It is expected for the STA entry on the target AP to move directly from
State 1 to State 3 when performing FT over-the-DS (i.e., FT Action
Request/Response frame exchange through the old AP followed by
Reassociation Request/Response frame exchange with the target AP).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
If no Beacon or Probe Response frame has been seen in the capture, use
the IEs from EAPOL-Key msg 3/4 to set up BSS information.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The previous implementation tried to update STA IE information based on
EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 to be able to handle captures that do not include the
(Re)Association Request frame. This was not sufficient (OSEN was not
included) and was done too late (the parsed information is needed for
PMK-to-PTK derivation).
Move the IE update step to happen before trying to derive the PTK if no
(Re)Association Request frame has been seen.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Fetch the BIGTK from EAPOL-Key msg 3/4 and use it to validate MME in
Beacon frames when the AP uses Beacon protection.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Allow option (command line argument -e) to capture Ethernet headers
instead of IEEE 802.11 so that wlantest can be used as a replacement for
tcpdump/dumpcap for capturing.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Track PMK-R0/PMK-R0-Name from the initial mobility domain association
and derive PMK-R1/PTK when the station uses FT protocol. This allows
frames from additional roaming cases to be decrypted.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
If a sniffer capture does not include FCS for each frame, but may
included frames with invalid FCS, it would be possible for wlantest to
try to decrypt the first received frame and fail (e.g., due to CCMP MIC
mismatch) because that particular frame was corrupted and then ignore
the following retry of that frame as a duplicate even if that retry has
different payload (e.g., if its reception did not show corruption).
Work around this by skipping duplicate frame detection immediately
following a decryption failure.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
wlantest used to ignore RSN/WPA/OSEN element in (Re)Association Request
frame if no Beacon frame had been seen from the AP before the
association exchange. This could result in not being able to derive keys
properly. Work around this by skipping that step if the BSS entry is not
yet complete.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
The length of the TK is available within struct wpa_ptk, so there is no
need to try to maintain it separately in wlantest.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Try to derive PTK when FILS shared key authentication is used without
PFS. The list of available PMKs is interpreted as rMSK for this purpose
and PMK and PTK is derived from that. If the resulting PTK (KEK) can be
used to decrypt the encrypted parts of (Re)Association Request/Response
frames, mark the PTK as derived so that encrypted frames during the
association can be decrypted. In addition, write a decrypted version of
the (Re)Association Request/Response frames into the output file.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Suite B 192-bit addition from IEEE Std 802.11ac-2013 replaced the
previous fixed length Key MIC field with a variable length field. That
change was addressed with an addition of a new struct defined for the
second MIC length. This is not really scalable and with FILS coming up
with a zero-length MIC case for AEAD, a more thorough change to support
variable length MIC is needed.
Remove the Key MIC and Key Data Length fields from the struct
wpa_eapol_key and find their location based on the MIC length
information (which is determined by the AKMP). This change allows the
separate struct wpa_eapol_key_192 to be removed since struct
wpa_eapol_key will now include only the fixed length fields that are
shared with all EAPOL-Key cases in IEEE Std 802.11.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This allows the CRC-32 routine to be shared for other purposes in
addition to the WEP/TKIP/FCS within wlantest.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This makes it easier to do live parsing of captured pcap files from
wlantest without having to rename and restart the capture file. Packet
writes are flushed to disk after each packet if -N is included in the
command line.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This adds minimal support for deriving keys for FT-PSK to allow the
initial mobility domain association to be analyzed in more detail.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
By analysing objdump output some read only structures were found in
.data section. To help compiler further optimize code declare these
as const.
Signed-off-by: Mikael Kanstrup <mikael.kanstrup@sonymobile.com>
This allows Hotspot 2.0 OSEN connection to be analyzed more
conveniently. The frames from an OSEN association can now be decrypted
using an MSK file.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
A text file with a hexdump of PTK (KCK|KEK=TK with 48 octets for CCMP or
64 octets for TKIP or alternative 16 or 32 octet TK for CCMP/TKIP) can
now be read from a file specified with the -T command line argument. If
the current known PTK fails to decrypt a frame (or if no current PTK is
known) all listed PTKs are iterated to see if any of them matches.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The new -n<file> command line argument can be used to request wlantest
to write all read or captured frames into a pcapng file. This is similar
to the -w argument, but with pcapng allowing per-frame comments to be
embedded in the file.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
When using DLT_IEEE802_11 datalink type in a pcap file, wlantest can now
be instructed to assume there is an FCS included in the frame by adding
the new -F command line argument. This will make wlantest validate the
FCS and strip it from the frame before processing.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Use a temporary PTK buffer during 4-way handshake when rekeying PTK
so that the new EAPOL-Key frame MIC values are checked against the
new PTK and frames are decrypted using the old PTK. Take the new
PTK into use once msg 4/4 is processed and clear RSC counters at
that point (including moving of RSC update to avoid setting RSC
based on the msg 4/4).
In addition, add a workaround to handle supplicant implementations that
set Secure bit to one during PTK rekeying 4-way handshake in msg 2/4.
This was previously assumed to be msg 4/4, but the key data contents
can be used to figure out whether this is msg 2/4 even if the Secure
bit is set to one.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
The TDLS link itself is bidirectional, but there is explicit
initiator/responder roles. Remove the other direction of the link if it
exists when processing TDLS Setup Confirm to make sure that the link
counters are stored for the current TDLS entery.
This is also changing the control interface search for TDLS counters
to require initiator/responder addresses in the correct order instead
of matching entries regardless of the role.
