This makes the implementation less likely to provide useful timing
information to potential attackers from comparisons of information
received from a remote device and private material known only by the
authorized devices.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This is similar to the existing functionality that parsed ASN.1-encoded
RSA public key by generating a similar public key instance from already
parsed n and e parameters.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Follow the PKCS #1 v1.5, 8.1 constraint of at least eight octets long PS
for the case where the internal TLS implementation decrypts PKCS #1
formatted data. Similar limit was already in place for signature
validation, but not for this decryption routine.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Based on PKCS #1, v1.5, 10.1.3, the block type shall be 01 for a
signature. This avoids a potential attack vector for internal TLS/X.509
implementation.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Verify that there is no extra data after the hash field. This is needed
to avoid potential attacks using additional data to construct a value
that passes the RSA operation and allows the hash value to be forged.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
The current position pointer was not updated when issuerUniqueID or
subjectUniqueID were present. This could result in extensions being
ignored.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
test-tls-4: Short 511-bit RSA-DHE prime
test-tls-5: Short 767-bit RSA-DHE prime
test-tls-6: Bogus RSA-DHE "prime" 15
test-tls-7: Very short 58-bit RSA-DHE prime in a long container
test-tls-8: Non-prime as RSA-DHE prime
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The internal TLS server implementation and RADIUS server implementation
in hostapd can be configured to allow EAP clients to be tested to
perform TLS validation steps correctly. This functionality is not
included in the default build; CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS=y in
hostapd/.config can be used to enable this.
When enabled, the RADIUS server will configure special TLS test modes
based on the received User-Name attribute value in this format:
<user>@test-tls-<id>.<rest-of-realm>. For example,
anonymous@test-tls-1.example.com. When this special format is used, TLS
test modes are enabled. For other cases, the RADIUS server works
normally.
The following TLS test cases are enabled in this commit:
1 - break verify_data in the server Finished message
2 - break signed_params hash in ServerKeyExchange
3 - break Signature in ServerKeyExchange
Correctly behaving TLS client must abort connection if any of these
failures is detected and as such, shall not transmit continue the
session.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This allows the internal TLS implementation to write log entries to the
same authlog with rest of the RADIUS server and EAP server
functionality.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Previously, this was silently dropped which left the connection waiting
for timeout. decrypt_error alert can be used here to avoid that.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This same design is used in both the server and the client roles in the
internal TLS implementation. Instead of duplicated implementation, use a
helper function.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Instead of separate server and client side implementations, use a common
set of helper functions for calculating the ServerParams hash for
ServerKeyExchange.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The SHA256-based RSA-AES-128/256 cipher suites were already implemented
and enabled for the internal TLS client, but they had not been enabled
for the server.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
There are quite a few places in the current implementation where a nul
terminated string is generated from binary data. Add a helper function
to simplify the code a bit.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Now that the internal AES implementation supports 256-bit keys, enable
use of the TLS cipher suites that use AES-256 regardless of which crypto
implementation is used.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Add support for generating and verifying RFC 3447 RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5
style DigestInfo for TLS v1.2 CertificateVerify. For now, this is
hardcoded to only support SHA256-based digest.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This allows the internal TLS implementation to be built for TLS v1.2
support. In addition to the build option, this changes the TLS PRF
based on the negotiated version number. Though, this commit does not
yet complete support for TLS v1.2.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Prepare for multiple TLS PRF functions by renaming the SHA1+MD5 based
TLS PRF function to more specific name and add tls_prf() within the
internal TLS implementation as a wrapper for this for now.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Reassemble partial TLS records to make the internal TLS client
implementation more convenient for stream sockets.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The padding validation was done on the last padding-length octets in the
buffer which misses the first padding octet (the last octet is the
padding length). Fix the starting offset for the comparison loop to get
the first octet verified. [Bug 420]
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Return number of user input bytes from tlsv1_record_receive() to
move this detail into the proper record layer processing. In addition,
ignore unknown content types at record layer and allow processing to
continue after warning level TLS alerts to provide minimal workaround
for closure alerts.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Instead of using separate bad_record_mac and decryption_failed alerts,
use only bad_record_mac alert regardless of how the CBC decryption
failed. This provides less information to attackers that could modify
packets. In addition, instead of returning immediately on error, run
through the MAC check to make timing attacks more difficult.
When the received data will be decrypted, there is no need to first
copy it and then handle decryption in-place when decryption step can
take care of both operations.
