Do not use a random MAC address for the GAS exchange that is used as
part of the DPP protocol exchange since that would break DPP.
Configurator expects the same MAC address to be used for DPP
Authentication exchange and DPP Configuration exchange (GAS).
Since the DPP Authentication exchange has already used the MAC address
configured on the interface, use of a random address for the GAS
exchange would not provide any additional privacy protection. If a
random MAC address needs to be used for this type of an exchange, that
random address would need to be first configured on the interface before
starting DPP exchange.
This does not change GAS query behavior for any other use case, i.e.,
the gas_rand_mac_addr configuration continues to apply to all the
Interworking/Hotspot 2.0 uses.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
The previous implementation did not check that we are associated with
the sender of the GAS response before checking for PMF status. This
could have accepted Venue URL when not in associated state. Fix this by
explicitly checking for association with the responder first.
This fixes an issue that was detected, e.g., with these hwsim test case
sequences:
gas_anqp_venue_url_pmf gas_anqp_venue_url
gas_prot_vs_not_prot gas_anqp_venue_url
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Force use of the wildcard BSSID address in GAS query frames with DPP
regardless of how the gas_address3 configuration parameter is set. DPP
specification mandates this and the use of GAS here is really outside
the context of a BSS, so using the wildcard BSSID makes sense even for
the corner case of Configurator running on a known AP (where IEEE 802.11
standard would allow the BSSID of the AP to be used).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
This function was added with the initial GAS implementation, but there
was no user for it at the time and no clear use now either, so remove
the unused function and the related GAS query reason code.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
When GAS is used with PMF negotiated, Protected Dual of Public Action
frames are expected to be used instead of Public Action frames, i.e.,
the GAS/ANQP frames are expected to be encrypted. Conver Public Action
GAS queries to use Dual of Public Action frame if PMF has been
negotiated with the AP to which the frame is being sent.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Avoid concurrent GAS operations with any other exclusive use of the
radio by using the radio work queuing mechanism. This replaces some of
the earlier constraints on concurrent operations with the more generic
wpa_radio work concept.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
These operations can have conflicting offchannel requirements, so wait
with a new scan trigger until a pending GAS query has been completed.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Remove the GPL notification text from files that were initially
contributed by Atheros Communications or Qualcomm Atheros.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This implements GAS request mechanism that is aimed at being used to
replace use case specific GAS/ANQP implementations in the future.
Compared to the earlier implementation in P2P SD, this implementation
includes support for multiple concurrent requests and more thorough
validation of frames against the pending query data.
GAS header processing, including comeback and reassembly, are handled
within gas_query.c and the users of this module will only need to
provide the Query Request and process the (possibly reassembled)
Query Response.
