fragattacks: updated SUMMARY with improved attack preconditions

research/SUMMARY.md

@@ -1,34 +1,34 @@
 # <div align="center">Summary of Vulnerabilities</div>
 
-This document contains a summary of the discovered vulnerabilities. Every bullet point corresponds to an individual vulnerability.
+This document contains a summary of the discovered vulnerabilities.
 
 ## Design Flaws
 
-- **Accepting non-SSP A-MSDU frames**: The 802.11 standard doesn't mandate that the A-MSDU flag in the plaintext QoS field is authenticated. Against devices that support receiving non-SSP A-MSDU frames, an adversary can abuse this to inject arbitrary network packets. The attack applies to all protected Wi-Fi networks, including WEP, WPA, WPA2, and WPA3.
+- **Accepting non-SSP A-MSDU frames**: The 802.11 standard doesn't mandate that the A-MSDU flag in the plaintext QoS header field is authenticated. Against devices that support receiving non-SSP A-MSDU frames, which is mantadory as part of 802.11n, an adversary can abuse this to inject arbitrary network packets. The attack applies to all protected Wi-Fi networks, including WEP, WPA, WPA2, and WPA3.
 
-- **Accepting short A-MSDU frames in non-DMG networks**: The 802.11 standard doesn't mandate that the short A-MSDU flag in the plaintext QoS field is authenticated in non-DMG networks. Against devices that support receiving short A-MSDU frames, an adversary can abuse this to spoof short A-MSDU frames. The attack applies to all protected Wi-Fi networks, including WEP, WPA, WPA2, and WPA3. I haven't yet found a device that supports short A-MSDUs, so currently this appears to be a theoretical issue.
+- **Accepting short A-MSDU frames in non-DMG networks**: The 802.11 standard doesn't mandate that the short A-MSDU flag in the plaintext QoS header field is authenticated in non-DMG networks. This is currently a theoretical issue: I haven't yet found a device that supports receiving short A-MSDUs, and it's unclear whether this would be exploitable.
 
-- **Reassembling fragments encrypted under different keys**: The 802.11 standard doesn't mandate that all fragments of a frame are encryted using the same key. An adversary can abuse this to decrypt selected fragments. The attack works against the WEP, CCMP, and GCMP encryption protocol, meaning it works against WPA2 and WPA3 networks as well. A WPA network is unaffected if the TKIP encryption cipher is being used.
+- **Reassembling fragments encrypted under different keys**: The 802.11 standard doesn't mandate that all fragments of a frame are encryted using the same key. An adversary can abuse this to decrypt selected fragments. This vulnerability is exploitable when another device sends fragmented frames and the WEP, CCMP, or GCMP encryption cipher is used (e.g. all WPA2 and WPA3 networks use CCMP or GCMP).
 
-- **Not clearing fragments from memory when (re)connecting to a network:** The 802.11 standard doesn't mandate that received fragments must be cleared from memory after (re)connecting to a network. Under the right circumstances an adversary can abuse this to inject arbitrary network packets and/or decrypt user data. The attack works against the WEP, CCMP, and GCMP encryption cipher, meaning it works against WPA2 and WPA3 networks as well. A WPA network is unaffected if the TKIP encryption cipher is being used.
+- **Not clearing fragments from memory when (re)connecting to a network:** The 802.11 standard doesn't mandate that received fragments must be cleared from memory after (re)connecting to a network. Under the right circumstances an adversary can abuse this to inject arbitrary network packets and/or decrypt user data. The attack works when the WEP, CCMP, or GCMP encryption cipher is used (e.g. all WPA2 and WPA3 networks use CCMP or GCMP).
 
 ## Common Implementation Vulnerabilities
 
-- **Reassembling encrypted fragments with non-consecutive packet numbers**: Vulnerable implementations defragment (i.e. reassemble) fragments with non-consecutive packet numbers. An adversary can abuse this to decrypt selected fragments. This vulnerability is exploitable under the right circumstances again the WEP, CCMP, and GCMP encryption ciphers, meaning it's exploitable in WPA2 and WPA3 networks as well.
+- **Reassembling encrypted fragments with non-consecutive packet numbers**: Vulnerable implementations defragment (i.e. reassemble) fragments with non-consecutive packet numbers. An adversary can abuse this to decrypt selected fragments. This vulnerability is exploitable when another device sends fragmented frames and the WEP, CCMP, or GCMP encryption cipher is used (e.g. all WPA2 and WPA3 networks use CCMP or GCMP).
 
-- **Reassembling mixed encrypted/plaintext fragments**: Vulnerable implementations defragment (i.e. reassemble) fragments even though some of them were sent in plaintext while connected to a protected Wi-Fi network. An adversary can potentially abuse this to inject packets and decrypt selected fragments.
+- **Reassembling mixed encrypted/plaintext fragments**: Vulnerable implementations defragment (i.e. reassemble) fragments even though some of them were sent in plaintext while connected to a protected Wi-Fi network. This vulnerability can be abused to inject packets and/or decrypt selected fragments when another device sends fragmented frames and the WEP, CCMP, or GCMP encryption cipher is used (e.g. all WPA2 and WPA3 networks use CCMP or GCMP).
 
 - **Accepting plaintext broadcast fragments as full frames (while connected to an encrypted network)**: Vulnerable implementations process broadcast fragments as full frames, and moreover accept plaintext broadcast fragments as full frames. An adversary can abuse this to inject arbitary network packets.
 
-- **Accepting plaintext A-MSDU frames that start with an rfc1042 header (in an encrypted network)**: Vulnerable implementations accept plaintext A-MSDU frames as long as the first 6 to 8 bytes correspond to a valid rfc1042 (e.g. EAPOL LLC/SNAP) header. An adversary can abuse this to inject arbitrary network packets independent of the network configuration.
+- **Accepting plaintext A-MSDU frames that start with an rfc1042 header (in an encrypted network)**: Vulnerable implementations accept plaintext A-MSDU frames as long as the first 6 to 8 bytes correspond to a valid rfc1042 (i.e. EAPOL LLC/SNAP) header. An adversary can abuse this to inject arbitrary network packets independent of the network configuration.
 
 ## Other Implementation Vulnerabilities
 
-- **Accepting plaintext data frames when connected to an encrypted network**: Vulnerable implementations accept plaintext frames when connected to an encrypted network. An adversary can abuse this to inject arbitrary packets independent of the network configuration.
+- **Accepting plaintext data frames when connected to an encrypted network**: Vulnerable implementations accept plaintext frames when connected to a protected Wi-Fi network. An adversary can abuse this to inject arbitrary packets independent of the network configuration.
 
-- **Accepting plaintext fragmented data frames when connected to an encrypted network**: Vulnerable implementations accept plaintext fragmented frames when connected to an encrypted network. An adversary can abuse this to inject arbitrary packets independent of the network configuration.
+- **Accepting plaintext fragmented data frames when connected to an encrypted network**: Vulnerable implementations accept plaintext fragmented frames when connected to a projected Wi-Fi network. An adversary can abuse this to inject arbitrary packets independent of the network configuration.
 
-- **Forwarding EAPOL frames even though the sender is not yet authenticated**: Vulnerable APs will forward EAPOL frames to other clients even though the sender has not yet successfully authenticated to the AP. On its own this cannot be abused to attack the AP, but it does make it easier to exploit certain vulnerabilities in connected clients.
+- **Forwarding EAPOL frames even though the sender is not yet authenticated**: Vulnerable APs will forward EAPOL frames to other clients even though the sender has not yet successfully authenticated to the AP. This makes it easier to exploit vulnerabilities in connected clients.
 
 - **Not verifying the TKIP MIC of fragmented frames**: Vulnerable implementations do not verify the Message Integrity Check, i.e., authenticity, of fragmented TKIP frames. An adversary can abuse this to inject and possibly decrypt packets.