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Reject psk parameter set with invalid passphrase character
WPA/WPA2-Personal passphrase is not allowed to include control characters. Reject a passphrase configuration attempt if that passphrase includes an invalid passphrase. This fixes an issue where wpa_supplicant could have updated the configuration file psk parameter with arbitrary data from the control interface or D-Bus interface. While those interfaces are supposed to be accessible only for trusted users/applications, it may be possible that an untrusted user has access to a management software component that does not validate the passphrase value before passing it to wpa_supplicant. This could allow such an untrusted user to inject up to 63 characters of almost arbitrary data into the configuration file. Such configuration file could result in wpa_supplicant trying to load a library (e.g., opensc_engine_path, pkcs11_engine_path, pkcs11_module_path, load_dynamic_eap) from user controlled location when starting again. This would allow code from that library to be executed under the wpa_supplicant process privileges. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
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@ -478,6 +478,12 @@ static int wpa_config_parse_psk(const struct parse_data *data,
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}
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wpa_hexdump_ascii_key(MSG_MSGDUMP, "PSK (ASCII passphrase)",
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(u8 *) value, len);
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if (has_ctrl_char((u8 *) value, len)) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
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"Line %d: Invalid passphrase character",
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line);
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return -1;
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}
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if (ssid->passphrase && os_strlen(ssid->passphrase) == len &&
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os_memcmp(ssid->passphrase, value, len) == 0) {
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/* No change to the previously configured value */
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