Commit 68a41bbb44 broke fallback from
reauth id to fullauth id by not allowing a second AKA/Identity round to
be used after having received unrecognized reauth_id in the first round.
Fix this by allowing fullauth id to be requested in such a case.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
If identity round limit is reached, EAP-SIM/AKA session is terminated.
This needs to free the allocated message.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
While the existing code already addresses TLS Message Length validation
for both EAP-TLS peer and server side, this adds explicit checks and
rejection of invalid messages in the functions handling reassembly. This
does not change externally observable behavior in case of EAP server.
For EAP peer, this starts rejecting invalid messages instead of
addressing them by reallocating the buffer (i.e., ignoring TLS Message
Length in practice).
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
EAP-TLS/PEAP/TTLS/FAST server implementation did not validate TLS
Message Length value properly and could end up trying to store more
information into the message buffer than the allocated size if the first
fragment is longer than the indicated size. This could result in hostapd
process terminating in wpabuf length validation. Fix this by rejecting
messages that have invalid TLS Message Length value.
This would affect cases that use the internal EAP authentication server
in hostapd either directly with IEEE 802.1X or when using hostapd as a
RADIUS authentication server and when receiving an incorrectly
constructed EAP-TLS message. Cases where hostapd uses an external
authentication are not affected.
Thanks to Timo Warns for finding and reporting this issue.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
intended-for: hostap-1
The EAP-SIM/AKA code is already validating the prefix and the following
lookup would not find matches if the prefix is incorrect, so there is no
need for the extra checks here.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
If EAP-Response/Identity includes a known pseudonym or re-auth username,
skip the AKA/Identity exchange since we already know the permanent
username of the peer.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
RFC 4186, chapter 6.3.3 mandates that EAP-Failure is used only after
Client-Error and Notification messages. Convert the direct jumps to the
FAILURE state with a notification round before sending out EAP-Failure.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
If the peer rejects re-authentication with AT_COUNTER_TOO_SMALL, fall
back to full authentication to allow the authentication session to be
completed.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
These fields are used only as the search key, so the value is already
known and does not need to be copied from the database.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Store permanent username (i.e., including prefix character) instead of
IMSI in the SQLite DB. Convert the string to a string since the EAP-AKA
prefix can start with zero. This cleans up the field names since the
value was already with the prefix included instead of just IMSI. In
addition, this explicitly removes some theoretical cases where the
different identity types could have been mixed.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Since the EAP-SIM/AKA identities are ASCII strings, there is no need to
use more complex way for storing and passing them. In addition, be more
strict about enforcing username (i.e., no realm part) to be used in the
EAP-SIM DB API. Similarly, require specific username type instead of any
of the types to be used as the key in the pseudonym and reauth
operations. This allows simpler lookup operations to be used.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Since we always request an identity in the request, the response
has to include AT_IDENTITY. This allows the AKA/Identity response
processing to be simplified a bit.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
There is no need to use eap_sim_db_identity_known() here since a new
AKA/Identity message is built only if the identity in the previous
response was not recognized. The first round is always used to request
AT_ANY_ID_REQ to meet the RFC 4187 recommendation on EAP method specific
identity request.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Since we always request an identity in the request, the response
has to include AT_IDENTITY. This allows the SIM/Start response
processing to be simplified a bit.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
There is no need to use eap_sim_db_identity_known() here since a new
SIM/Start message is built only if the identity in the previous response
was not recognized. The first round will always request AT_ANY_ID_REQ to
meet the RFC 4186 recommendation on EAP method specific identity request
being used.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The reauth_id prefix can be used to determine which AKA version is used,
so there is no need to store the aka_prime information in a separate
field.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
If hostapd is built and configured to use SQLite database, store
EAP-SIM/AKA reauth data into the database to allow this to persist
over hostapd restarts.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This allows hostapd to use an SQLite database for storing EAP-SIM/AKA
pseudonyms over process restarts. CONFIG_SQLITE=y build option adds
support for this and the SQLite database file is specified in eap_sib_db
configuration parameter.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This EAP type uses a vendor specific expanded EAP header to encapsulate
EAP-TLS with a configuration where the EAP server does not authenticate
the EAP peer. In other words, this method includes only server
authentication. The peer is configured with only the ca_cert parameter
(similarly to other TLS-based EAP methods). This method can be used for
cases where the network provides free access to anyone, but use of RSN
with a securely derived unique PMK for each station is desired.
The expanded EAP header uses the hostapd/wpa_supplicant vendor
code 39068 and vendor type 1 to identify the UNAUTH-TLS method.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The previous implementation was able to re-open the connection to an
external program (e.g., hlr_auc_gw) when needed, but required the
connection to be available during startup. Extend this to allow the
initial failure, so that hlr_auc_gw can be started after hostapd.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
All the TNC base64 operations are within tncs.c, so there is no point in
including base64.h into eap_server_tnc.c.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
If the os_malloc() call for the User-Name value fails in EAP-TTLS
server, the inner MSCHAPv2 processing could have tried to dereference a
NULL pointer. Avoid this by handling this cleanly as an internal error
and reject the authentication attempt.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
intended-for: hostap-1
These validation steps are already done in the EAP parsing code and in
the EAP methods, but the additional check is defensive programming and
can make the validation of received EAP messages more easier to
understand.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
If the peer uses an unknown reauth id, it would still be possible to use
pseudonym instead of permanent id. Allow this by changing the
AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ to AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ in case unknown reauth id is
used in EAP-Response/Identity.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
There was a technical change between the last IETF draft version
(draft-arkko-eap-aka-kdf-10) and RFC 5448 in the leading characters
used in the username (i.e., use unique characters for EAP-AKA' instead
of reusing the EAP-AKA ones). This commit updates EAP-AKA' server and
peer implementations to use the leading characters based on the final
RFC.
Note: This will make EAP-AKA' not interoperate between the earlier
draft version and the new version.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
intended-for: hostap-1
Incorrect identity string could end up being used with EAP-AKA' when
the EAP client is using pseudonym. This code was supposed to use
sm->identity just like the EAP-AKA case.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
intended-for: hostap-1
AT_NEXT_PSEUDONYM is supposed to be included only in the Challenge
messages, not in the Re-authentication messages. This attribute was
incorrectly included in the Re-authentication messages and could have
been used to update the pseudonym state on the server without the peer
updating its state.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
intended-for: hostap-1
Remove the GPL notification text from EAP-pwd implementation per
approval from Dan Harkins who contributed these files.
(email from Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org> dated
Wed, 4 Jan 2012 16:25:48 -0800)
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Fix start of reauthentication after failed authentication with
passthrough (external AAA server) to use internal EAP Identity method.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This reverts commit 204dd3f420.
start_reauth was not supposed to be used in this way and setting it
to TRUE in INITIALIZE breaks internal EAP server.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Make sure sign extension does not end up getting used here by
explicitly type casting the variables to correct size.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Previously, sm->start_reauth was set to TRUE in SUCCESS2 state to force
reauthentication to start with EAP identity request. This works fine for
the case of EAP success through the AAA passthrough authentication, but
is not enough to handle passthrough authentication failure. sm->identity
is set in that case and getDecision would return PASSTHROUGH instead of
CONTINUE (to Identity method).
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
While the copy is not used as a null terminated string, this can prevent
some static analyzers from complaining about non-issue.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Prepare for multiple TLS PRF functions by renaming the SHA1+MD5 based
TLS PRF function to more specific name and add tls_prf() within the
internal TLS implementation as a wrapper for this for now.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This structure was not really used for anything apart from figuring out
length of the EAP-pwd header (and even that in a way that would not work
with fragmentation). Since the bitfields in the structure could have
been problematic depending on target endianness, remove this unnecessary
structure.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Another niceness of OpenSSL is that if the high-order bit of a 521-bit
big num is not set then BN_bn2bin() will just return 65 bytes instead of
66 bytes with the 1st (big endian, after all) being all zero. When this
happens the wrong number of octets are mixed into function H(). So
there's a whole bunch of "offset" computations and BN_bn2bin() dumps the
big number into a buffer + offset. That should be obvious in the patch
too.
This cleans up the code a bit by not having to deal with theoretical
possibility of maximum number of EAP methods to be different between
various components in hostapd.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This avoid incorrect errors from some static analyzers that do not like
memmove with pointers just after the end of a buffer even if the number
of bytes to move is zero.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This function can fail in theory since the SHA-1 functions are
allowed to return an error. While this does not really happen in
practice (we would not get this far if SHA-1 does not work), it is
cleaner to include the error handling here to keep static analyzers
happier. [Bug 421]
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
These protocols seem to be abandoned: latest IETF drafts have expired
years ago and it does not seem likely that EAP-TTLSv1 would be
deployed. The implementation in hostapd/wpa_supplicant was not complete
and not fully tested. In addition, the TLS/IA functionality was only
available when GnuTLS was used. Since GnuTLS removed this functionality
in 3.0.0, there is no available TLS/IA implementation in the latest
version of any supported TLS library.
Remove the EAP-TTLSv1 and TLS/IA implementation to clean up unwanted
complexity from hostapd and wpa_supplicant. In addition, this removes
any potential use of the GnuTLS extra library.
Windows 7 uses incorrect way of figuring out AP's WPS capabilities by
acting as a Registrar and using M1 from the AP. The config methods
attribute in that message is supposed to indicate only the configuration
method supported by the AP in Enrollee role, i.e., to add an external
Registrar. For that case, PBC shall not be used and as such, the
PushButton config method is removed from M1 by default. If pbc_in_m1=1
is included in the configuration file, the PushButton config method is
left in M1 (if included in config_methods parameter) to allow Windows 7
to use PBC instead of PIN (e.g., from a label in the AP).
The supportedTypes parameter is a list of TNC_MessageType values
and the buffer to be copied should use size of TNC_MessageType, not
TNC_MessageTypeList. In practice, these are of same length on most
platforms, so this is not a critical issue, but anyway, the correct
type should be used.
An optional parameter, p2p_dev_addr, can now be given to WPS_PBC
command on P2P GO to indicate that only the P2P device with the
specified P2P Device Address is allowed to connect using PBC. If
any other device tries to use PBC, a session overlap is indicated
and the negotiation is rejected with M2D. The command format for
specifying the address is "WPS_PBC p2p_dev_addr=<address>", e.g.,
WPS_PBC p2p_dev_addr=02:03:04:05:06:07
In addition, show the PBC session overlap indication as a WPS failure
event on an AP/GO interface. This particular new case shows up as
"WPS-FAIL msg=4 config_error=12".
The changes are:
1. the word "and" in the hunting-and-pecking string passed to the KDF
should be capitalized.
2. the primebitlen used in the KDF should be a short not an int.
3. the computation of MK in hostap is based on an older version of the
draft and is not the way it's specified in the RFC.
4. the group being passed into computation of the Commit was not in
network order.
This commit adds a new wrapper, random_get_bytes(), that is currently
defined to use os_get_random() as is. The places using
random_get_bytes() depend on the returned value being strong random
number, i.e., something that is infeasible for external device to
figure out. These values are used either directly as a key or as
nonces/challenges that are used as input for key derivation or
authentication.
The remaining direct uses of os_get_random() do not need as strong
random numbers to function correctly.
Commit c3fc47ea8e fixed EAP passthrough
server to allow Logoff/Re-authentication to be used. However, it
broke EAP standalone server while doing that. Fix this by reverting
the earlier fix and by clearing the EAP Identity information in the
EAP server code whenever an EAPOL-Start or EAPOL-Logoff packet is
received.
Some sequencies of EAPOL logoff/logon/start messages seem to be
able to get the previous implementation into state where hostapd
would not be able to start reauthentication when external
authentication server is used. The EAP server code would bypass
the initial Identity Request generation and EAPOL code would not
be able to send anything to the authentication server or supplicant
at that point. Work around this by forcing EAP server code to
start with Identity Request after INITIALIZE state even if the
Identity is known.
Prior to commit 6195adda9b the sm->user
dereference did not exist here. While this is in practice non-NULL,
better use more defensive construction here to avoid NULL pointer
dereference should this ever change.
This indicates that the peer identity is associated with the
credential and will be required to match with the identity used
during authentication when the PAC is used (RFC 5422, 4.2.4).
In theory, this should not really be needed, but Windows 7 uses
Registrar mode to probe AP's WPS capabilities before trying to use
Enrollee and fails if the AP does not allow that probing to happen.
This allows the AP to start as an Enrollee and send M1, but refuse
to continue beyond that (M3 will not be sent if AP PIN is not known).
62477841a1 tried to address fragmentation
issues, but it did not address the case where the final EAP-TNC
message gets fragmented. Move the state update to the correct place
to address this case, too.
There are no subdirectories in any of these directories or plans
for adding ones. As such, there is no point in running the loop
that does not do anything and can cause problems with some shells.
TNC IF-T is somewhat unclear on this are, but
draft-hanna-nea-pt-eap-00.txt, which is supposed to define the same
protocol, is clearer on the Flags field being included.
This change breaks interoperability with the old implementation if
EAP-TNC fragmentation is used. The old version would not accept
the acknowledgement message with the added Flags octet while the
new version accepts messagss with with both options.
If the last message from the EAP-TNC server was fragmented, the
fragment processing lost the DONE/FAIL state and did not know how
to handle the final ACK from the peer. Fix this by remembering the
earlier DONE/FAIL state when fragmenting a frame.
TNC IF-T specification is unclear on the exact contents of the fragment
acknowledgement frame. An interoperability issue with the tncs@fhh
implementation was reported by Arne Welzel
<arne.welzel@stud.fh-hannover.de> due to the different interpretations
of the specification. Relax EAP-TNC server/peer validation rules to
accept fragmentation acknowledgement frames to include the Flags field
to avoid this issue.
The previous version could end leaking memory since os_free() was used
instead of wpabuf_free(). In addition, this could potentially have
triggered a crash if the TLS context were being freed when pending
input data where still in the buffer (though, this may not be possible
to trigger in practice).
The use_psk_key parameter can now be used to force the Registrar to
use PSK format instead of ASCII passphrase when building a Credential
for the Enrollee. For now, this is not enabled, but it could be enabled
either based on external (to WPS) configuration or automatically set
based on some WPS attribute values from the Enrollee.
The new TLS wrapper use may end up returning alert data and we need to
make sure here that it does not end up getting interpreted as success
due to non-NULL response.
This converts tls_connection_handshake(),
tls_connection_server_handshake(), tls_connection_encrypt(), and
tls_connection_decrypt() to use struct wpa_buf to allow higher layer
code to be cleaned up with consistent struct wpabuf use.
If Finished message from peer has been received before the server
Finished message, start Phase 2 with the same message to avoid extra
roundtrip when the peer does not have anything to send after the server
Finished message.
This fixes issues with some GnuTLS versions that seem to be adding
quite a bit of extra data into TLS messages. The EAP server code is
now using the same 300 byte extra room that was already used in the
EAP peer implementation.
