax) + plen, EAP_CODE_RESPONSE, id);
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if (resp == NULL)
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return NULL;
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pax = wpabuf_put(resp, sizeof(*pax));
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pax->op_code = op_code;
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pax->flags = 0;
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pax->mac_id = req->mac_id;
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pax->dh_group_id = req->dh_group_id;
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pax->public_key_id = req->public_key_id;
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return resp;
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}
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static struct wpabuf * eap_pax_process_std_1(struct eap_pax_data *data,
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struct eap_method_ret *ret, u8 id,
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const struct eap_pax_hdr *req,
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size_t req_plen)
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{
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struct wpabuf *resp;
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const u8 *pos;
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u8 *rpos;
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size_t left, plen;
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PAX: PAX_STD-1 (received)");
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if (data->state != PAX_INIT) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PAX: PAX_STD-1 received in "
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"unexpected state (%d) - ignored", data->state);
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ret->ignore = TRUE;
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return NULL;
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}
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if (req->flags & EAP_PAX_FLAGS_CE) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PAX: PAX_STD-1 with CE flag set - "
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"ignored");
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ret->ignore = TRUE;
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return NULL;
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}
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left = req_plen - sizeof(*req);
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if (left < 2 + EAP_PAX_RAND_LEN) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PAX: PAX_STD-1 with too short "
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"payload");
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ret->ignore = TRUE;
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return NULL;
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}
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pos = (const u8 *) (req + 1);
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if (WPA_GET_BE16(pos) != EAP_PAX_RAND_LEN) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PAX: PAX_STD-1 with incorrect A "
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"length %d (expected %d)",
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WPA_GET_BE16(pos), EAP_PAX_RAND_LEN);
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ret->ignore = TRUE;
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return NULL;
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}
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pos += 2;
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left -= 2;
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os_memcpy(data->rand.r.x, pos, EAP_PAX_RAND_LEN);
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wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "EAP-PAX: X (server rand)",
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data->rand.r.x, EAP_PAX_RAND_LEN);
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pos += EAP_PAX_RAND_LEN;
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left -= EAP_PAX_RAND_LEN;
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if (left > 0) {
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wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "EAP-PAX: ignored extra payload",
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pos, left);
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}
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if (random_get_bytes(data->rand.r.y, EAP_PAX_RAND_LEN)) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "EAP-PAX: Failed to get random data");
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ret->ignore = TRUE;
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return NULL;
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}
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wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "EAP-PAX: Y (client rand)",
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data->rand.r.y, EAP_PAX_RAND_LEN);
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if (eap_pax_initial_key_derivation(req->mac_id, data->ak, data->rand.e,
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data->mk, data->ck, data->ick,
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data->mid) < 0) {
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ret->ignore = TRUE;
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return NULL;
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}
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PAX: PAX_STD-2 (sending)");
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plen = 2 + EAP_PAX_RAND_LEN + 2 + data->cid_len + 2 + EAP_PAX_MAC_LEN +
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EAP_PAX_ICV_LEN;
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resp = eap_pax_alloc_resp(req, id, EAP_PAX_OP_STD_2, plen);
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if (resp == NULL)
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return NULL;
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wpabuf_put_be16(resp, EAP_PAX_RAND_LEN);
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wpabuf_put_data(resp, data->rand.r.y, EAP_PAX_RAND_LEN);
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wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "EAP-PAX: B = Y (client rand)",
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data->rand.r.y, EAP_PAX_RAND_LEN);
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wpabuf_put_be16(resp, data->cid_len);
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wpabuf_put_data(resp, data->cid, data->cid_len);
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wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_MSGDUMP, "EAP-PAX: CID",
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(u8 *) data->cid, data->cid_len);
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wpabuf_put_be16(resp, EAP_PAX_MAC_LEN);
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rpos = wpabuf_put(resp, EAP_PAX_MAC_LEN);
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eap_pax_mac(req->mac_id, data->ck, EAP_PAX_CK_LEN,
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data->rand.r.x, EAP_PAX_RAND_LEN,
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data->rand.r.y, EAP_PAX_RAND_LEN,
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(u8 *) data->cid, data->cid_len, rpos);
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wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "EAP-PAX: MAC_CK(A, B, CID)",
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rpos, EAP_PAX_MAC_LEN);
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/* Optional ADE could be added here, if needed */
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rpos = wpabuf_put(resp, EAP_PAX_ICV_LEN);
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eap_pax_mac(req->mac_id, data->ick, EAP_PAX_ICK_LEN,
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wpabuf_head(resp), wpabuf_len(resp) - EAP_PAX_ICV_LEN,
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NULL, 0, NULL, 0, rpos);
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wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "EAP-PAX: ICV", rpos, EAP_PAX_ICV_LEN);
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data->state = PAX_STD_2_SENT;
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data->mac_id = req->mac_id;
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data->dh_group_id = req->dh_group_id;
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data->public_key_id = req->public_key_id;
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return resp;
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}
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static struct wpabuf * eap_pax_process_std_3(struct eap_pax_data *data,
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struct eap_method_ret *ret, u8 id,
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const struct eap_pax_hdr *req,
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size_t req_plen)
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{
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struct wpabuf *resp;
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u8 *rpos, mac[EAP_PAX_MAC_LEN];
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const u8 *pos;
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size_t left;
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PAX: PAX_STD-3 (received)");
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if (data->state != PAX_STD_2_SENT) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PAX: PAX_STD-3 received in "
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"unexpected state (%d) - ignored", data->state);
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ret->ignore = TRUE;
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return NULL;
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}
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if (req->flags & EAP_PAX_FLAGS_CE) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PAX: PAX_STD-3 with CE flag set - "
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"ignored");
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ret->ignore = TRUE;
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return NULL;
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}
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left = req_plen - sizeof(*req);
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if (left < 2 + EAP_PAX_MAC_LEN) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PAX: PAX_STD-3 with too short "
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"payload");
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ret->ignore = TRUE;
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return NULL;
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}
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pos = (const u8 *) (req + 1);
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if (WPA_GET_BE16(pos) != EAP_PAX_MAC_LEN) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PAX: PAX_STD-3 with incorrect "
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"MAC_CK length %d (expected %d)",
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WPA_GET_BE16(pos), EAP_PAX_MAC_LEN);
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ret->ignore = TRUE;
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return NULL;
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}
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pos += 2;
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left -= 2;
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wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "EAP-PAX: MAC_CK(B, CID)",
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pos, EAP_PAX_MAC_LEN);
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eap_pax_mac(data->mac_id, data->ck, EAP_PAX_CK_LEN,
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data->rand.r.y, EAP_PAX_RAND_LEN,
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(u8 *) data->cid, data->cid_len, NULL, 0, mac);
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if (os_memcmp_const(pos, mac, EAP_PAX_MAC_LEN) != 0) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PAX: Invalid MAC_CK(B, CID) "
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"received");
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wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "EAP-PAX: expected MAC_CK(B, CID)",
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mac, EAP_PAX_MAC_LEN);
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ret->methodState = METHOD_DONE;
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ret->decision = DECISION_FAIL;
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return NULL;
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}
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pos += EAP_PAX_MAC_LEN;
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left -= EAP_PAX_MAC_LEN;
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if (left > 0) {
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wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "EAP-PAX: ignored extra payload",
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pos, left);
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}
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PAX: PAX-ACK (sending)");
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resp = eap_pax_alloc_resp(req, id, EAP_PAX_OP_ACK, EAP_PAX_ICV_LEN);
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if (resp == NULL)
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return NULL;
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/* Optional ADE could be added here, if needed */
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rpos = wpabuf_put(resp, EAP_PAX_ICV_LEN);
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eap_pax_mac(data->mac_id, data->ick, EAP_PAX_ICK_LEN,
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wpabuf_head(resp), wpabuf_len(resp) - EAP_PAX_ICV_LEN,
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NULL, 0, NULL, 0, rpos);
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wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "EAP-PAX: ICV", rpos, EAP_PAX_ICV_LEN);
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data->state = PAX_DONE;
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ret->methodState = METHOD_DONE;
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ret->decision = DECISION_UNCOND_SUCC;
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ret->allowNotifications = FALSE;
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return resp;
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}
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static struct wpabuf * eap_pax_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
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struct eap_method_ret *ret,
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const struct wpabuf *reqData)
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{
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struct eap_pax_data *data = priv;
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const struct eap_pax_hdr *req;
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struct wpabuf *resp;
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u8 icvbuf[EAP_PAX_ICV_LEN], id;
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const u8 *icv, *pos;
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size_t len;
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u16 flen, mlen;
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pos = eap_hdr_validate(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_PAX, reqData, &len);
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if (pos == NULL || len < sizeof(*req) + EAP_PAX_ICV_LEN) {
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ret->ignore = TRUE;
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return NULL;
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}
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id = eap_get_id(reqData);
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req = (const struct eap_pax_hdr *) pos;
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flen = len - EAP_PAX_ICV_LEN;
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mlen = wpabuf_len(reqData) - EAP_PAX_ICV_LEN;
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PAX: received frame: op_code 0x%x "
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"flags 0x%x mac_id 0x%x dh_group_id 0x%x "
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"public_key_id 0x%x",
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req->op_code, req->flags, req->mac_id, req->dh_group_id,
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req->public_key_id);
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wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "EAP-PAX: received payload",
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pos, len - EAP_PAX_ICV_LEN);
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if (data->state != PAX_INIT && data->mac_id != req->mac_id) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PAX: MAC ID changed during "
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"authentication (was 0x%d, is 0x%d)",
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data->mac_id, req->mac_id);
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ret->ignore = TRUE;
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return NULL;
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}
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if (data->state != PAX_INIT && data->dh_group_id != req->dh_group_id) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PAX: DH Group ID changed during "
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"authentication (was 0x%d, is 0x%d)",
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data->dh_group_id, req->dh_group_id);
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ret->ignore = TRUE;
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return NULL;
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}
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if (data->state != PAX_INIT &&
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data->public_key_id != req->public_key_id) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PAX: Public Key ID changed during "
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"authentication (was 0x%d, is 0x%d)",
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data->public_key_id, req->public_key_id);
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ret->ignore = TRUE;
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return NULL;
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}
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/* TODO: add support EAP_PAX_HMAC_SHA256_128 */
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if (req->mac_id != EAP_PAX_MAC_HMAC_SHA1_128) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PAX: Unsupported MAC ID 0x%x",
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req->mac_id);
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ret->ignore = TRUE;
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return NULL;
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}
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if (req->dh_group_id != EAP_PAX_DH_GROUP_NONE) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PAX: Unsupported DH Group ID 0x%x",
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req->dh_group_id);
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ret->ignore = TRUE;
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return NULL;
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}
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if (req->public_key_id != EAP_PAX_PUBLIC_KEY_NONE) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PAX: Unsupported Public Key ID 0x%x",
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req->public_key_id);
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ret->ignore = TRUE;
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return NULL;
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}
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if (req->flags & EAP_PAX_FLAGS_MF) {
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/* TODO: add support for reassembling fragments */
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wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PAX: fragmentation not supported - "
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"ignored packet");
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ret->ignore = TRUE;
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return NULL;
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}
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icv = pos + len - EAP_PAX_ICV_LEN;
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wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "EAP-PAX: ICV", icv, EAP_PAX_ICV_LEN);
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if (req->op_code == EAP_PAX_OP_STD_1) {
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eap_pax_mac(req->mac_id, (u8 *) "", 0,
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wpabuf_head(reqData), mlen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
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icvbuf);
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} else {
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eap_pax_mac(req->mac_id, data->ick, EAP_PAX_ICK_LEN,
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wpabuf_head(reqData), mlen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
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icvbuf);
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}
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if (os_memcmp_const(icv, icvbuf, EAP_PAX_ICV_LEN) != 0) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PAX: invalid ICV - ignoring the "
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"message");
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wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "EAP-PAX: expected ICV",
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icvbuf, EAP_PAX_ICV_LEN);
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ret->ignore = TRUE;
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return NULL;
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}
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ret->ignore = FALSE;
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ret->methodState = METHOD_MAY_CONT;
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ret->decision = DECISION_FAIL;
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ret->allowNotifications = TRUE;
|
|
|
|
switch (req->op_code) {
|
|
case EAP_PAX_OP_STD_1:
|
|
resp = eap_pax_process_std_1(data, ret, id, req, flen);
|
|
break;
|
|
case EAP_PAX_OP_STD_3:
|
|
resp = eap_pax_process_std_3(data, ret, id, req, flen);
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PAX: ignoring message with unknown "
|
|
"op_code %d", req->op_code);
|
|
ret->ignore = TRUE;
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ret->methodState == METHOD_DONE) {
|
|
ret->allowNotifications = FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return resp;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static Boolean eap_pax_isKeyAvailable(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv)
|
|
{
|
|
struct eap_pax_data *data = priv;
|
|
return data->state == PAX_DONE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static u8 * eap_pax_getKey(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, size_t *len)
|
|
{
|
|
struct eap_pax_data *data = priv;
|
|
u8 *key;
|
|
|
|
if (data->state != PAX_DONE)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
key = os_malloc(EAP_MSK_LEN);
|
|
if (key == NULL)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
*len = EAP_MSK_LEN;
|
|
eap_pax_kdf(data->mac_id, data->mk, EAP_PAX_MK_LEN,
|
|
"Master Session Key", data->rand.e, 2 * EAP_PAX_RAND_LEN,
|
|
EAP_MSK_LEN, key);
|
|
|
|
return key;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static u8 * eap_pax_get_emsk(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, size_t *len)
|
|
{
|
|
struct eap_pax_data *data = priv;
|
|
u8 *key;
|
|
|
|
if (data->state != PAX_DONE)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
key = os_malloc(EAP_EMSK_LEN);
|
|
if (key == NULL)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
*len = EAP_EMSK_LEN;
|
|
eap_pax_kdf(data->mac_id, data->mk, EAP_PAX_MK_LEN,
|
|
"Extended Master Session Key",
|
|
data->rand.e, 2 * EAP_PAX_RAND_LEN,
|
|
EAP_EMSK_LEN, key);
|
|
|
|
return key;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static u8 * eap_pax_get_session_id(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, size_t *len)
|
|
{
|
|
struct eap_pax_data *data = priv;
|
|
u8 *sid;
|
|
|
|
if (data->state != PAX_DONE)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
sid = os_malloc(1 + EAP_PAX_MID_LEN);
|
|
if (sid == NULL)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
*len = 1 + EAP_PAX_MID_LEN;
|
|
sid[0] = EAP_TYPE_PAX;
|
|
os_memcpy(sid + 1, data->mid, EAP_PAX_MID_LEN);
|
|
|
|
return sid;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
int eap_peer_pax_register(void)
|
|
{
|
|
struct eap_method *eap;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
eap = eap_peer_method_alloc(EAP_PEER_METHOD_INTERFACE_VERSION,
|
|
EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_PAX, "PAX");
|
|
if (eap == NULL)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
eap->init = eap_pax_init;
|
|
eap->deinit = eap_pax_deinit;
|
|
eap->process = eap_pax_process;
|
|
eap->isKeyAvailable = eap_pax_isKeyAvailable;
|
|
eap->getKey = eap_pax_getKey;
|
|
eap->get_emsk = eap_pax_get_emsk;
|
|
eap->getSessionId = eap_pax_get_session_id;
|
|
|
|
ret = eap_peer_method_register(eap);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
eap_peer_method_free(eap);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|