Maintain internal entropy pool for augmenting random number generation
By default, make hostapd and wpa_supplicant maintain an internal
entropy pool that is fed with following information:
hostapd:
- Probe Request frames (timing, RSSI)
- Association events (timing)
- SNonce from Supplicants
wpa_supplicant:
- Scan results (timing, signal/noise)
- Association events (timing)
The internal pool is used to augment the random numbers generated
with the OS mechanism (os_get_random()). While the internal
implementation is not expected to be very strong due to limited
amount of generic (non-platform specific) information to feed the
pool, this may strengthen key derivation on some devices that are
not configured to provide strong random numbers through
os_get_random() (e.g., /dev/urandom on Linux/BSD).
This new mechanism is not supposed to replace proper OS provided
random number generation mechanism. The OS mechanism needs to be
initialized properly (e.g., hw random number generator,
maintaining entropy pool over reboots, etc.) for any of the
security assumptions to hold.
If the os_get_random() is known to provide strong ramdom data (e.g., on
Linux/BSD, the board in question is known to have reliable source of
random data from /dev/urandom), the internal hostapd random pool can be
disabled. This will save some in binary size and CPU use. However, this
should only be considered for builds that are known to be used on
devices that meet the requirements described above. The internal pool
is disabled by adding CONFIG_NO_RANDOM_POOL=y to the .config file.
2010-11-23 18:29:40 -05:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Random number generator
|
2011-03-22 17:15:00 -04:00
|
|
|
* Copyright (c) 2010-2011, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
|
Maintain internal entropy pool for augmenting random number generation
By default, make hostapd and wpa_supplicant maintain an internal
entropy pool that is fed with following information:
hostapd:
- Probe Request frames (timing, RSSI)
- Association events (timing)
- SNonce from Supplicants
wpa_supplicant:
- Scan results (timing, signal/noise)
- Association events (timing)
The internal pool is used to augment the random numbers generated
with the OS mechanism (os_get_random()). While the internal
implementation is not expected to be very strong due to limited
amount of generic (non-platform specific) information to feed the
pool, this may strengthen key derivation on some devices that are
not configured to provide strong random numbers through
os_get_random() (e.g., /dev/urandom on Linux/BSD).
This new mechanism is not supposed to replace proper OS provided
random number generation mechanism. The OS mechanism needs to be
initialized properly (e.g., hw random number generator,
maintaining entropy pool over reboots, etc.) for any of the
security assumptions to hold.
If the os_get_random() is known to provide strong ramdom data (e.g., on
Linux/BSD, the board in question is known to have reliable source of
random data from /dev/urandom), the internal hostapd random pool can be
disabled. This will save some in binary size and CPU use. However, this
should only be considered for builds that are known to be used on
devices that meet the requirements described above. The internal pool
is disabled by adding CONFIG_NO_RANDOM_POOL=y to the .config file.
2010-11-23 18:29:40 -05:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
|
|
|
|
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
|
|
|
|
* published by the Free Software Foundation.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Alternatively, this software may be distributed under the terms of BSD
|
|
|
|
* license.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* See README and COPYING for more details.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* This random number generator is used to provide additional entropy to the
|
|
|
|
* one provided by the operating system (os_get_random()) for session key
|
|
|
|
* generation. The os_get_random() output is expected to be secure and the
|
|
|
|
* implementation here is expected to provide only limited protection against
|
|
|
|
* cases where os_get_random() cannot provide strong randomness. This
|
|
|
|
* implementation shall not be assumed to be secure as the sole source of
|
|
|
|
* randomness. The random_get_bytes() function mixes in randomness from
|
|
|
|
* os_get_random() and as such, calls to os_get_random() can be replaced with
|
|
|
|
* calls to random_get_bytes() without reducing security.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* The design here follows partially the design used in the Linux
|
|
|
|
* drivers/char/random.c, but the implementation here is simpler and not as
|
|
|
|
* strong. This is a compromise to reduce duplicated CPU effort and to avoid
|
|
|
|
* extra code/memory size. As pointed out above, os_get_random() needs to be
|
|
|
|
* guaranteed to be secure for any of the security assumptions to hold.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#include "utils/includes.h"
|
2010-11-24 06:08:03 -05:00
|
|
|
#ifdef __linux__
|
|
|
|
#include <fcntl.h>
|
|
|
|
#endif /* __linux__ */
|
Maintain internal entropy pool for augmenting random number generation
By default, make hostapd and wpa_supplicant maintain an internal
entropy pool that is fed with following information:
hostapd:
- Probe Request frames (timing, RSSI)
- Association events (timing)
- SNonce from Supplicants
wpa_supplicant:
- Scan results (timing, signal/noise)
- Association events (timing)
The internal pool is used to augment the random numbers generated
with the OS mechanism (os_get_random()). While the internal
implementation is not expected to be very strong due to limited
amount of generic (non-platform specific) information to feed the
pool, this may strengthen key derivation on some devices that are
not configured to provide strong random numbers through
os_get_random() (e.g., /dev/urandom on Linux/BSD).
This new mechanism is not supposed to replace proper OS provided
random number generation mechanism. The OS mechanism needs to be
initialized properly (e.g., hw random number generator,
maintaining entropy pool over reboots, etc.) for any of the
security assumptions to hold.
If the os_get_random() is known to provide strong ramdom data (e.g., on
Linux/BSD, the board in question is known to have reliable source of
random data from /dev/urandom), the internal hostapd random pool can be
disabled. This will save some in binary size and CPU use. However, this
should only be considered for builds that are known to be used on
devices that meet the requirements described above. The internal pool
is disabled by adding CONFIG_NO_RANDOM_POOL=y to the .config file.
2010-11-23 18:29:40 -05:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#include "utils/common.h"
|
2011-03-22 17:15:00 -04:00
|
|
|
#include "utils/eloop.h"
|
Maintain internal entropy pool for augmenting random number generation
By default, make hostapd and wpa_supplicant maintain an internal
entropy pool that is fed with following information:
hostapd:
- Probe Request frames (timing, RSSI)
- Association events (timing)
- SNonce from Supplicants
wpa_supplicant:
- Scan results (timing, signal/noise)
- Association events (timing)
The internal pool is used to augment the random numbers generated
with the OS mechanism (os_get_random()). While the internal
implementation is not expected to be very strong due to limited
amount of generic (non-platform specific) information to feed the
pool, this may strengthen key derivation on some devices that are
not configured to provide strong random numbers through
os_get_random() (e.g., /dev/urandom on Linux/BSD).
This new mechanism is not supposed to replace proper OS provided
random number generation mechanism. The OS mechanism needs to be
initialized properly (e.g., hw random number generator,
maintaining entropy pool over reboots, etc.) for any of the
security assumptions to hold.
If the os_get_random() is known to provide strong ramdom data (e.g., on
Linux/BSD, the board in question is known to have reliable source of
random data from /dev/urandom), the internal hostapd random pool can be
disabled. This will save some in binary size and CPU use. However, this
should only be considered for builds that are known to be used on
devices that meet the requirements described above. The internal pool
is disabled by adding CONFIG_NO_RANDOM_POOL=y to the .config file.
2010-11-23 18:29:40 -05:00
|
|
|
#include "sha1.h"
|
|
|
|
#include "random.h"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define POOL_WORDS 32
|
|
|
|
#define POOL_WORDS_MASK (POOL_WORDS - 1)
|
|
|
|
#define POOL_TAP1 26
|
|
|
|
#define POOL_TAP2 20
|
|
|
|
#define POOL_TAP3 14
|
|
|
|
#define POOL_TAP4 7
|
|
|
|
#define POOL_TAP5 1
|
|
|
|
#define EXTRACT_LEN 16
|
2010-11-24 06:08:03 -05:00
|
|
|
#define MIN_READY_MARK 2
|
Maintain internal entropy pool for augmenting random number generation
By default, make hostapd and wpa_supplicant maintain an internal
entropy pool that is fed with following information:
hostapd:
- Probe Request frames (timing, RSSI)
- Association events (timing)
- SNonce from Supplicants
wpa_supplicant:
- Scan results (timing, signal/noise)
- Association events (timing)
The internal pool is used to augment the random numbers generated
with the OS mechanism (os_get_random()). While the internal
implementation is not expected to be very strong due to limited
amount of generic (non-platform specific) information to feed the
pool, this may strengthen key derivation on some devices that are
not configured to provide strong random numbers through
os_get_random() (e.g., /dev/urandom on Linux/BSD).
This new mechanism is not supposed to replace proper OS provided
random number generation mechanism. The OS mechanism needs to be
initialized properly (e.g., hw random number generator,
maintaining entropy pool over reboots, etc.) for any of the
security assumptions to hold.
If the os_get_random() is known to provide strong ramdom data (e.g., on
Linux/BSD, the board in question is known to have reliable source of
random data from /dev/urandom), the internal hostapd random pool can be
disabled. This will save some in binary size and CPU use. However, this
should only be considered for builds that are known to be used on
devices that meet the requirements described above. The internal pool
is disabled by adding CONFIG_NO_RANDOM_POOL=y to the .config file.
2010-11-23 18:29:40 -05:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static u32 pool[POOL_WORDS];
|
|
|
|
static unsigned int input_rotate = 0;
|
|
|
|
static unsigned int pool_pos = 0;
|
2010-11-24 06:08:03 -05:00
|
|
|
static u8 dummy_key[20];
|
2010-12-14 10:10:39 -05:00
|
|
|
#ifdef __linux__
|
2010-11-24 06:08:03 -05:00
|
|
|
static size_t dummy_key_avail = 0;
|
2011-03-22 17:15:00 -04:00
|
|
|
static int random_fd = -1;
|
2010-12-14 10:10:39 -05:00
|
|
|
#endif /* __linux__ */
|
2010-11-24 06:08:03 -05:00
|
|
|
static unsigned int own_pool_ready = 0;
|
2011-05-31 13:07:11 -04:00
|
|
|
#define RANDOM_ENTROPY_SIZE 20
|
|
|
|
static char *random_entropy_file = NULL;
|
|
|
|
static int random_entropy_file_read = 0;
|
Maintain internal entropy pool for augmenting random number generation
By default, make hostapd and wpa_supplicant maintain an internal
entropy pool that is fed with following information:
hostapd:
- Probe Request frames (timing, RSSI)
- Association events (timing)
- SNonce from Supplicants
wpa_supplicant:
- Scan results (timing, signal/noise)
- Association events (timing)
The internal pool is used to augment the random numbers generated
with the OS mechanism (os_get_random()). While the internal
implementation is not expected to be very strong due to limited
amount of generic (non-platform specific) information to feed the
pool, this may strengthen key derivation on some devices that are
not configured to provide strong random numbers through
os_get_random() (e.g., /dev/urandom on Linux/BSD).
This new mechanism is not supposed to replace proper OS provided
random number generation mechanism. The OS mechanism needs to be
initialized properly (e.g., hw random number generator,
maintaining entropy pool over reboots, etc.) for any of the
security assumptions to hold.
If the os_get_random() is known to provide strong ramdom data (e.g., on
Linux/BSD, the board in question is known to have reliable source of
random data from /dev/urandom), the internal hostapd random pool can be
disabled. This will save some in binary size and CPU use. However, this
should only be considered for builds that are known to be used on
devices that meet the requirements described above. The internal pool
is disabled by adding CONFIG_NO_RANDOM_POOL=y to the .config file.
2010-11-23 18:29:40 -05:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define MIN_COLLECT_ENTROPY 1000
|
|
|
|
static unsigned int entropy = 0;
|
2010-11-24 06:08:03 -05:00
|
|
|
static unsigned int total_collected = 0;
|
Maintain internal entropy pool for augmenting random number generation
By default, make hostapd and wpa_supplicant maintain an internal
entropy pool that is fed with following information:
hostapd:
- Probe Request frames (timing, RSSI)
- Association events (timing)
- SNonce from Supplicants
wpa_supplicant:
- Scan results (timing, signal/noise)
- Association events (timing)
The internal pool is used to augment the random numbers generated
with the OS mechanism (os_get_random()). While the internal
implementation is not expected to be very strong due to limited
amount of generic (non-platform specific) information to feed the
pool, this may strengthen key derivation on some devices that are
not configured to provide strong random numbers through
os_get_random() (e.g., /dev/urandom on Linux/BSD).
This new mechanism is not supposed to replace proper OS provided
random number generation mechanism. The OS mechanism needs to be
initialized properly (e.g., hw random number generator,
maintaining entropy pool over reboots, etc.) for any of the
security assumptions to hold.
If the os_get_random() is known to provide strong ramdom data (e.g., on
Linux/BSD, the board in question is known to have reliable source of
random data from /dev/urandom), the internal hostapd random pool can be
disabled. This will save some in binary size and CPU use. However, this
should only be considered for builds that are known to be used on
devices that meet the requirements described above. The internal pool
is disabled by adding CONFIG_NO_RANDOM_POOL=y to the .config file.
2010-11-23 18:29:40 -05:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2011-05-31 13:07:11 -04:00
|
|
|
static void random_write_entropy(void);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Maintain internal entropy pool for augmenting random number generation
By default, make hostapd and wpa_supplicant maintain an internal
entropy pool that is fed with following information:
hostapd:
- Probe Request frames (timing, RSSI)
- Association events (timing)
- SNonce from Supplicants
wpa_supplicant:
- Scan results (timing, signal/noise)
- Association events (timing)
The internal pool is used to augment the random numbers generated
with the OS mechanism (os_get_random()). While the internal
implementation is not expected to be very strong due to limited
amount of generic (non-platform specific) information to feed the
pool, this may strengthen key derivation on some devices that are
not configured to provide strong random numbers through
os_get_random() (e.g., /dev/urandom on Linux/BSD).
This new mechanism is not supposed to replace proper OS provided
random number generation mechanism. The OS mechanism needs to be
initialized properly (e.g., hw random number generator,
maintaining entropy pool over reboots, etc.) for any of the
security assumptions to hold.
If the os_get_random() is known to provide strong ramdom data (e.g., on
Linux/BSD, the board in question is known to have reliable source of
random data from /dev/urandom), the internal hostapd random pool can be
disabled. This will save some in binary size and CPU use. However, this
should only be considered for builds that are known to be used on
devices that meet the requirements described above. The internal pool
is disabled by adding CONFIG_NO_RANDOM_POOL=y to the .config file.
2010-11-23 18:29:40 -05:00
|
|
|
static u32 __ROL32(u32 x, u32 y)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return (x << (y & 31)) | (x >> (32 - (y & 31)));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void random_mix_pool(const void *buf, size_t len)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
static const u32 twist[8] = {
|
|
|
|
0x00000000, 0x3b6e20c8, 0x76dc4190, 0x4db26158,
|
|
|
|
0xedb88320, 0xd6d6a3e8, 0x9b64c2b0, 0xa00ae278
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
const u8 *pos = buf;
|
|
|
|
u32 w;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_EXCESSIVE, "random_mix_pool", buf, len);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while (len--) {
|
|
|
|
w = __ROL32(*pos++, input_rotate & 31);
|
|
|
|
input_rotate += pool_pos ? 7 : 14;
|
|
|
|
pool_pos = (pool_pos - 1) & POOL_WORDS_MASK;
|
|
|
|
w ^= pool[pool_pos];
|
|
|
|
w ^= pool[(pool_pos + POOL_TAP1) & POOL_WORDS_MASK];
|
|
|
|
w ^= pool[(pool_pos + POOL_TAP2) & POOL_WORDS_MASK];
|
|
|
|
w ^= pool[(pool_pos + POOL_TAP3) & POOL_WORDS_MASK];
|
|
|
|
w ^= pool[(pool_pos + POOL_TAP4) & POOL_WORDS_MASK];
|
|
|
|
w ^= pool[(pool_pos + POOL_TAP5) & POOL_WORDS_MASK];
|
|
|
|
pool[pool_pos] = (w >> 3) ^ twist[w & 7];
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void random_extract(u8 *out)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unsigned int i;
|
|
|
|
u8 hash[SHA1_MAC_LEN];
|
|
|
|
u32 *hash_ptr;
|
|
|
|
u32 buf[POOL_WORDS / 2];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* First, add hash back to pool to make backtracking more difficult. */
|
|
|
|
hmac_sha1(dummy_key, sizeof(dummy_key), (const u8 *) pool,
|
|
|
|
sizeof(pool), hash);
|
|
|
|
random_mix_pool(hash, sizeof(hash));
|
|
|
|
/* Hash half the pool to extra data */
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < POOL_WORDS / 2; i++)
|
|
|
|
buf[i] = pool[(pool_pos - i) & POOL_WORDS_MASK];
|
|
|
|
hmac_sha1(dummy_key, sizeof(dummy_key), (const u8 *) buf,
|
|
|
|
sizeof(buf), hash);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Fold the hash to further reduce any potential output pattern.
|
|
|
|
* Though, compromise this to reduce CPU use for the most common output
|
|
|
|
* length (32) and return 16 bytes from instead of only half.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
hash_ptr = (u32 *) hash;
|
|
|
|
hash_ptr[0] ^= hash_ptr[4];
|
|
|
|
os_memcpy(out, hash, EXTRACT_LEN);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void random_add_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct os_time t;
|
|
|
|
static unsigned int count = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
count++;
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_MSGDUMP, "Add randomness: count=%u entropy=%u",
|
|
|
|
count, entropy);
|
|
|
|
if (entropy > MIN_COLLECT_ENTROPY && (count & 0x3ff) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* No need to add more entropy at this point, so save CPU and
|
|
|
|
* skip the update.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
os_get_time(&t);
|
|
|
|
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_EXCESSIVE, "random pool",
|
|
|
|
(const u8 *) pool, sizeof(pool));
|
|
|
|
random_mix_pool(&t, sizeof(t));
|
|
|
|
random_mix_pool(buf, len);
|
|
|
|
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_EXCESSIVE, "random pool",
|
|
|
|
(const u8 *) pool, sizeof(pool));
|
|
|
|
entropy++;
|
2010-11-24 06:08:03 -05:00
|
|
|
total_collected++;
|
Maintain internal entropy pool for augmenting random number generation
By default, make hostapd and wpa_supplicant maintain an internal
entropy pool that is fed with following information:
hostapd:
- Probe Request frames (timing, RSSI)
- Association events (timing)
- SNonce from Supplicants
wpa_supplicant:
- Scan results (timing, signal/noise)
- Association events (timing)
The internal pool is used to augment the random numbers generated
with the OS mechanism (os_get_random()). While the internal
implementation is not expected to be very strong due to limited
amount of generic (non-platform specific) information to feed the
pool, this may strengthen key derivation on some devices that are
not configured to provide strong random numbers through
os_get_random() (e.g., /dev/urandom on Linux/BSD).
This new mechanism is not supposed to replace proper OS provided
random number generation mechanism. The OS mechanism needs to be
initialized properly (e.g., hw random number generator,
maintaining entropy pool over reboots, etc.) for any of the
security assumptions to hold.
If the os_get_random() is known to provide strong ramdom data (e.g., on
Linux/BSD, the board in question is known to have reliable source of
random data from /dev/urandom), the internal hostapd random pool can be
disabled. This will save some in binary size and CPU use. However, this
should only be considered for builds that are known to be used on
devices that meet the requirements described above. The internal pool
is disabled by adding CONFIG_NO_RANDOM_POOL=y to the .config file.
2010-11-23 18:29:40 -05:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int random_get_bytes(void *buf, size_t len)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
u8 *bytes = buf;
|
|
|
|
size_t left;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_MSGDUMP, "Get randomness: len=%u entropy=%u",
|
|
|
|
(unsigned int) len, entropy);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Start with assumed strong randomness from OS */
|
|
|
|
ret = os_get_random(buf, len);
|
|
|
|
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_EXCESSIVE, "random from os_get_random",
|
|
|
|
buf, len);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Mix in additional entropy extracted from the internal pool */
|
|
|
|
left = len;
|
|
|
|
while (left) {
|
|
|
|
size_t siz, i;
|
|
|
|
u8 tmp[EXTRACT_LEN];
|
|
|
|
random_extract(tmp);
|
|
|
|
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_EXCESSIVE, "random from internal pool",
|
|
|
|
tmp, sizeof(tmp));
|
|
|
|
siz = left > EXTRACT_LEN ? EXTRACT_LEN : left;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < siz; i++)
|
|
|
|
*bytes++ ^= tmp[i];
|
|
|
|
left -= siz;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_EXCESSIVE, "mixed random", buf, len);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (entropy < len)
|
|
|
|
entropy = 0;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
entropy -= len;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2010-11-24 06:08:03 -05:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int random_pool_ready(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
#ifdef __linux__
|
|
|
|
int fd;
|
|
|
|
ssize_t res;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Make sure that there is reasonable entropy available before allowing
|
|
|
|
* some key derivation operations to proceed.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (dummy_key_avail == sizeof(dummy_key))
|
|
|
|
return 1; /* Already initialized - good to continue */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Try to fetch some more data from the kernel high quality
|
|
|
|
* /dev/random. There may not be enough data available at this point,
|
|
|
|
* so use non-blocking read to avoid blocking the application
|
|
|
|
* completely.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
fd = open("/dev/random", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
|
|
|
|
if (fd < 0) {
|
2010-11-25 16:32:17 -05:00
|
|
|
#ifndef CONFIG_NO_STDOUT_DEBUG
|
2010-11-24 06:08:03 -05:00
|
|
|
int error = errno;
|
|
|
|
perror("open(/dev/random)");
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "random: Cannot open /dev/random: %s",
|
|
|
|
strerror(error));
|
2010-11-25 16:32:17 -05:00
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_NO_STDOUT_DEBUG */
|
2010-11-24 06:08:03 -05:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
res = read(fd, dummy_key + dummy_key_avail,
|
|
|
|
sizeof(dummy_key) - dummy_key_avail);
|
|
|
|
if (res < 0) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "random: Cannot read from /dev/random: "
|
|
|
|
"%s", strerror(errno));
|
|
|
|
res = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "random: Got %u/%u bytes from "
|
|
|
|
"/dev/random", (unsigned) res,
|
|
|
|
(unsigned) (sizeof(dummy_key) - dummy_key_avail));
|
|
|
|
dummy_key_avail += res;
|
|
|
|
close(fd);
|
|
|
|
|
2011-05-31 13:07:11 -04:00
|
|
|
if (dummy_key_avail == sizeof(dummy_key)) {
|
|
|
|
if (own_pool_ready < MIN_READY_MARK)
|
|
|
|
own_pool_ready = MIN_READY_MARK;
|
|
|
|
random_write_entropy();
|
2010-11-24 06:08:03 -05:00
|
|
|
return 1;
|
2011-05-31 13:07:11 -04:00
|
|
|
}
|
2010-11-24 06:08:03 -05:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "random: Only %u/%u bytes of strong "
|
|
|
|
"random data available from /dev/random",
|
|
|
|
(unsigned) dummy_key_avail, (unsigned) sizeof(dummy_key));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (own_pool_ready >= MIN_READY_MARK ||
|
|
|
|
total_collected + 10 * own_pool_ready > MIN_COLLECT_ENTROPY) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "random: Allow operation to proceed "
|
|
|
|
"based on internal entropy");
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "random: Not enough entropy pool available for "
|
|
|
|
"secure operations");
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
#else /* __linux__ */
|
|
|
|
/* TODO: could do similar checks on non-Linux platforms */
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
#endif /* __linux__ */
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void random_mark_pool_ready(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
own_pool_ready++;
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "random: Mark internal entropy pool to be "
|
|
|
|
"ready (count=%u/%u)", own_pool_ready, MIN_READY_MARK);
|
2011-05-31 13:07:11 -04:00
|
|
|
random_write_entropy();
|
2010-11-24 06:08:03 -05:00
|
|
|
}
|
2011-03-22 17:15:00 -04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef __linux__
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void random_close_fd(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (random_fd >= 0) {
|
|
|
|
eloop_unregister_read_sock(random_fd);
|
|
|
|
close(random_fd);
|
|
|
|
random_fd = -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void random_read_fd(int sock, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ssize_t res;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (dummy_key_avail == sizeof(dummy_key)) {
|
|
|
|
random_close_fd();
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
res = read(sock, dummy_key + dummy_key_avail,
|
|
|
|
sizeof(dummy_key) - dummy_key_avail);
|
|
|
|
if (res < 0) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "random: Cannot read from /dev/random: "
|
|
|
|
"%s", strerror(errno));
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "random: Got %u/%u bytes from /dev/random",
|
|
|
|
(unsigned) res,
|
|
|
|
(unsigned) (sizeof(dummy_key) - dummy_key_avail));
|
|
|
|
dummy_key_avail += res;
|
|
|
|
|
2011-05-31 13:07:11 -04:00
|
|
|
if (dummy_key_avail == sizeof(dummy_key)) {
|
2011-03-22 17:15:00 -04:00
|
|
|
random_close_fd();
|
2011-05-31 13:07:11 -04:00
|
|
|
if (own_pool_ready < MIN_READY_MARK)
|
|
|
|
own_pool_ready = MIN_READY_MARK;
|
|
|
|
random_write_entropy();
|
|
|
|
}
|
2011-03-22 17:15:00 -04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#endif /* __linux__ */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2011-05-31 13:07:11 -04:00
|
|
|
static void random_read_entropy(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
char *buf;
|
|
|
|
size_t len;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!random_entropy_file)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
buf = os_readfile(random_entropy_file, &len);
|
|
|
|
if (buf == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return; /* entropy file not yet available */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (len != 1 + RANDOM_ENTROPY_SIZE) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "random: Invalid entropy file %s",
|
|
|
|
random_entropy_file);
|
|
|
|
os_free(buf);
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
own_pool_ready = (u8) buf[0];
|
|
|
|
random_add_randomness(buf + 1, RANDOM_ENTROPY_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
random_entropy_file_read = 1;
|
|
|
|
os_free(buf);
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "random: Added entropy from %s "
|
|
|
|
"(own_pool_ready=%u)",
|
|
|
|
random_entropy_file, own_pool_ready);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void random_write_entropy(void)
|
2011-03-22 17:15:00 -04:00
|
|
|
{
|
2011-05-31 13:07:11 -04:00
|
|
|
char buf[RANDOM_ENTROPY_SIZE];
|
|
|
|
FILE *f;
|
|
|
|
u8 opr;
|
2011-08-06 14:16:31 -04:00
|
|
|
int fail = 0;
|
2011-05-31 13:07:11 -04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!random_entropy_file)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
2011-07-15 10:17:48 -04:00
|
|
|
if (random_get_bytes(buf, RANDOM_ENTROPY_SIZE) < 0)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
2011-05-31 13:07:11 -04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
f = fopen(random_entropy_file, "wb");
|
|
|
|
if (f == NULL) {
|
2011-10-30 15:50:22 -04:00
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "random: Could not open entropy file %s "
|
|
|
|
"for writing", random_entropy_file);
|
2011-05-31 13:07:11 -04:00
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
opr = own_pool_ready > 0xff ? 0xff : own_pool_ready;
|
2011-08-06 14:16:31 -04:00
|
|
|
if (fwrite(&opr, 1, 1, f) != 1 ||
|
|
|
|
fwrite(buf, RANDOM_ENTROPY_SIZE, 1, f) != 1)
|
|
|
|
fail = 1;
|
2011-05-31 13:07:11 -04:00
|
|
|
fclose(f);
|
2011-08-06 14:16:31 -04:00
|
|
|
if (fail) {
|
2011-10-30 15:50:22 -04:00
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "random: Could not write entropy data "
|
|
|
|
"to %s", random_entropy_file);
|
2011-08-06 14:16:31 -04:00
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2011-05-31 13:07:11 -04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "random: Updated entropy file %s "
|
|
|
|
"(own_pool_ready=%u)",
|
|
|
|
random_entropy_file, own_pool_ready);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void random_init(const char *entropy_file)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
os_free(random_entropy_file);
|
|
|
|
if (entropy_file)
|
|
|
|
random_entropy_file = os_strdup(entropy_file);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
random_entropy_file = NULL;
|
|
|
|
random_read_entropy();
|
|
|
|
|
2011-03-22 17:15:00 -04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef __linux__
|
|
|
|
if (random_fd >= 0)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
random_fd = open("/dev/random", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
|
|
|
|
if (random_fd < 0) {
|
|
|
|
#ifndef CONFIG_NO_STDOUT_DEBUG
|
|
|
|
int error = errno;
|
|
|
|
perror("open(/dev/random)");
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "random: Cannot open /dev/random: %s",
|
|
|
|
strerror(error));
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_NO_STDOUT_DEBUG */
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "random: Trying to read entropy from "
|
|
|
|
"/dev/random");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
eloop_register_read_sock(random_fd, random_read_fd, NULL, NULL);
|
|
|
|
#endif /* __linux__ */
|
2011-05-31 13:07:11 -04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
random_write_entropy();
|
2011-03-22 17:15:00 -04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void random_deinit(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
#ifdef __linux__
|
|
|
|
random_close_fd();
|
|
|
|
#endif /* __linux__ */
|
2011-05-31 13:07:11 -04:00
|
|
|
random_write_entropy();
|
|
|
|
os_free(random_entropy_file);
|
|
|
|
random_entropy_file = NULL;
|
2011-03-22 17:15:00 -04:00
|
|
|
}
|