This function exposes internal state of the TLS negotiated parameters
for the sole purpose of being able to implement PRF for EAP-FAST. Since
tls_connection_prf() is now taking care of all TLS-based key derivation
cases, it is cleaner to keep this detail internal to each tls_*.c
wrapper implementation.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
tls_openssl.c is the only remaining TLS/crypto wrapper that needs the
internal PRF implementation for EAP-FAST (since
SSL_export_keying_material() is not available in older versions and does
not support server-random-before-client case). As such, it is cleaner to
assume that TLS libraries support tls_connection_prf() and move the
additional support code for the otherwise unsupported cases into
tls_openssl.c.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This extends EAP-pwd peer support to allow NtHash version of password
storage in addition to full plaintext password. In addition, this allows
the server to request hashed version even if the plaintext password is
available on the client. Furthermore, unsupported password preparation
requests are now rejected rather than allowing the authentication
attempt to continue.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This commit introduces a callback to notify any configuration updates
from the eap_proxy layer. This is used to trigger re-reading of IMSI and
MNC length.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
For wired IEEE 802.1X authentication, phase1="allow_canned_success=1"
can now be used to configure a mode that allows EAP-Success (and
EAP-Failure) without going through authentication step. Some switches
use such sequence when forcing the port to be authorized/unauthorized or
as a fallback option if the authentication server is unreachable. By
default, wpa_supplicant discards such frames to protect against
potential attacks by rogue devices, but this option can be used to
disable that protection for cases where the server/authenticator does
not need to be authenticated.
When enabled, this mode allows EAP-Success/EAP-Failure as an immediate
response to EAPOL-Start (or even without EAPOL-Start) and EAP-Success is
also allowed immediately after EAP-Identity exchange (fallback case for
authenticator not being able to connect to authentication server).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
wpa_supplicant used to request user to re-enter username/password if the
server indicated that EAP-MSCHAPv2 (e.g., in PEAP Phase 2)
authentication failed (E=691), but retry is allowed (R=1). This is a
reasonable default behavior, but there may be cases where it is more
convenient to close the authentication session immediately rather than
wait for user to do something.
Add a new "mschapv2_retry=0" option to the phase2 field to allow the
retry behavior to be disabled. This will make wpa_supplicant abort
authentication attempt on E=691 regardless of whether the server allows
retry.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This extends the VENDOR-TEST EAP method peer implementation to allow
pending processing case to be selected at run time. The
ap_wpa2_eap_vendor_test test case is similarly extended to include this
option as the second case for full coverage.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This is similar with domain_suffix_match, but required a full match of
the domain name rather than allowing suffix match (subdomains) or
wildcard certificates.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
A new "CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-ALT depth=<i> <alt name>" event is now used
to provide information about server certificate chain alternative
subject names for upper layers, e.g., to make it easier to configure
constraints on the server certificate. For example:
CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-ALT depth=0 DNS:server.example.com
Currently, this includes DNS, EMAIL, and URI components from the
certificates. Similar information is priovided to D-Bus Certification
signal in the new altsubject argument which is a string array of these
items.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
These were already covered in both README-HS20 for credentials and in
header files for developers' documentation, but the copy in
wpa_supplicant.conf did not include all the details. In addition, add a
clearer note pointing at subject_match not being suitable for suffix
matching domain names; domain_suffix_match must be used for that.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This allows recovery through fallback to full EAP authentication if the
server rejects us, e.g., due to having dropped ERP state.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This can be used to determine whether the last TLS-based EAP
authentication instance re-used a previous session (e.g., TLS session
resumption or EAP-FAST session ticket).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Commit 35efa2479f ('OpenSSL: Allow TLS
v1.1 and v1.2 to be negotiated by default') changed from using
TLSv1_method() to SSLv23_method() to allow negotiation of TLS v1.0,
v1.1, and v1.2.
Unfortunately, it looks like EAP-FAST does not work with this due to
OpenSSL not allowing ClientHello extensions to be configured with
SSL_set_session_ticket_ext() when SSLv23_method() is used. Work around
this regression by initiating a separate SSL_CTX instance for EAP-FAST
phase 1 needs with TLSv1_method() while leaving all other EAP cases
using TLS to work with the new default that allows v1.1 and v1.2 to be
negotiated. This is not ideal and will hopefully get fixed in the future
with a new OpenSSL method, but until that time, this can be used allow
other methods use newer TLS versions while still allowing EAP-FAST to be
used even if it remains to be constraint to TLS v1.0 only.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This converts os_snprintf() result validation cases to use
os_snprintf_error() for cases that were note covered by spatch and
semantic patches.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This was not really a real issue since bin_clear_free() would not use
the emsk_len argument when emsk is NULL as it would be on the path where
emsk_len has not been initilized. Anyway, it is better to get rid of the
warning.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Derive rRK and rIK on EAP peer if ERP is enabled. The new wpa_supplicant
network configuration parameter erp=1 can now be used to configure the
EAP peer to derive EMSK, rRK, and rIK at the successful completion of an
EAP authentication method. This functionality is not included in the
default build and can be enabled with CONFIG_ERP=y.
If EAP authenticator indicates support for re-authentication protocol,
initiate this with EAP-Initiate/Re-auth and complete protocol when
receiving EAP-Finish/Re-auth.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This adds EAP-PAX server and peer method functions for deriving
Session-Id from Method-Id per RFC 4746 and RFC 5247.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The comment about library not supporting Session-Id derivation was not
accurate and there is no need to check for master key that is not used
as part of derivation.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Previously, this was implicitly limited by the 16-bit length field to
65535. This resulted in unhelpful static analyzer warnings (CID 62868).
Add an explicit (but pretty arbitrary) limit of 50000 bytes to avoid
this. The actual WSC messages are significantly shorter in practice, but
there is no specific protocol limit, so 50000 is as good as any limit to
use here.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Some static analyzers seem to have issues understanding "pos +
proposal_len > end" style validation, so convert this to "proposal_len >
end - pos" to make this more obvious to be bounds checking for
proposal_len. (CID 62874)
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Some static analyzers seem to have issues with "pos + len > end"
validation (CID 62875), so convert this to "len > end - pos" to make it
more obvious that len is validated against its bounds.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This was too difficult for some static analyzers (CID 62876). In
addition, the pac_info_len assignment should really have explicitly
validated that there is room for the two octet length field instead of
trusting the following validation step to handle both this and the
actual pac_info_len bounds checking.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This gets registered in tls_openssl.c from tls_init(), so there is no
need for EAP-pwd implementation to register explicitly. This avoids some
corner cases where OpenSSL resources do not get fully freed on exit.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The new openssl_cipher configuration parameter can be used to select
which TLS cipher suites are enabled for TLS-based EAP methods when
OpenSSL is used as the TLS library. This parameter can be used both as a
global parameter to set the default for all network blocks and as a
network block parameter to override the default for each network
profile.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This forces EAP peer implementation to drop any possible fast resumption
data if the network block for the current connection is not the same as
the one used for the previous one. This allows different network blocks
to be used with non-matching parameters to enforce different rules even
if the same authentication server is used. For example, this allows
different CA trust rules to be enforced with different ca_cert
parameters which can prevent EAP-TTLS Phase 2 from being used based on
TLS session resumption.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Use an explicit memset call to clear any configuration parameter and
dynamic data that contains private information like keys or identity.
This brings in an additional layer of protection by reducing the length
of time this type of private data is kept in memory.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This makes the EAP-pwd server and peer implementations more robust
should OpenSSL fail to derive random number for some reason. While this
is unlikely to happen in practice, the implementation better be prepared
for this should something unexpected ever happen. See
http://jbp.io/2014/01/16/openssl-rand-api/#review-of-randbytes-callers
for more details.
Signed-off-by: Florent Daigniere <nextgens@freenetproject.org>
This makes the implementation less likely to provide useful timing
information to potential attackers from comparisons of information
received from a remote device and private material known only by the
authorized devices.
Signed-off-by: Florent Daigniere <nextgens@freenetproject.org>
This changes OpenSSL calls to explicitly clear the EC_POINT memory
allocations when freeing them. This adds an extra layer of security by
avoiding leaving potentially private keys into local memory after they
are not needed anymore. While some of these variables are not really
private (e.g., they are sent in clear anyway), the extra cost of
clearing them is not significant and it is simpler to just clear these
explicitly rather than review each possible code path to confirm where
this does not help.
Signed-off-by: Florent Daigniere <nextgens@freenetproject.org>
This changes OpenSSL calls to explicitly clear the bignum memory
allocations when freeing them. This adds an extra layer of security by
avoiding leaving potentially private keys into local memory after they
are not needed anymore. While some of these variables are not really
private (e.g., they are sent in clear anyway), the extra cost of
clearing them is not significant and it is simpler to just clear these
explicitly rather than review each possible code path to confirm where
this does not help.
Signed-off-by: Florent Daigniere <nextgens@freenetproject.org>
FreeRADIUS releases before 1.1.4 did not send MS-CHAP2-Success in
EAP-TTLS/MSCHAPv2. A wpa_supplicant workaround for that was added in
2005 and it has been enabled by default to avoid interoperability
issues. This could be disabled with all other EAP workarounds
(eap_workaround=0). However, that will disable some workarounds that are
still needed with number of authentication servers.
Old FreeRADIUS versions should not be in use anymore, so it makes sense
to remove this EAP-TTLS/MSCHAPv2 workaround completely to get more
complete validation of server behavior. This allows MSCHAPv2 to verify
that the server knows the password instead of relying only on the TLS
certificate validation.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Shmidt <dimitrysh@google.com>
Reduce the amount of time keying material (MSK, EMSK, temporary private
data) remains in memory in EAP methods. This provides additional
protection should there be any issues that could expose process memory
to external observers.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Use an explicit memset call to clear any wpa_supplicant configuration
parameter that contains private information like keys or identity. This
brings in an additional layer of protection by reducing the length of
time this type of private data is kept in memory.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The pos pointer is not used after this now nor in future plans, so no
need to increment the value. This remove a static analyzer warning about
dead increment.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This makes the implementation less likely to provide useful timing
information to potential attackers from comparisons of information
received from a remote device and private material known only by the
authorized devices.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This makes the implementation less likely to provide useful timing
information to potential attackers from comparisons of information
received from a remote device and private material known only by the
authorized devices.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This makes the implementation less likely to provide useful timing
information to potential attackers from comparisons of information
received from a remote device and private material known only by the
authorized devices.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This makes the implementation less likely to provide useful timing
information to potential attackers from comparisons of information
received from a remote device and private material known only by the
authorized devices.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This makes the implementation less likely to provide useful timing
information to potential attackers from comparisons of information
received from a remote device and private material known only by the
authorized devices.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This makes the implementation less likely to provide useful timing
information to potential attackers from comparisons of information
received from a remote device and private material known only by the
authorized devices.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
