This gets rid of a valgrind warning on uninitialized memory read in the
wpas_ctrl_error test case where the result was used after the failed
sha256_vector() call.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Check for hmac_sha256() failures and exit from wps_derive_psk() without
printing out the derived keys if anything fails. This removes a valgrind
warning on uninitialized value when running the ap_wps_m3_oom test case.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Commit 4104267e81 ('Fix memory leak on NFC
DH generation error path') modified dh5_init() behavior in the
non-OpenSSL implementation to free the public key (if any was previously
set). However, this did not update one of the callers to make sure the
publ argument in the call is initialized. This could result in trying to
free invalid pointer and segmentation fault when hostapd or
wpa_supplicant was built against some other crypto library than OpenSSL.
Signed-off-by: Rujun Wang <chinawrj@gmail.com>
WPA/WPA2-Personal passphrase is not allowed to include control
characters. Reject a Credential received from a WPS Registrar both as
STA (Credential) and AP (AP Settings) if the credential is for WPAPSK or
WPA2PSK authentication type and includes an invalid passphrase.
This fixes an issue where hostapd or wpa_supplicant could have updated
the configuration file PSK/passphrase parameter with arbitrary data from
an external device (Registrar) that may not be fully trusted. Should
such data include a newline character, the resulting configuration file
could become invalid and fail to be parsed.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This reduces duration that private keying material might remain in the
process memory by clearing wpabuf data used in WPS operations when there
is possibility of the buffer including keys or related material.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Remove the fallback dependency on os_random() when generating a WPS pin.
This is exceptionally unlikely to ever be called as the call to
os_get_random() is unlikely to fail. The intention is to facilitate
future removal of os_random() as it uses a low quality PRNG.
Signed-off-by: Nick Lowe <nick.lowe@lugatech.com>
The new wps_force_{auth,encr}_types parameters can be used in test build
(CONFIG_WPS_TESTING) to force wpa_supplicant to use the specified value
in the Authentication/Encryption Type flags attribute. This can be used
to test AP behavior on various error cases for which there are
workarounds to cover deployed device behavior.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Some deployed implementations seem to advertise incorrect information in
this attribute. A value of 0x1b (WPA2 + WPA + WPAPSK + OPEN, but no
WPA2PSK) has been reported to be used. Add WPA2PSK to the list to avoid
issues with building Credentials that do not use the strongest actually
supported authentication option (that device does support WPA2PSK even
when it does not claim it here).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
It was possible for the Registrar code to generate a Credential with
auth type WPAPSK (i.e., WPA v1) with encr type AES if the Enrollee
claimed support for WPAPSK and not WPA2PSK while the AP was configured
in mixed mode WPAPSK+WPA2PSK regardless of how wpa_pairwise (vs.
rsn_pairwise) was set since encr type was selected from the union of
wpa_pairwise and rsn_pairwise. This could result in the Enrollee
receiving a Credential that it could then not use with the AP.
Fix this by masking the encryption types separately on AP based on the
wpa_pairwise/rsn_pairwise configuration. In the example case described
above, the Credential would get auth=WPAPSK encr=TKIP instead of
auth=WPAPSK encr=AES.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This allows multiple external registrars to execute a WPS protocol run
with a WPS AP over UPnP. Previously, hostapd supported only a single WPS
peer entry at a time and if multiple ERs tried to go through a WPS
protocol instance concurrently, only one such exchange could succeed.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Reorder terms in a way that no invalid pointers are generated with
pos+len operations. end-pos is always defined (with a valid pos pointer)
while pos+len could end up pointing beyond the end pointer which would
be undefined behavior.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
All the other web_connection_parse_*() functions were already doing
this, so make the GET handler consistent as well.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Use shorter variables for storing the attribute lengths and group these
variables together to allow compiler to pack them more efficiently. This
reduces the struct size from 960 bytes to 760 bytes in 64-bit builds.
This reduces stack use in number of functions.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
There is no need to maintain two concurrent instances of struct
wps_parse_attr in this function. Share a single structure for parsing
both IEs.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This is needed to allow new operation to be started after an error
without having to wait for the AP entry to time out.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
No need to have a common failure handler if it is used from only a
single location and that lcoation does not even need the memory freeing
step.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The hbp pointer is moved to the next space already earlier in this code
path, so the while loop here did not really do anything.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Commit 7da4f4b499 ('WPS: Check maximum
HTTP body length earlier in the process') added too strict check for
body length allocation. The comparison of new_alloc_nbytes against
h->max_bytes did not take into account that HTTPREAD_BODYBUF_DELTA was
added to previous allocation even if that ended up going beyond
h->max_bytes. This ended up rejecting some valid HTTP operations, e.g.,
when checking AP response to WPS ER setting selected registrar.
Fix this by taking HTTPREAD_BODYBUF_DELTA into account.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Incorrect number of bytes was skipped from the beginning of the line
which resulted in the loop skipping spaces doing nothing. However, the
following operation was simply looking for the max-age parameter with
os_strstr(), so this did not have any effect on functionality. Fix the
number of bytes to skip and remove the unneeded loop to skip spaces.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This is similar to the earlier commit
b363121a20 ('WPS: Reject invalid
credential more cleanly'), but for the AP cases where AP settings are
being replaced. Previously, the new settings were taken into use even if
the invalid PSK/passphrase had to be removed. Now, the settings are
rejected with such an invalid configuration.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Use a local variable and check the record payload length validity before
writing it into record->payload_length in hopes of getting rid of a
bogus static analyzer warning. The negative return value was sufficient
to avoid record->payload_length being used, but that seems to be too
complex for some analyzers. (CID 122668)
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
While this is already enforced in practice due to the limits on the
maximum control interface command length and total_length bounds
checking here, this explicit check on payload_length value may help
static analyzers understand the code better. (CID 122668)
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
It was possible for the 32-bit record->total_length value to end up
wrapping around due to integer overflow if the longer form of payload
length field is used and record->payload_length gets a value close to
2^32. This could result in ndef_parse_record() accepting a too large
payload length value and the record type filter reading up to about 20
bytes beyond the end of the buffer and potentially killing the process.
This could also result in an attempt to allocate close to 2^32 bytes of
heap memory and if that were to succeed, a buffer read overflow of the
same length which would most likely result in the process termination.
In case of record->total_length ending up getting the value 0, there
would be no buffer read overflow, but record parsing would result in an
infinite loop in ndef_parse_records().
Any of these error cases could potentially be used for denial of service
attacks over NFC by using a malformed NDEF record on an NFC Tag or
sending them during NFC connection handover if the application providing
the NDEF message to hostapd/wpa_supplicant did no validation of the
received records. While such validation is likely done in the NFC stack
that needs to parse the NFC messages before further processing,
hostapd/wpa_supplicant better be prepared for any data being included
here.
Fix this by validating record->payload_length value in a way that
detects integer overflow. (CID 122668)
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The 32-bit version of payload length field may not be 32-bit aligned in
the message buffer, so use WPA_GET_BE32() to read it instead of ntohl().
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The debug information from httpread can be helpful in figuring out error
cases in general and as such, should be enabled by default. Get rid of
the hardcoded httpread_debug value that would require source code
changes to enable.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
There is no need to continue processing a HTTP body when it becomes
clear that the end result would be over the maximum length.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Verify that ncopy parameter to memcpy is not negative. While this is not
supposed to be needed, it is a good additional protection against
unknown implementation issues.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
strtoul() return value may end up overflowing the int h->chunk_size and
resulting in a negative value to be stored as the chunk_size. This could
result in the following memcpy operation using a very large length
argument which would result in a buffer overflow and segmentation fault.
This could have been used to cause a denial service by any device that
has been authorized for network access (either wireless or wired). This
would affect both the WPS UPnP functionality in a WPS AP (hostapd with
upnp_iface parameter set in the configuration) and WPS ER
(wpa_supplicant with WPS_ER_START control interface command used).
Validate the parsed chunk length value to avoid this. In addition to
rejecting negative values, we can also reject chunk size that would be
larger than the maximum configured body length.
Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
reporting this issue.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Handling of WPS RF band for 60 GHz was missing. Add it in all relevant
places and also map "AES" as the cipher to GCMP instead of CCMP when
operating on the 60 GHz band.
Signed-off-by: Hamad Kadmany <qca_hkadmany@qca.qualcomm.com>
By analysing objdump output some read only structures were found in
.data section. To help compiler further optimize code declare these
as const.
Signed-off-by: Mikael Kanstrup <mikael.kanstrup@sonymobile.com>
There is no need to try to derive DH shared key with a peer that tries
to use too short or too long DH Public Key. Previously, such cases ended
up implicitly getting rejected by the DH operations failing to produce
matching results. That is unnecessarily, so simply reject the message
completely if it does not have a Public Key with valid length. Accept
couple of octets shorter value to be used to avoid interoperability
issues if there are implementations that do not use zero-padding
properly.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This enforces variable length strings Manufacturer, Model Name, Model
Number, and Serial Number to be within the maximum length defined in the
WSC specification. While none of the existing users for these within
hostapd/wpa_supplicant had problems with longer strings, it is good to
ensure the strings are not longer to avoid potential issues at higher
layer components.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This program can be used to run fuzzing tests for areas related to P2P
message parsing and processing. p2p-fuzzer allows data files to be used
to inject Probe Response and Action frames for processing by the P2P
module.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This modifies couple of code segments that replaced control characters
in strings with '_' to use a common helper function.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
While it looks like all the users of this parsed attribute were able to
handle longer SSID values, there is no valid use case for these and to
avoid any potential future issues, enforce maximum length (32 bytes) on
the SSID during parsing.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
While it looks like all the users of this parsed attribute were able to
handle longer Device Name values, there is no valid use case for these
and to avoid any potential issues in upper layer components, enforce
maximum length (32 bytes) on the Device Name during parsing.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
