The check for erp->keyname_nai within eap_erp_get_key() is apparently
too difficult for some static analyzers to notice. Add an explicit check
for os_strchr() return value being non-NULL to avoid false reports.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This allows ERP keys to be managed by external entities, e.g., when
offloading FILS shared key authentication to a driver.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Add an internal flag which indicates to tunneled EAP methods (FAST,
PEAP, TTLS) that they should cache decrypted EAP-SIM/AKA/AKA' requests.
This allows EAP-SIM/AKA/AKA' to be tunneled within these outer methods
while using an external SIM authenticator over the control interface.
Signed-off-by: Paul Stewart <pstew@google.com>
While RFC 5295 uses "8" as the value to use in the length field in KDF
context when deriving EMSKname, it is clearer to use the macro defining
EMSKname as the value since the KDF design in RFC 5295 encodes the
length of the derived data in octets in that part of the context data.
This change is just making the implementation easier to understand while
not actually changing the behavior.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Unlike the EMSKname and rRK derivations, rIK derivation is actually
using the "optional data" component in the context data (see RFC 5295).
RFC 6696 defines that optional data to be the cryptosuite field for rIK.
This was missing from the previous implementation and that resulted in
incorrect rIK being derived.
In addition, the rIK Label string does not actually include the "EAP "
prefix in the way as the rRK Label in RFC 6696 does. This would also
have resulted in incorrect rIK value.
Fix rIK derivation by adding the cryptosuite value into the KDF context
data and fixing the label string. This change is not backwards
compatible and breaks all ERP use cases (including FILS shared key
authentication) with older (broken) and new (fixed)
hostapd/wpa_supplicant builds.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This needs to be callable through the EAPOL supplicant wrappers to allow
FILS implementation to use ERP.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
That function does not need the full EAP header -- it only needs to know
which EAP identifier to use in the message. Make this usable for cases
where the previous EAP message may not exist (FILS).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This adds support for optional functionality to validate server
certificate chain in TLS-based EAP methods in an external program.
wpa_supplicant control interface is used to indicate when such
validation is needed and what the result of the external validation is.
This external validation can extend or replace the internal validation.
When ca_cert or ca_path parameter is set, the internal validation is
used. If these parameters are omitted, only the external validation is
used. It needs to be understood that leaving those parameters out will
disable most of the validation steps done with the TLS library and that
configuration is not really recommend.
By default, the external validation is not used. It can be enabled by
addingtls_ext_cert_check=1 into the network profile phase1 parameter.
When enabled, external validation is required through the CTRL-REQ/RSP
mechanism similarly to other EAP authentication parameters through the
control interface.
The request to perform external validation is indicated by the following
event:
CTRL-REQ-EXT_CERT_CHECK-<id>:External server certificate validation needed for SSID <ssid>
Before that event, the server certificate chain is provided with the
CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT events that include the cert=<hexdump>
parameter. depth=# indicates which certificate is in question (0 for the
server certificate, 1 for its issues, and so on).
The result of the external validation is provided with the following
command:
CTRL-RSP-EXT_CERT_CHECK-<id>:<good|bad>
It should be noted that this is currently enabled only for OpenSSL (and
BoringSSL/LibreSSL). Due to the constraints in the library API, the
validation result from external processing cannot be reported cleanly
with TLS alert. In other words, if the external validation reject the
server certificate chain, the pending TLS handshake is terminated
without sending more messages to the server.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
While this is not part of RFC 4137, the way m.check(eapReqData) is
implemented in wpa_supplicant allows an EAP method to not update the
ignore value even though each such call is really supposed to get a new
response. It seems to be possible to hit a sequence where a previous EAP
authentication attempt terminates with sm->ignore set from the last
m.check() call and the following EAP authentication attempt could fail
to go through the expected code path if it does not clear the ignore
flag. This is likely only hit in some error cases, though. The hwsim
test cases could trigger this with the following sequence:
eap_proto_ikev2 ap_wps_m1_oom
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
MD5 is not available in CONFIG_FIPS=y builds, so use SHA1 for the EAP
peer workaround that tries to detect more robustly whether a duplicate
message was sent.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Use explicit typecasting to avoid implicit conversion warnings in cases
where enum eap_erp_type is used in functions taking an EapType argument.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
By analysing objdump output some read only structures were found in
.data section. To help compiler further optimize code declare these
as const.
Signed-off-by: Mikael Kanstrup <mikael.kanstrup@sonymobile.com>
For wired IEEE 802.1X authentication, phase1="allow_canned_success=1"
can now be used to configure a mode that allows EAP-Success (and
EAP-Failure) without going through authentication step. Some switches
use such sequence when forcing the port to be authorized/unauthorized or
as a fallback option if the authentication server is unreachable. By
default, wpa_supplicant discards such frames to protect against
potential attacks by rogue devices, but this option can be used to
disable that protection for cases where the server/authenticator does
not need to be authenticated.
When enabled, this mode allows EAP-Success/EAP-Failure as an immediate
response to EAPOL-Start (or even without EAPOL-Start) and EAP-Success is
also allowed immediately after EAP-Identity exchange (fallback case for
authenticator not being able to connect to authentication server).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
A new "CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-ALT depth=<i> <alt name>" event is now used
to provide information about server certificate chain alternative
subject names for upper layers, e.g., to make it easier to configure
constraints on the server certificate. For example:
CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-ALT depth=0 DNS:server.example.com
Currently, this includes DNS, EMAIL, and URI components from the
certificates. Similar information is priovided to D-Bus Certification
signal in the new altsubject argument which is a string array of these
items.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This allows recovery through fallback to full EAP authentication if the
server rejects us, e.g., due to having dropped ERP state.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This was not really a real issue since bin_clear_free() would not use
the emsk_len argument when emsk is NULL as it would be on the path where
emsk_len has not been initilized. Anyway, it is better to get rid of the
warning.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Derive rRK and rIK on EAP peer if ERP is enabled. The new wpa_supplicant
network configuration parameter erp=1 can now be used to configure the
EAP peer to derive EMSK, rRK, and rIK at the successful completion of an
EAP authentication method. This functionality is not included in the
default build and can be enabled with CONFIG_ERP=y.
If EAP authenticator indicates support for re-authentication protocol,
initiate this with EAP-Initiate/Re-auth and complete protocol when
receiving EAP-Finish/Re-auth.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The new openssl_cipher configuration parameter can be used to select
which TLS cipher suites are enabled for TLS-based EAP methods when
OpenSSL is used as the TLS library. This parameter can be used both as a
global parameter to set the default for all network blocks and as a
network block parameter to override the default for each network
profile.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This forces EAP peer implementation to drop any possible fast resumption
data if the network block for the current connection is not the same as
the one used for the previous one. This allows different network blocks
to be used with non-matching parameters to enforce different rules even
if the same authentication server is used. For example, this allows
different CA trust rules to be enforced with different ca_cert
parameters which can prevent EAP-TTLS Phase 2 from being used based on
TLS session resumption.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Reduce the amount of time keying material (MSK, EMSK, temporary private
data) remains in memory in EAP methods. This provides additional
protection should there be any issues that could expose process memory
to external observers.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Some EAP methods can go through a step that is expected to fail and as
such, should not trigger temporary network disabling when processing
EAP-Failure or deauthentication. EAP-WSC for WPS was already handled as
a special case, but similar behavior is needed for EAP-FAST with
unauthenticated provisioning.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The hash return buffer was previously left uninitialized in case
externally stored password ("password=ext:...") was used. This could
result in MSCHAPv2 failure if that uninitialized memory happened to be
something else than zero.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
One of the RFC 4137 state transitions (METHOD -> FAILURE) had been
forgotten and this could result in EAP peer method processing not
reporting failure immediately and instead, remain stuck waiting for the
connection to time out. Fix this by adding the methodState == DONE &&
decision == FAIL case to allow immediate reporting of failures.
The condition from RFC 4137 as-is would cause problems for number of the
existing EAP method implementations since they use that in places where
the final message before EAP-Failure should really be sent to the EAP
server (e.g., WSC_Done in EAP-WSC). Address this by includng eapRespData
== NULL as an additional constraint for entering FAILURE state directly
from METHOD.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The new configuration parameter external_sim=<0/1> can now be used to
configure wpa_supplicant to use external SIM/USIM processing (e.g., GSM
authentication for EAP-SIM or UMTS authentication for EAP-AKA). The
requests and responses for such operations are sent over the ctrl_iface
CTRL-REQ-SIM and CTRL-RSP-SIM commands similarly to the existing
password query mechanism.
Changes to the EAP methods to use this new mechanism will be added in
separate commits.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Swisscom SIM cards do not include MNC length within EF_AD, and end up
using incorrect MNC length based on the 3-digit default. Hardcode MNC
length of 2 for Switzerland, in the same manner as it was done for
Finland.
Signed-hostap: Andrejs Cainikovs <andrejs.cainikovs@sonymobile.com>
We should not call getSessionID method if it's not provided. This fixes
a regression from commit 950c563076 where
EAP methods that did not implement getSessionId resulted in NULL pointer
dereference when deriving the key.
Signed-off-by: Shijie Zhang <shijiez@qca.qualcomm.com>
This adds a new getSessionId() callback for EAP peer methods to allow
EAP Session-Id to be derived. This commits implements this for EAP-FAST,
EAP-GPSK, EAP-IKEv2, EAP-PEAP, EAP-TLS, and EAP-TTLS.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Signal the start of EAP authentication as well as when additional
credentials are required to complete.
Signed-hostap: Paul Stewart <pstew@chromium.org>
Commit 458cb30191 broke LEAP since it
rejects EAP-Success packet that is used within LEAP and this frame does
not have a payload. Fix LEAP by relaxing the generic EAP packet
validation if LEAP has been negotiated.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Use the anonymous_identity field to store EAP-SIM/AKA pseudonym identity
so that this can be maintained between EAP sessions (e.g., after
wpa_supplicant restart) even if fast re-authentication data was cleared.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
These validation steps are already done in the EAP parsing code and in
the EAP methods, but the additional check is defensive programming and
can make the validation of received EAP messages more easier to
understand.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This allows the password parameter for EAP methods to be fetched
from an external storage.
Following example can be used for developer testing:
ext_password_backend=test:pw1=password|pw2=testing
network={
key_mgmt=WPA-EAP
eap=TTLS
identity="user"
password=ext:pw1
ca_cert="ca.pem"
phase2="auth=PAP"
}
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Send an "EAP" signal via the new DBus interface under various
conditions during EAP authentication:
- During method selection (ACK and NAK)
- During certificate verification
- While sending and receiving TLS alert messages
- EAP success and failure messages
This provides DBus callers a number of new tools:
- The ability to probe an AP for available EAP methods
(given an identity).
- The ability to identify why the remote certificate was
not verified.
- The ability to identify why the remote peer refused
a TLS connection.
Signed-hostap: Paul Stewart <pstew@chromium.org>
There was a technical change between the last IETF draft version
(draft-arkko-eap-aka-kdf-10) and RFC 5448 in the leading characters
used in the username (i.e., use unique characters for EAP-AKA' instead
of reusing the EAP-AKA ones). This commit updates EAP-AKA' server and
peer implementations to use the leading characters based on the final
RFC.
Note: This will make EAP-AKA' not interoperate between the earlier
draft version and the new version.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
intended-for: hostap-1
OpenSSL wrapper was using the same certificate store for both Phase 1
and Phase 2 TLS exchange in case of EAP-PEAP/TLS, EAP-TTLS/TLS, and
EAP-FAST/TLS. This would be fine if the same CA certificates were used
in both phases, but does not work properly if different CA certificates
are used. Enforce full separation of TLS state between the phases by
using a separate TLS library context in EAP peer implementation.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Some SIM cards do not include MNC length with in EF_AD. Try to figure
out the MNC length based on the MCC/MNC values in the beginning of the
IMSI. This covers a prepaid Elisa/Kolumbus card that would have ended
up using incorrect MNC length based on the 3-digit default.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The temporary IMSI buffer can be used for this without needing the
extra memory allocation. In addition, the implementation is easier
to understand when the extra identity prefix value for EAP-SIM/AKA
is not included while fetching MCC/MNC from the IMSI.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Control requests will be extended for non-EAP uses later, so it makes
sense to have them be generic. Furthermore, having them defined as an
enum is easier for processing internally, and more generic for control
interfaces that may not use field names. The public ctrl_req_type /
field_name conversion function will be used later by the D-Bus control
interface too.
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dcbw@redhat.com>
This fixes an issue where WPS run leaves a small ClientTimeout
value (2) configured and the next EAPOL authentication is started
with that small value even for Identity exchange. This can cause
problems when an EAPOL packet gets dropped immediately after
association and a retry of that packet is needed (which may take
more than two seconds).
eapol_test command line argument -o<file> can now be used to request
the received server certificate chain to be written to the specified
file. The certificates will be written in PEM format. [Bug 391]
