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Tweaks to the vulnerability summaries

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Mathy Vanhoef 2020-09-28 10:35:52 +04:00
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# <div align="center">Summary of Vulnerabilities</div>
This document contains a summary of the discovered vulnerabilities.
## Design Flaws
- **CVE-2020-24588: Accepting non-SSP A-MSDU frames**: The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that the A-MSDU flag in the plaintext QoS header field is authenticated. Against devices that support receiving non-SSP A-MSDU frames, which is mandatory as part of 802.11n, an adversary can abuse this to inject arbitrary network packets.
- **CVE-2020-24588: Accepting non-SPP A-MSDU frames**: The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that the A-MSDU flag in the plaintext QoS header field is authenticated. Against devices that support receiving non-SPP A-MSDU frames, which is mandatory as part of 802.11n, an adversary can abuse this to inject arbitrary network packets.
- **CVE-2020-24587: Reassembling fragments encrypted under different keys**: The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that all fragments of a frame are encrypted under the same key. An adversary can abuse this to exfiltrate selected fragments when another device sends fragmented frames and the WEP, CCMP, or GCMP encryption key is periodically renewed.
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- **Accepting plaintext data frames in a protected network**: Vulnerable WEP, WPA, WPA2, or WPA3 implementations accept plaintext frames in a protected Wi-Fi network. An adversary can abuse this to inject arbitrary data frames independent of the network configuration.
- **Accepting fragmented plaintext data frames in a protected network**: Vulnerable WEP, WPA, WPA2, or WPA3 implementations accept fragmented plaintext frames in a protected Wi-Fi network. An adversary can abuse this to inject arbitrary data frames independent of the network configuration.
- **Accepting _fragmented_ plaintext data frames in a protected network**: Vulnerable WEP, WPA, WPA2, or WPA3 implementations accept fragmented plaintext frames in a protected Wi-Fi network. An adversary can abuse this to inject arbitrary data frames independent of the network configuration.
- **Forwarding EAPOL frames even though the sender is not yet authenticated**: Vulnerable Access Points (APs) forward EAPOL frames to other clients even though the sender has not yet successfully authenticated to the AP. This can be abused in projected Wi-Fi networks to launch denial-of-service attacks against connected clients and makes it easier to exploit other vulnerabilities in connected clients.
- **Forwarding EAPOL frames even though the sender is not yet authenticated**: Vulnerable Access Points (APs) forward EAPOL frames to other clients even though the sender has not yet successfully authenticated to the AP. An adversary might be able to abuse this in projected Wi-Fi networks to launch denial-of-service attacks against connected clients, and this makes it easier to exploit other vulnerabilities in connected clients.
- **Not verifying the TKIP MIC of fragmented frames**: Vulnerable Wi-Fi implementations do not verify the Message Integrity Check (authenticity) of fragmented TKIP frames. An adversary can abuse this to inject and possibly decrypt packets in WPA or WPA2 networks that support the TKIP data-confidentiality protocol.