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Fix validation of EAPOL-Key length with AES key wrap (CID 62859)
The additional eight octet field was removed from keydatalen without proper validation of the Key Data Length field. It would have been possible for an invalid EAPOL-Key frame to be processed in a way that ends up reading beyond the buffer. In theory, this could have also resulted in writing beyond the EAPOL-Key frame buffer, but that is unlikely to be feasible due to the AES key wrap validation step on arbitrary memory contents. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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@ -1501,7 +1501,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_decrypt_key_data(struct wpa_sm *sm,
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ver == WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC ||
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ver == WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC ||
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sm->key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN) {
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sm->key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN) {
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u8 *buf;
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u8 *buf;
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if (keydatalen % 8) {
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if (keydatalen < 8 || keydatalen % 8) {
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wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
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wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
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"WPA: Unsupported AES-WRAP len %d",
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"WPA: Unsupported AES-WRAP len %d",
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keydatalen);
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keydatalen);
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