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FT: Do not expose GTK/IGTK in FT Reassociation Response frame in OSEN
Do not include the actual GTK/IGTK value in FT protocol cases in OSEN or with DGAF disabled (Hotspot 2.0). This was already the case for the EAPOL-Key cases of providing GTK/IGTK, but the FT protocol case was missed. OSEN cannot really use FT, so that part is not impacted, but it would be possible to enable FT in a Hotspot 2.0 network that has DGAF disabled. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
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@ -2163,11 +2163,12 @@ static inline int wpa_auth_get_seqnum(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
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static u8 * wpa_ft_gtk_subelem(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, size_t *len)
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static u8 * wpa_ft_gtk_subelem(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, size_t *len)
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{
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{
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u8 *subelem;
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u8 *subelem;
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struct wpa_auth_config *conf = &sm->wpa_auth->conf;
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struct wpa_group *gsm = sm->group;
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struct wpa_group *gsm = sm->group;
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size_t subelem_len, pad_len;
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size_t subelem_len, pad_len;
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const u8 *key;
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const u8 *key;
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size_t key_len;
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size_t key_len;
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u8 keybuf[32];
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u8 keybuf[WPA_GTK_MAX_LEN];
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const u8 *kek;
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const u8 *kek;
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size_t kek_len;
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size_t kek_len;
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@ -2194,12 +2195,30 @@ static u8 * wpa_ft_gtk_subelem(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, size_t *len)
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pad_len += 8;
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pad_len += 8;
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if (pad_len && key_len < sizeof(keybuf)) {
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if (pad_len && key_len < sizeof(keybuf)) {
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os_memcpy(keybuf, gsm->GTK[gsm->GN - 1], key_len);
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os_memcpy(keybuf, gsm->GTK[gsm->GN - 1], key_len);
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if (conf->disable_gtk ||
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sm->wpa_key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN) {
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/*
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* Provide unique random GTK to each STA to prevent use
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* of GTK in the BSS.
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*/
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if (random_get_bytes(keybuf, key_len) < 0)
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return NULL;
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}
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os_memset(keybuf + key_len, 0, pad_len);
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os_memset(keybuf + key_len, 0, pad_len);
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keybuf[key_len] = 0xdd;
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keybuf[key_len] = 0xdd;
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key_len += pad_len;
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key_len += pad_len;
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key = keybuf;
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key = keybuf;
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} else
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} else if (conf->disable_gtk || sm->wpa_key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN) {
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/*
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* Provide unique random GTK to each STA to prevent use of GTK
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* in the BSS.
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*/
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if (random_get_bytes(keybuf, key_len) < 0)
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return NULL;
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key = keybuf;
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} else {
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key = gsm->GTK[gsm->GN - 1];
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key = gsm->GTK[gsm->GN - 1];
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}
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/*
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/*
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* Sub-elem ID[1] | Length[1] | Key Info[2] | Key Length[1] | RSC[8] |
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* Sub-elem ID[1] | Length[1] | Key Info[2] | Key Length[1] | RSC[8] |
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@ -2233,11 +2252,13 @@ static u8 * wpa_ft_gtk_subelem(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, size_t *len)
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static u8 * wpa_ft_igtk_subelem(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, size_t *len)
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static u8 * wpa_ft_igtk_subelem(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, size_t *len)
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{
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{
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u8 *subelem, *pos;
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u8 *subelem, *pos;
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struct wpa_auth_config *conf = &sm->wpa_auth->conf;
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struct wpa_group *gsm = sm->group;
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struct wpa_group *gsm = sm->group;
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size_t subelem_len;
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size_t subelem_len;
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const u8 *kek;
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const u8 *kek, *igtk;
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size_t kek_len;
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size_t kek_len;
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size_t igtk_len;
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size_t igtk_len;
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u8 dummy_igtk[WPA_IGTK_MAX_LEN];
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if (wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
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if (wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
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kek = sm->PTK.kek2;
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kek = sm->PTK.kek2;
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@ -2264,8 +2285,19 @@ static u8 * wpa_ft_igtk_subelem(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, size_t *len)
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wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm->wpa_auth, NULL, gsm->GN_igtk, pos);
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wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm->wpa_auth, NULL, gsm->GN_igtk, pos);
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pos += 6;
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pos += 6;
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*pos++ = igtk_len;
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*pos++ = igtk_len;
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if (aes_wrap(kek, kek_len, igtk_len / 8,
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igtk = gsm->IGTK[gsm->GN_igtk - 4];
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gsm->IGTK[gsm->GN_igtk - 4], pos)) {
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if (conf->disable_gtk || sm->wpa_key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN) {
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/*
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* Provide unique random IGTK to each STA to prevent use of
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* IGTK in the BSS.
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*/
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if (random_get_bytes(dummy_igtk, igtk_len / 8) < 0) {
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os_free(subelem);
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return NULL;
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}
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igtk = dummy_igtk;
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}
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if (aes_wrap(kek, kek_len, igtk_len / 8, igtk, pos)) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
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"FT: IGTK subelem encryption failed: kek_len=%d",
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"FT: IGTK subelem encryption failed: kek_len=%d",
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(int) kek_len);
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(int) kek_len);
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