mirror of
https://github.com/vanhoefm/fragattacks.git
synced 2025-01-19 11:24:05 -05:00
SAE: Use constant time operations in sae_test_pwd_seed_ffc()
Try to avoid showing externally visible timing or memory access differences regardless of whether the derived pwd-value is smaller than the group prime. This is related to CVE-2019-9494. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
This commit is contained in:
parent
f8f20717f8
commit
cff138b074
@ -334,14 +334,17 @@ static int sae_test_pwd_seed_ecc(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *pwd_seed,
|
|||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/* Returns -1 on fatal failure, 0 if PWE cannot be derived from the provided
|
||||||
|
* pwd-seed, or 1 if a valid PWE was derived from pwd-seed. */
|
||||||
static int sae_test_pwd_seed_ffc(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *pwd_seed,
|
static int sae_test_pwd_seed_ffc(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *pwd_seed,
|
||||||
struct crypto_bignum *pwe)
|
struct crypto_bignum *pwe)
|
||||||
{
|
{
|
||||||
u8 pwd_value[SAE_MAX_PRIME_LEN];
|
u8 pwd_value[SAE_MAX_PRIME_LEN];
|
||||||
size_t bits = sae->tmp->prime_len * 8;
|
size_t bits = sae->tmp->prime_len * 8;
|
||||||
u8 exp[1];
|
u8 exp[1];
|
||||||
struct crypto_bignum *a, *b;
|
struct crypto_bignum *a, *b = NULL;
|
||||||
int res;
|
int res, is_val;
|
||||||
|
u8 pwd_value_valid;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: pwd-seed", pwd_seed, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
|
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: pwd-seed", pwd_seed, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@ -353,16 +356,29 @@ static int sae_test_pwd_seed_ffc(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *pwd_seed,
|
|||||||
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: pwd-value", pwd_value,
|
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: pwd-value", pwd_value,
|
||||||
sae->tmp->prime_len);
|
sae->tmp->prime_len);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
if (os_memcmp(pwd_value, sae->tmp->dh->prime, sae->tmp->prime_len) >= 0)
|
/* Check whether pwd-value < p */
|
||||||
{
|
res = const_time_memcmp(pwd_value, sae->tmp->dh->prime,
|
||||||
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: pwd-value >= p");
|
sae->tmp->prime_len);
|
||||||
return 0;
|
/* pwd-value >= p is invalid, so res is < 0 for the valid cases and
|
||||||
}
|
* the negative sign can be used to fill the mask for constant time
|
||||||
|
* selection */
|
||||||
|
pwd_value_valid = const_time_fill_msb(res);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/* If pwd-value >= p, force pwd-value to be < p and perform the
|
||||||
|
* calculations anyway to hide timing difference. The derived PWE will
|
||||||
|
* be ignored in that case. */
|
||||||
|
pwd_value[0] = const_time_select_u8(pwd_value_valid, pwd_value[0], 0);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
/* PWE = pwd-value^((p-1)/r) modulo p */
|
/* PWE = pwd-value^((p-1)/r) modulo p */
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
res = -1;
|
||||||
a = crypto_bignum_init_set(pwd_value, sae->tmp->prime_len);
|
a = crypto_bignum_init_set(pwd_value, sae->tmp->prime_len);
|
||||||
|
if (!a)
|
||||||
|
goto fail;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/* This is an optimization based on the used group that does not depend
|
||||||
|
* on the password in any way, so it is fine to use separate branches
|
||||||
|
* for this step without constant time operations. */
|
||||||
if (sae->tmp->dh->safe_prime) {
|
if (sae->tmp->dh->safe_prime) {
|
||||||
/*
|
/*
|
||||||
* r = (p-1)/2 for the group used here, so this becomes:
|
* r = (p-1)/2 for the group used here, so this becomes:
|
||||||
@ -376,33 +392,34 @@ static int sae_test_pwd_seed_ffc(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *pwd_seed,
|
|||||||
b = crypto_bignum_init_set(exp, sizeof(exp));
|
b = crypto_bignum_init_set(exp, sizeof(exp));
|
||||||
if (b == NULL ||
|
if (b == NULL ||
|
||||||
crypto_bignum_sub(sae->tmp->prime, b, b) < 0 ||
|
crypto_bignum_sub(sae->tmp->prime, b, b) < 0 ||
|
||||||
crypto_bignum_div(b, sae->tmp->order, b) < 0) {
|
crypto_bignum_div(b, sae->tmp->order, b) < 0)
|
||||||
crypto_bignum_deinit(b, 0);
|
goto fail;
|
||||||
b = NULL;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
if (a == NULL || b == NULL)
|
if (!b)
|
||||||
res = -1;
|
goto fail;
|
||||||
else
|
|
||||||
res = crypto_bignum_exptmod(a, b, sae->tmp->prime, pwe);
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
crypto_bignum_deinit(a, 0);
|
res = crypto_bignum_exptmod(a, b, sae->tmp->prime, pwe);
|
||||||
crypto_bignum_deinit(b, 0);
|
if (res < 0)
|
||||||
|
goto fail;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
if (res < 0) {
|
/* There were no fatal errors in calculations, so determine the return
|
||||||
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Failed to calculate PWE");
|
* value using constant time operations. We get here for number of
|
||||||
return -1;
|
* invalid cases which are cleared here after having performed all the
|
||||||
}
|
* computation. PWE is valid if pwd-value was less than prime and
|
||||||
|
* PWE > 1. Start with pwd-value check first and then use constant time
|
||||||
|
* operations to clear res to 0 if PWE is 0 or 1.
|
||||||
|
*/
|
||||||
|
res = const_time_select_u8(pwd_value_valid, 1, 0);
|
||||||
|
is_val = crypto_bignum_is_zero(pwe);
|
||||||
|
res = const_time_select_u8(const_time_is_zero(is_val), res, 0);
|
||||||
|
is_val = crypto_bignum_is_one(pwe);
|
||||||
|
res = const_time_select_u8(const_time_is_zero(is_val), res, 0);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
/* if (PWE > 1) --> found */
|
fail:
|
||||||
if (crypto_bignum_is_zero(pwe) || crypto_bignum_is_one(pwe)) {
|
crypto_bignum_deinit(a, 1);
|
||||||
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: PWE <= 1");
|
crypto_bignum_deinit(b, 1);
|
||||||
return 0;
|
return res;
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: PWE found");
|
|
||||||
return 1;
|
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user