The server handshake processing was still using SSL_read() to get OpenSSL
to perform the handshake. While this works for most cases, it caused some
issues for re-authentication. This is now changed to use SSL_accept() which
is more approriate here since we know that the handshake is still going on
and there will not be any tunneled data available. This resolves some of
the re-authentication issues and makes it possible for the server to notice
if TLS processing fails (SSL_read() did not return an error in many of
these cases while SSL_accept() does).
Set session id context to a unique value in order to avoid fatal errors
when client tries session resumption (SSL_set_session_id_context() must be
called for that to work), but disable session resumption with the unique
value for the time being since not all server side code is ready for it yet
(e.g., EAP-TTLS needs special Phase 2 processing when using abbreviated
handshake).
Changed EAP-TLS server not to call TLS library when processing the final
ACK (empty data) from the client in order to avoid starting a new TLS
handshake with SSL_accept().
Move the basic processing of received frames into eap_tls_common.c and use
callback functions to handle EAP type specific processing of the version
field and payload.
Fragmentation is now done as a separate step to clean up the design and to
allow the same code to be used in both Phase 1 and Phase 2. This adds
support for fragmenting EAP-PEAP/TTLS/FAST Phase 2 (tunneled) data.
Need to clear the state back to MSG after having processed all incoming
fragments. Without this, the server got stuck in sending the fragment ACK
even after having received the full message.
Even though we try to disable TLS compression, it is possible that this
cannot be done with all TLS libraries. For example, OpenSSL 0.9.8 does not
seem to have a configuration item for disabling all compression (0.9.9 has
such an option). If compression is used, Phase 2 decryption may end up
producing more data than the input buffer due to compressed data. This
shows up especially with EAP-TNC that uses very compressible data format.
As a workaround, increase the decryption buffer length to (orig_len+500)*3.
This is a hack, but at least it handles most cases. TLS compression should
really be disabled for EAP use of TLS, but since this can show up with
common setups, it is better to handle this case.
It looks like this SSL_set_options() value was added in 0.9.9 and it does
not exist in stable releases of OpenSSL. Fix build by using #ifdef on this
variable before use.
The TLS client changes in ssl3_get_server_hello() were based on the
pre-RFC 5077 version of OpenSSL and they hardcoded s->hit to 1 in case
PAC-Opaque was used. This prevented fallback to full TLS handshake in case
the server rejected PAC-Opaque in ClientHello. The fixed version simplifies
ssl3_get_server_hello() and uses the new RFC 5077 functionality in OpenSSL
(ssl3_check_finished) to allow the state machine handle start of
abbreviated handshake based on the used ticket.
The TLS client changes in ssl3_get_server_hello() were based on the
pre-RFC 5077 version of OpenSSL and they hardcoded s->hit to 1 in case
PAC-Opaque was used. This prevented fallback to full TLS handshake in case
the server rejected PAC-Opaque in ClientHello. The fixed version simplifies
ssl3_get_server_hello() and uses the new RFC 5077 functionality in OpenSSL
(ssl3_check_finished) to allow the state machine handle start of
abbreviated handshake based on the used ticket.
The middle byte of the secret (key for PRF) is shared with key halfs in
case the key length is odd. This does not happen in any of the current
tls_prf() uses, but it's better to fix this function to avoid future issues
should someone end up defining a use that uses an odd length for the key.
Process SoH Request in SoH EAP Extension method and reply with SoH TLV. The
contents of SSoH is not yet complete (i.e., some of the required attributes
are still missing). Use of SoH is disabled by default; it can be enabled
with tnc=soh in phase1 parameter for PEAP.
crypto_binding=# in phase1 network parameter can now be used to change the
PEAPv0 cryptobinding behavior (0 = do not use, 1 = optional (default),
2 = required).
Explain that wpa_supplicant supports a variety of drivers, but only a
subset of them are chosen at compile time.
Signed-off-by: Kel Modderman <kel@otaku42.de>
Allow the user to set the IP address of the eapol_test client. This if
very useful when you have a machine with many interfaces and want to use a
particular one for testing RADIUS connectivity. For instance when I run the
national eduroam proxy I can only connect to other server from a particular
address, an our machine happens to have several IPs. So if I want to run
connectivity tests, I must make sure that my test uses a particular
interface. The -A option allows one to set this).
(jm: cleaned up to use radius configuration structure instead of global
variable for the address and added IPv6 support)
Implements the Chargable-User-Identity (CUI), as defined in RFC 4372.
Option "-i" causes the eapol_test to send a NUL CUI - which is a request to
send a CUI back. Capital "-I" allows to specify the value of the CUI.
This has been defined for cases where the client wants to reauthenticate.
If TNC is enabled, PEAPv0 server is now sending out SoH request to initiate
IF-TNCCS-SOH (Microsoft NAP / Statement of Health) handshake. The results
are currently only shown in debug log and they do not affect authentication
or authorization result.
The previous version was deriving unnecessarily large amount of output data
for the implicit challenge. With the TLS PRF, this was not causing any
problems because the output length is not explicitly bound into the
derivation. Anyway, it is better to use the correct output length should
the PRF be ever changed to a one that uses the output length to change the
beginning of the output data.
It looks like Microsoft implementation does not match with their
specification as far as PRF+ label usage is concerned.. IPMK|CMK is derived
without null termination on the label, but the label for CSK derivation
must be null terminated.
This allows cryptobinding to be used with PEAPv0 in a way that
interoperates with Windows XP SP3 (RC2) and as such, this functionality is
now enabled as an optional addition to PEAPv0.
Microsoft uses reverse order for MS-MPPE keys in EAP-PEAP when compared to
EAP-FAST derivation of ISK. Swap the keys here to get the correct ISK for
EAP-PEAPv0 cryptobinding. This resolves the cryptobinding interop issue
with WinXP SP3 RC2. However, it looks like MSK derivation does not
interoperate when using cryptobinding, so this code remains disabled for
the time being.
This implementation is complete for PEAPv0 (Microsoft extension), but the
use of cryptobinding is disabled in this version, i.e., this does not
change protocol behavior at all.
Interop tests between hostapd and wpa_supplicant work fine, but there are
some problems in getting hostapd to interoperate with Windows XP SP3 RC2
(peer replies with Result Failure to the attempted cryptobinding). The
implementation will remain disabled until this issue has been resolved.
EAP-PEAP was the only method that used the external eap_tlv.c peer
implementation. This worked fine just for the simple protected result
notification, but extending the TLV support for cryptobinding etc. is not
trivial with such separation. With the TLV processing integrated into
eap_peap.c, all the needed information is now available for using
additional TLVs.
